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EDITORIAL
“Words, once they are printed, have a life of their own.” So said Mark 
Twain. He could not have been more adept while describing the pro-
cess of writing and as to how imperative it is for everyone to imbibe 
the culture of writing. With the same goal in mind and commitment to 
such thoughts, the Student Journal Society of Amity Law School, Delhi 
comes up with the inaugural edition of its bi-annual student-edited, 
peer-reviewed law journal titled “ALSD STUDENT JOURNAL”. The 
journal aims to cater to the needs of the legal fraternity by providing 
inter-disciplinary knowledge on legal issues. 
When we decided to traverse this path of legal writing and introduce a 
new tradition in the college (foundations of which had already been laid 
down firmly by our distinguished alumni), all that occupied our mind 
space was to take this journal to every law student of the country, reach 
out to those whose voices had yet not been heard by the top echelons of 
the legal community and encourage those people to indulge in the craft 
of writing who had long forgotten its significance. Apprehensive yet 
with a steely resolve, as we got down to work out the nitty-gritty’s of a 
venture so ambitious and yet so achievable, we stood largely humbled 
with the response that we got. Not taking away anything from the fact 
that we were resolute in our stand of making this project a huge suc-
cess, the feelings of uncertainty, indecision and ambiguity struck all 
of us at one point or the other. Questions like ‘Will we able to pull it 
off?’, ‘Will there be enough contributors?’, ‘Will people even revert to 
our Call for Papers?’ and so on plagued us for days together. All these 
moments of insecurity stood behind us till the time we didn’t receive 
our first submission. From there on, it’s been a barrage of mails which 
have, at times (owing to our tight calendar) been difficult to manage. 
Contributions to the journal have poured in from far and wide; most of 
them showcasing stellar pieces of legal acumen, and continue to do so; 
so much so that we already have a bank of articles which are in serious 
consideration for publication in our next issue. 
Being only the inaugural issue, calls for a momentous celebration shall 
be deemed premature. Yet as we sit down to ponder as to what worked 
for us, despite the countless hurdles which lay in our path, is the fact 
that we were flexible in our approach. So even when we had a theme 
for this issue, “Public International Law”, as you flip through the pag-
es, you’ll notice we’ve not limited our published articles to this theme 
alone. There were write ups on Taxation Laws, Environmental Law, 
and Cyber Law etc. which find a place in the ALSD STUDENT LAW 
JOURNAL. The logic behind this was simple. Not to let a meritorious 
v
piece of work to squander away merely because it didn’t adhere to 
our theme. The motto behind initiating such a venture was to chip in, 
in our own unassuming ways, to the concept of legal writing and to 
promote it in a way most suited to law students and professionals in 
the field of law i.e. publications. Publications which will be accessed by 
the legal world at large and whereby their work will be made available 
to everybody who wishes to do an in-depth study on any given topic. 
Hence, even when we were editing the articles, the thought of having a 
restricted lot of write-ups never crossed our minds for we intended to 
accord space to the most earnest and legally sound piece of work. We 
sincerely hope we’ve lived up to that promise. 
The journal which you hold forth in your hands is a product of count-
less meetings, brainstorming and hours of deliberations put together. 
We may not have created perfection but we’ve tried to come close. Ours 
being a maiden attempt, we’ve been lucky enough to be welcomed 
with a more than warm approach by the legal fraternity and we look 
forward to their continued support in the near future too, for all our 
endeavours.  We’d also like to extend our kind gratitude to our Insti-
tutional Head, Prof. M.K. Balachandran without whose guidance this 
initiative would have simply remained a dream. The journey has just 
begun. There are miles to be covered before we count ourselves among 
the premier journals of the country. However, going by the commit-
ment and response, we like to believe that day doesn’t seem very far 
away into the horizon.
Warm regards
THE EDITORIAL BOARD
ALSD STUDENT JOURNAL
vi
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1. For the European Union, see Treaty of the European Union arts. 7, 8 & 49, 
Mar. 30, 2010, O.J. C 83/13, and Conclusions of the European Council in 
Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1933, Doc/93/3; for the Organization of American 
States, see Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 3(d) & 9, 
Dec. 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
2. See European Coauncil Regulation 1999/976 art. 7, 1999 O.J. (L 120) 42 (EC).
3. Carlos Santiso, Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and 
Conditionality, 7 Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 1 (2001).
4. Treaty of the European Union, supra note 1, arts. 3 & 2; Constitutive Act of 
the African Union art. 3(g), July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (2001); 
Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 1, art. 2(b); Treaty 
of the Southern African Development Community art. 5, July 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 116 (1993); Treaty of Economic Community of West African States art. 
4, July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996). 
5. The legality of the use of force to spread democracy as an element of 
foreign policy has been referred to as the “Bush Doctrine”. Robert Jervis, 
Understanding the Bush Doctrine, 118 Pol. Sci. Q. 365, (2003); Jonathan 
Monten, The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy 
Democracy anD Human rigHts: 
a complex relationsHip
Cécile Vandewoude*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The importance of democracy in international law is increasing 
rapidly. Democracy is for instance used as a membership 
requirement by various organizations1 and as a prerequisite 
for obtaining international financial support2 or humanitarian 
aid.3 The promotion, consolidation, defense or maintenance of 
democracy is also listed as a goal or fundamental principle of 
several regional and international organizations4. Even wars are 
currently being fought allegedly in the name of “the promotion 
and the spread of democracy.”5 
However,  in international  law there does not exist  a 
universally accepted definition of democracy. Regardless, there 
does appear to exist an international consensus on the existence 
of an indissoluble link between human rights and democracy. 
However, the exact nature of that link is unclear. It is the purpose 
of this article to explore the nature of the nexus between human 
rights and democracy.  
Part  one wil l  examine how democracy is  def ined in 
1
2Promotion in U.S. Strategy, 29 int’l. Security 112 (2005).
6. BeRnaRd CRick, democRacy: a veRy ShoRt intRoduction (2002); Ian ShaPiRo 
and JoSé Antonio Cheibub RobeRt Dahl, the democRacy SouRcebook (2003).
7. Kenneth GRaham, The Role of Regional Organizations in Promoting Democracy, 
background paper #7 to the Sixth International Conference of New and Restored 
Democracies, www.icnrd.com (2006).
8. maRc coGen, the comPRehenSive Guide to inteRnational law 169-170 (2008); 
Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Democratie en Internationaal Recht, in Recht 
en democRatie: de democRatiSche veRbeeldinG in het Recht 575 (Maurice 
Adams & Patricia Populier eds., 2004); Jan Wouters et al., Democracy and 
International Law, 1 N.Y.I.L. 137 (2003).
9. Samuel HuntinGton, the thiRd wave: democRatization in the late twentieth 
centuRy (1993).
international law and what methods can be used to do so. Part 
two will then focus on the nature of the link between democracy 
and human rights. 
II.  DEFINING DEMOCRACY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Democracy a recent phenomenon 
Contrary to other political theories such as communism, 
democracy does not have a(ny) founding father(s). Consequently 
democracy’s scope and meaning has not been developed by 
a limited number of people during a limited period of time. 
Conversely, democracy is a very old concept that can be traced 
back to ancient Greece. Etymologically the word is derived 
from the Greek “äçìïò” and “êñáôåéí” which means respectively 
“people” and “power”. Throughout its long history, the concept 
has had several different meanings, some of which would be 
considered contrary to today’s interpretation.6 Its current meaning 
is the result of a century long evolution.7 
Regardless of this long and rich history, democracy in 
international law is a recent phenomenon. It was only after 
the Cold War that international law dared to address the 
issue of democracy which previously was considered to be 
a “domestic” issue and thus one not subject to international 
scrutiny.8 In the literature this “shift” is explained by the events 
of 1989-1991 which led to the embrace of democracy in many 
countries, primarily in Eastern Europe. The “Third Wave of 
Democratization”, to use Samuel Huntington’s term,9 led many 
310. See for instance Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 
86 am. J. int’l l. 46 (1992); Henry Steiner, Political Participation as a Human 
Right, 1 haRv. hum. RtS. J. 77 (1988); Gregory Fox, The Right to Political 
Participation in International Law, 17 yale J. int’l. l. 539 (1992); Reginald 
Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry, 22 bRook J. int’l l. 495 
(1996-1997).
11. See references below. For more background information see Nsongurua 
Udombana, Articulating the right to Democratic Governance in Africa, 24 mich. 
J. int’l. l. 1209 (2002-2003); Dexter Boniface, Is there a Democratic Norm in 
the Americas? An Analysis of the Organization of American States, 8 Global 
Governance 365 (2002); Richard Burchill, The Promotion and Protection of 
Democracy by Regional Organizations in Europe: the Case of Austria, 7 euR. Pub. 
l. 79 (2001); Christopher Joyner, The United Nations and Democracy, 5 Global 
Governance 333 (1999).
12. Susan Marks, The “Emerging Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic Governance”, 
91 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. PRoc. 372 (1997).
13. Id. For more background information on the different perceptions on 
democracy and human rights see for instance Yash Ghai, Human Rights and 
Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 auSt. Y.B.I.L. 1 (1994); Larbi Sadaki, Al-la 
Nidam: An Arab View of the New World (Dis)Order, 17 aRab Stud. Q. 1 (1995).
scholars10, states and international organizations11 to think about 
the idea of democracy as a legal principle. Despite the increased 
attention for the issue there does not exist a universally accepted 
definition of democracy.
Possible methods to define democracy in international law
Defining democracy in international law is extremely difficult. 
Amongst legal scholars, disagreement even exists on whether the 
concept of democracy can überhaupt be defined in a way that is 
universally acceptable. Some authors claim that democracy is “the 
archetype of an essentially contested concept.”12 “As it means different 
things to different people” they argue that “any attempts to define the 
concept would be meaningless at best and imperialistic at worst.”13 
In international law the feasibility of defining democracy 
appears to be accepted. In the practice of states as exercised within 
a significant number of regional and international organizations 
the issue has never been discussed. Similarly, human rights bodies 
when interpreting the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” 
have never questioned the possibility of defining democracy. 
Finally, in the writings of legal scholars the issue barely has 
come up. The focus of the definition debate is not on whether the 
concept can be defined, but how it should be defined? The latter 
question will be addressed next.
414. All four methods are described in David Bentham, DefininG and meaSuRinG 
democRacy 36 (1994).
15. Id. at 6-7.
16. Id. at 6-7.
17. “Absolute democracy (…) which no society embodies totally” Thomas Franck, The 
Democratic Entitlement, 29 u. Rich. l. Rev. 1, 4 (1994-1995). See also art. 2 of 
the Universal Declaration on Democracy, Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997) 
which refers to democracy as “a constantly perfected and perfectible state or 
condition whose progress will depend upon a variety of political, social, economic 
and cultural factors.”
18. Such a method was used for instance in Crick, supra note 6; Dahl, supra note 
6.
From a theoretical standpoint, several methods can be used 
to define democracy. Within the writings of political scientists 
comprehensive descriptions can be found of possible methods, 
some of which will serve as a useful theoretical framework for 
the discussion here.14  The fact that the methods are proposed 
by political scientists and not by international layers is of minor 
importance here as these methods suggest a general methodology 
which easily can be applied to other fields of research including 
the area of law. Moreover, as will be illustrated, in international 
law some examples can be found of concrete implementations 
of these methods. It should be noted that none of the methods 
suggested is flawless, which is recognized in the literature.15 
The first possible approach would be to look at nations 
generally referred to as democracies and define the concept 
according to certain features of those systems. Such an approach 
would not be useful as it is considered to be illogical to define 
democracy by induction from the practice of one political system. 
It would be no longer possible to praise that country for being 
democratic as a society cannot be praised for qualities which 
belong to it by definition rather than by political contrivance.16 In 
addition, it is recognized that a definition of democracy does not 
necessarily have to refer to a particular society past or present as 
democracy will always be “aspirational” to some extent.17 
A second possible method would be to define democracy 
based on an historical analysis.18 As mentioned above the current 
political and sociological meaning of democracy is the result of 
a centuries long evolution, however democracy in international 
is a recent phenomenon. As the start of the legal debate on 
democracy can be traced to the end of the Cold War, the historical 
period which can be examined is limited to a period of 20 years, 
519. Cécile Vandewoude, Book Review: Democracy and International Law (by Richard 
Burchill) 19 euR. J. int’l. l. 234 (2008). 
20. The Jasmine Revolution is an intensive campaign of civil unrest and 
demonstrations against non-democratic governments. The revolution started 
in December 2010 in Tunisia and led there to the ousting of President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. The revolution in Tunisia has spread to other 
Arab countries, including Egypt where President Hosni Mubarak was forced 
to step down and Libya where a full-scale rebellion has broken out. Protests 
have also taken place in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain and Mauritania.
21. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) art. 50, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
22. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid arts. 1 & 2, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. It should be 
noted that “Western” nations have never signed nor ratified this Convention. 
However, the crime of Apartheid has been endorsed - albeit in a weaker 
form – in other instruments for instance in the Geneva Convention Protocol 
I, supra note 22, art. 85, para. 4(c); Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind art. 18(f), July 17, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, 
corr.1, corr.3 (1996), which does not mention the word “Apartheid” but 
refers to “institutionalized racial discrimination” as species of crime against 
humanity and article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 7, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
23. Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: 
The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 am. J. int’l. l. 1 (1968).
24. The Nazi-regime was called by the Nuremberg tribunal a “complete 
dictatorship”, inteRnational militaRy tRibunal, nuRembeRG, tRial of the 
maJoR waR cRiminalS befoRe the inteRnational militaRy tRibunal (1945 
-1946).
25. Cécile Vandewoude, The Rise of Self-Determination versus the Rise of Democracy, 
2 (3) GO. J. I. L. 981, 985 (2010).
which is relatively short. It is undisputed that the events of 1989-
1990 constituted a breach with the past in international law in 
particular with regard to the concepts of state sovereignty and 
human rights. However, since the beginning of the nineties the 
discussion on democracy does not appear to have progressed 
significantly.19 Consequently, to this date no historical evolution 
may be said to have taken place with regard to democracy’s legal 
meaning, not taken into account the possible consequences of the 
still ongoing “Jasmine Revolution”.20 
A third possible method would be to define democracy 
negatively i.e. stating what democracy is not. Such an approach 
has also been used before in international law for instance the 
concept “civilians” in international humanitarian law is defined 
negatively and could be used here.21 In international law an 
international consensus exists on the fact an “Apartheid regime” 
as applied in South Africa22 and in South-Rhodesia23” and a 
626. Gerhard Van Der Schyff, Het Concept Democratie in het EVRM, in Recht en 
democRatie: de democRatiSche veRbeeldinG in het Recht 563 (Maurice Adams 
and Patricia Populier ed., 2004).
27. Bentham., supra note 14, at 6-7.
28. Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 
haRv. int’l. l. J. 387, 396-401 (2003).; MaRkS., supra note 12, at 372-373.
“Nazi regime”24 are non-democratic.25 One could therefore define 
democracy as a form of governance that does not constitute 
a regime of Apartheid and/or Nazi regime. Such a method is 
deemed to be useful in human rights law it has been argued 
that examining the limits of a certain concept does provide a 
better insight into its meaning.26 However, defining democracy 
negatively would lead to an open-ended definition giving leeway 
to more discussion and would not provide better insights in what 
a democracy is. 
A fourth method would be to define democracy according to 
certain basic principles.27 The latter method is used in international 
law and will therefore be withheld in this paper.  
Defining democracy in international law is defining democracy 
in function of its constituent elements: a minimalistic versus a 
comprehensive approach
In international law, a multitude of circumscriptions of 
democracy can be found. The majority of them appear in policy 
documents adopted within various international organizations 
and in the writings of scholars. All of them define democracy 
in function of its constituent elements. The list of constituent 
elements tends to differ in all definitions.
In an effort to identify democracy’s core elements, generally 
two approaches can be discerned within the literature: a 
minimalistic or formal approach and a comprehensive or 
substantive approach.28 Proponents of the former consider 
democracy to be a way to legitimize governments and a 
government is considered to be legitimate when it is representative 
and participatory. This approach is called “formal” as democracy 
is considered to be a method to producing governments through 
the mechanism of free and fair elections, while respecting certain 
human rights mainly reference is made to freedom of expression, 
assembly and association.  This approach is called minimalistic 
as it considers democracy to be “merely” the sum of various 
elements such as respect for human rights, respect for the rule of 
729. Dianne Otto, Challenging the “New World Order”: International Law, Global 
Democracy and the Possibilities for Women, 3 tRanSnat’l & contemP. PRobS. 371 
(1993).
30. Beutz., supra note 29, at 396.
31. James Crawford, Democracy and the Body of International Law, in democRatic 
GoveRnance and inteRnational law (Gregory Fox & Brad Roth ed., 2000).
32. Beutz., supra note 29, at 396.
33. FRanck, .supra note 10, at 52.
34. Ezetah., supra note 10, at 514-523.
35. Steven Weatley, Democracy and International Law: A European Perspective, 51 
int’l & comP. l. Q. 225, 235-246 (2002).
36. See for instance SteineR., supra note 10, at 96-116; Fox., supra note 10, at 540-
542 ; Christina Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the 
Pipe Dream of the West, 27 N.Y.U. J. int’l. & Pol. 289, 295 (1994-1995).
law, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary etc. 
Advocators of the substantive approach consider democracy to 
be a form of self-government i.e. a form of government allowing 
the people to influence all decisions directly affecting them. This 
requires a more comprehensive approach to democracy as other 
elements such as the role of civil society, feminist perspectives29, 
accountability mechanisms30 and the democratic nature of 
international decision-making mechanisms31 should be taken into 
account. Here democracy is considered to be “more” than just the 
sum of various elements. The meaning of democracy can only be 
fully grasped when democracy is placed in a broader context. The 
nexus between these various elements is considered to be essential 
to the concept. Both approaches are closely connected and cannot 
be strictly separated from each other.32 
Research shows that the majority of legal scholars –for 
whatever reason- tends to favor a minimalistic approach. For 
instance Thomas Franck argues that the legitimacy of governments 
will be judged by the international community and this according 
to an international accepted democracy standard comprising of 
the right to self-determination, the right to free and fair elections 
and freedom of expression.33 Reginald Ezetah limits the content 
of the “right to democracy” to the right to political participation 
including the right to free and fair elections.34 Steven Weatley 
defines the right to democratic governance in function of the 
right to political participation including the right to free and fair 
elections, the right to freedom of association, and the right to 
837. G.A. Res. 62/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/7 (Dec. 13, 2007).
38. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2003/36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.36 
(April 23, 2003).
39. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/41 
(Mar. 21, 2001).
40. See for instance Bamako Declaration, Organisation Internationale de la 
Francophonie ¶ 2, Nov. 3, 2000; Organization of African Union, Lomé 
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government ¶ 8, July 10-12, 2000, AHG/Decl. 5(XXXVI).
41. David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention, 19 houS. 
J. int’l. l. 659 (1996-1997).
freedom of expression.35 The same elements are withheld as core 
elements in definitions proclaimed by other authors.36 
Conversely, within the practice of international organizations 
a holistic approach seems to be preferred. Within the context 
of the UN for instance democracy is defined as “a universal 
value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their 
own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full 
participation in all aspects of their lives.”37 In addition the former UN 
Commission of Human Rights recognized “the comprehensive 
nature of democracy as a system of governance that encompasses 
procedures and substance, formal institutions and informal 
processes, majorities and minorities, mechanisms and mentalities, 
laws and their enforcement, government and civil society.”38 It 
also reaffirmed “that free and fair elections are an essential feature 
of democracy and must be part of a broader process that strengthens 
democratic principles, values, institutions, mechanisms and practices 
which underpin formal democratic structures and the rule of law.”39 A 
similar comprehensive approach is echoed within texts adopted 
by other international organizations.40
The difference in approach may be explained by the fact that 
scholars are looking for specific criteria to determine whether 
a nation is democratic or are examining whether a right to 
democracy can or does exist in international law. Such research 
requires a detailed and specific definition of democracy. States, 
however, merely want to express their commitment to democracy 
in general. The documents in which they do so are generally 
political in nature the goal of which is not to create on any 
concrete obligations (see below). It has been correctly argued in 
the literature that these texts could only have been adopted by 
consensus due to the fact that they are written in such a general 
942. Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship, 
36 Geo. J. int’l. l. 809, 817 (2004-2005).
43. Lomé Declaration, supra note 41.
44. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter arts. 2 
& 3, Sept. 11, 2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.1 (2001).
45. European Union, Cotonou Agreement art. 9, June 7, 2003, O.J. (L 141).
46. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe ¶ 3, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991).
47. Bamako Declaration, supra note 41. 
48. The Commonwealth, Millbrook Commonwealth Action Program on the 
Harare Declaration ¶ 1, Nov. 12, 1995, (1997) commonwealth Y.B 51. 
49. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration 
and Program of Action, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993); G.A. 
Res. 61/226, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/226 (Mar. 14, 2007); G.A. Res. 60/253, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/253 (May 24, 2006); G.A. Res. 58/13, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/58/13 (Nov. 24, 2003); G.A. Res. 56/96 , U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/96 
(Jan. 30, 2002); G.A. Res. 55/43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/43 (Jan. 18, 2001); 
G.A. Res. 52/18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/18 (Mar. 2, 1998); Commission on 
Human Rights Res. 2002/46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/46 (Jan. 23, 2002); 
Commission on Human Rights Res. 47, U.N. ESCOR, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
manner41 and that the consensus would break down once one 
moves beyond the general discussions to the difficult issues of 
how democracy and human rights are to be interpreted and how 
they should be implemented or promoted.42 
In conclusion, currently, there does not exist a universal 
consensus on one particular definition of democracy. However 
when looking at the vast array of definitions it becomes clear 
that one element appears to be present in all definitions, namely 
the respect for human rights. Minimalistic approaches tend to 
focus on specific rights whereas holistic approaches stress the 
indissoluble link between democracy and human rights. The 
existence of some sort of link does not appear to be controversial 
or questioned, however the exact nature of the link is unclear. 
The following section will take a closer look at the nature of the 
connection between democracy and human rights. 
III. THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
International consensus on the existence of a link between 
human rights and democracy
Without clarifying the concepts of democracy and human 
rights their interdependence has been recognized by many 
international and regional organizations inter alia the African 
10
E/2000/47 (2000); Commission on Human Rights Res. 2003/36, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/L.36 (April 23, 2003); Commission on Human Rights Res. 
2001/41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/41 (Mar. 21, 2001).
50. Universal Declaration on Democracy, supra note 17, at ¶ 3. 
51. Community of Democracies, Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of 
Democracies ¶ 3, June, 27, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1306 (2000). 
52. The Inter-Governmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights 
and the Role of the International Criminal Court, Sana’s Declaration on 
Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court 
¶ d, Jan 10-12, 2004.
53. World Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok, Report of the Regional Meeting 
for Asia, ¶ 10 & ¶17-20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/
PC/59 (April 7, 1993).
54. PeeRenboom., supra note 43, at 817.
55. PeeRenboom., supra note 43, at 817.
56. Christian Berger, OSCE and International Law, 24 int’l. J. leGal info 36, 38 
(1996).
57. The constituent elements of a rule of customary international law are 
described in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany/Denmark and 
Germany/The Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 4 ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
Union43, the Organization of American States44, the European 
Union45, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe46, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie47, the 
Commonwealth48, the United Nations49, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union50, the Community of Democracies51 and by various Arab52 
and Asian53 states. 
As practically all nations are represented in one of these 
institutions, it may be concluded that there is an international 
consensus on the existence of a link between human rights and 
democracy. 
The significance and scope of the universal recognition of a 
link between democracy and human rights should be put into 
perspective. Firstly, the meaning and scope of both terms is and 
remains controversial. One may not derive from the above that 
an international consensus is emerging on the content or scope 
of these two terms.54 In addition as the nature of that link is not 
specified it also cannot be derived that a consensus exists on the 
nature of that link.55
Secondly, the existence of the link is recognized mainly in 
policy documents generally conceived not to be legally binding 
upon the participating states. However, it has convincingly been 
argued that the qualification of a policy document does not 
necessarily mean that it does not contain any legally binding 
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norms as such documents may contain clauses stemming from 
international law, referring to international law or can be traced 
to international agreements by which the participating states are 
legally bound.56 Rules contained in such documents can under 
certain conditions evolve to rules of customary international law.57 
The qualification as policy document does however influence 
the enforcement possibilities.58 It is noteworthy that the few 
documents which are legally binding are regional in nature. This 
can be explained by the fact that a regional consensus exists or 
can easier be achieved on the content of human rights.
The nature of the nexus between human rights and democracy
The references to the existence of a link between democracy 
and human rights can be divided into two groups. The first 
one considers respect for human rights to be a prerequisite for 
democracy, or the other way around. The second proclaims that 
democracy and human rights are interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing. The following section will examine the difference 
between these two approaches and its consequences and possible 
significance?
Respect for human rights is often perceived to be a prerequisite 
for democracy or vice versa namely that democracy constitutes a 
prerequisite for the respect of human rights. For instance the 
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
1966, for instance, state “the expression “in a democratic society” shall 
be interpreted as imposing a further restriction on the limitation clauses 
it qualifies. The burden is upon a state imposing limitations so qualified 
to demonstrate that the limitations do not impair the democratic 
functioning of the society. While there is no single model of a democratic 
society, a society which recognizes and respects the human rights set 
forth in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights may be viewed as meeting this definition”.59 Other texts 
58. BeRGeR., supra note 57, at 42-43; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of 
Non-Binding International Agreements, 71 am. J. int’l. l. 296, 300 (1977).; 
Thomas Buergenthal, The CSCE Rights System, 25 Geo. waSh. J. int’l. & econ. 
333, 375-381 (1991-1992). 
59. United Nations Economic and Security Council, Siracusa Principles on the 
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights ¶¶ 19-21, Sept. 28, 1984, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4.
60. See for instance G.A. Res. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000), at 1 and 
CeRna., supra note 37, at 295.
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reverse the order and consider democracy to a be a prerequisite 
for respecting human rights insinuating that in a democracy 
respect for human rights is best assured.60
Defining democracy in such a manner is incorrect and 
problematic as it suggests the existence of a causal connection 
between the two i.e.  if  a nation respects human rights it 
automatically may be considered to be a democracy and a 
democracy automatically respects human rights. 
Respecting human rights does not automatically turn a nation 
into a democracy. Certain human rights can be adequately 
protected in non-democracies while others may be violated. For 
instance Ivory Coast organized elections which were declared free 
and fair by the international community but can hardly be called 
a democracy.61 
Conversely, the above made insinuation that in a democracy 
respect for human rights is best assured is false. Empirical studies 
have illustrated that a democracy does not necessarily entail better 
protection of human rights.62 Democracy may even exacerbate 
ethnic conflict and lead to greater violations of human rights 
especially in the period immediately following transition to a 
democratic system. Respect for human rights is only said to 
increase at the end of the democratization process i.e. when a 
democracy is well installed.63 
In addition, longstanding democracies do not automatically 
provide the highest and best protection of human rights. For 
instance, in many democracies (e.g. Belgium and the United 
States) economic and social rights are not justiciable or only 
partly justiciable. Governments might provide a variety of welfare 
benefits including food and shelter, medical care and access to 
education. But citizens generally do not have the right to sue the 
government for such benefits in court.64 
Moreover, the term democracy is often misused by nations 
61. nGo newS and viewS, http://www.ngopulse.org/category/defined-tags/
governance-and-democracy/elections 
62. PeeRenboom., supra note 43, at 864-865.
63. Id. at 864-865.
64. Id. at 843.
65. Akwasi Aidoo, Africa: Democracy Without Human Rights?, 15 hum. RtS. Q. 703 
(1993).
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claiming to be a democracy but massively violating human 
rights for instance the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.65 Thus “official” or 
“formal” democracies do not always adequately protect human 
rights.
The second and in my view more correct manner to identify 
the link between democracy and human rights is to describe both 
concepts as interdependent and mutually reinforcing.66 Stressing 
the interdependence and mutual reinforcing character eliminates 
the causal connection between two concepts. “Interdependent” 
means that one cannot exist without the other. “Mutually 
reinforcing” means that both concepts directly or indirectly 
influence each other. 
It is evident that a democracy cannot exist without human 
rights. It is also true that there is a greater likelihood that human 
rights are “better” respected. However, it is well recognized that 
democracy is “aspirational” to some extent as violations of human 
rights occur even in longstanding democracies.67 Not all human 
rights violations undermine the democratic system. Other factors 
are important as well such as the “degree” of violation. Moreover, 
under specific circumstances, a government may limit the exercise 
of certain human rights.68  
Both approaches do not resolve the following underlying 
issue. The phrase “respect for human rights” is a very vague as 
it is unclear what human rights are envisioned? Theoretically, 
all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent.69 
Thus, in order to be “democratic” all civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights would have to be respected. This would 
be problematic for the following reasons. First human rights 
66. See for instance Commission on Human Rights Res. 2003/36, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2003/L.36 (April 23, 2003).
67. “Absolute democracy (…) which no society embodies total ly” FR a n c k , 
The Democratic Entitlement., supra note 17, at 4; See also the Universal 
Declaration on Democracy, supra note 17 at ¶ 2 which refers to democracy 
as “a constantly perfected and perfectible state or condition whose progress will 
depend upon a variety of political, social, economic and cultural factors”.
68. Karel Rimanque, Noodzakelijkheid in een Democratische Samenleving - Een 
Begrenzing van Beperkingen aan Grondrechten, in libeR amicoRum fRedeRic 
dumon (Fréderic Dumon ed., 1983); Oscar Garibaldi, On the Ideological 
Content of Human Rights Instruments: The Clause “In A Democratic Society”, in 
contemPoRaRy iSSueS in inteRnational law: eSSayS in honoR of louiS b. Sohn 
(Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1984).
69. Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, supra note 50, at ¶ 5.
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appear to be an open-ended category of rights.70 Secondly, all 
human rights treaties and texts contain a different set of rights. 
Moreover, not all nations accept all rights to be legally binding 
upon them71 and different geographical regions tend to emphasize 
different human rights.72 The interpretation and implementation 
may also vary according to the region.73 
Secondly, the phrase does also not provide any clarity on the 
extent to which human rights must be respected or to what extent 
they may they be limited. In most human rights treaties certain 
human rights may be limited when “necessary in a democratic 
society”. This is a circular reasoning as on the one hand these texts 
recognize that a nation respecting human rights can be labeled 
democratic; on the other hand it is acknowledged that human 
rights may be limited in the event that they are democratic. 
Conceptually democracy is linked to human rights. As many 
issues remain unsolved with regard to human rights, these issues 
reflect on the discussion of democracy. As such no true progress 
can ever be made with regard to democracy if no progress is 
made with regard to these outstanding human rights issues.
IV.  CONCLUSION
This article examined the link between democracy and human 
rights in international law. The importance of the research lies 
in the fact that democracy’s importance in international law is 
increasing rapidly, however no clarity appears to exist on its 
scope and content. Currently in international law there is no 
universal consensus on one particular definition of democracy. 
Regardless, there does appear to exist an international consensus 
on the existence of an indissoluble link between human rights and 
democracy. The exact nature of that link is unclear. As a closer 
look at the nature of that link can provide deeper insights into the 
70. The UN General Assembly recognized very recently the right to water and 
sanitation as a human right. G.A. Res. 62/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/292 
(July 28, 2010).
71. The status of ratifications of the various human rights treaties can be 
consulted at united nationS tReaty collection, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited on Jan. 16, 2011).
72. See for instance China’s comments after the recorded vote on the Draft 
Resolution on the Promotion of the Right to Democracy, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., 
57th mtg. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.57 (April 30, 1999). See also Ghai., 
supra note 13.
73. PeeRenboom., supra note 43, at 868.
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meaning of democracy it was the purpose of this article to explore 
the nature of the nexus between human rights and democracy.  
Part one examined how democracy is defined in international 
law and what methods can be used when doing so. Research 
has shown that there are several manners which may be used 
to define democracy and that all of them have certain flaws. 
International law favors the method of defining democracy in 
function of its underlying elements. Currently no consensus 
exists on one particular definition. Consequently many different 
circumscriptions of the term exist in international law. When 
looking at the vast array of these definitions it becomes clear that 
respect for human rights is present in all of these definitions.
Section two of the paper then examined how respect for 
human rights relates to democracy. It has become clear that in 
international law two approaches exist: one accepts the existence 
of a causal link between the two terms, while the other considers 
both concepts to be interdependent and mutually enforcing. 
Research has shown that accepting the existence of a causal link 
between democracy and human rights is problematic for various 
reasons. Therefore the second approach was considered to be the 
better one. However, both approaches do not resolve standing 
issues with regard to the meaning of human rights. Due to the 
remaining obscurity surrounding the concept of human rights it 
would prove quasi impossible to define a universal acceptable 
“human rights standard” to determine whether a nation is 
democratic or not. Given that democracy’s fate is attached to that 
of human rights, no true progress can be made on the issue of 
democracy as long as no international consensus can be found on 
the exact content on human rights.
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international law anD its relationsHip  
witH municipal law
Rakesh Gosain*
I. INTRODUCTION
International law has the relationship between States as its primary 
focus,1 while municipal law is concerned with the domestic aspects of 
governance, with issues between individuals and issues between the 
individual and the administrative setup. There are various theories that 
govern the relationship of international and municipal law, ranging from 
monism, dualism, transformation, delegation and harmonization.
International law supersedes municipal law in the sense that non 
compliance to an international obligation cannot be brushed off by a 
State claiming that the action was in pursuit of its own municipal laws. 
The State cannot use any provision within its internal legal structure to 
evade an international obligation.
Treaties, executive certificates, and other principles of customary law 
provide a means for application of international law. Different countries 
however follow different methods in the approach and application of 
international law to municipal jurisdiction.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW: THE INTERFACE
It is the nature of man to live in communities.  He lives in this fashion 
in every part of the world today, and the evidence of history and pre-
history shows how long he has been doing so.  But then it must be 
noted that where people live together, conflict is bound to arise due 
to various conflicting interests among the people.  Also, bearing in 
mind that everybody tries to work hard, obtains basic needs and all 
other things which help to make life happy and comfortable which 
are incidentally in short supply, since the supply is always in short in 
proportion to the demand, competition for them sets in.  It is a race in 
which we all engage. And in every race or game there must be rules 
and regulations, else, we are moving towards the ’state of nature’ as 
enunciated by Hobbes.  Therefore, the existence of rules and regulations 
(in particular, law) becomes a sine qua non to the peaceful co-existence 
of people and nations all over the world.
*Advocate – on – Record, Supreme Court of India
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There have been various definitions of law by different scholars across 
the global intellectual community.  These definitions exist, ranging 
from the philosophical to the practical. Plato called law as social 
control; William Blackstone (1977) sees law as rule thereby specifying 
what was right and what was wrong.  For the purpose of this study, 
law is viewed as a body of rules that establish a certain level of social 
conduct, or duties that members of the society honour.
Law simply means an arrangement that coordinates and confines 
people’s behaviours to conform to an agreed general way of human 
conduct in a given society, with a threat of sanction against defiant 
behaviours. Inferred from the above definitions is the need to obey the 
law. This is because disobedience may attract sanctions that may result 
in imprisonment, fine or death, depending on the nature of offence. 
Law may also be defined as a body of rules or regulations governing 
the conduct of human beings in their social regulations.
The inherent nature of human beings is their unpredictability in terms 
of behavioural conduct. States, groups and international organisations, 
like individuals who constitute membership of these social formations, 
suffer from this innate problem.  Therefore, for law to really serve 
its purposes, a competent and constituted body that has recognised 
authority must make such law. Further, it must be dynamic because 
society in which it operates is dynamic and ever-evolving.  Law should 
also be consensual. International law is one of consensus rather than 
one of force.  Even in the national society, laws are only laws when 
one consents to it.  It might be out of fear of reprisal or coercion. Law 
regulates conduct, maintains peace, and provides protection and means 
of achieving justice.
Specifically, law serves as a tool of order, and as a tool order it promotes 
order within the national and international society.  There is no denying 
the fact that a comprehensive set of rules, regulations, obligations, rights, 
legal doctrines and decisions of national and international tribunals on 
legal matters does help to promote international order.  Law regulates 
the behaviour of the citizenry.  Without law, society would have been 
disorganised and become ungovernable.
III. THE CONCEPT OF MUNICIPAL LAW
Municipal law is the internal law of the State which is binding on the 
citizens of that particular State.  It is defined as the domestic law of a 
State regulating the conduct of individuals and legal entities within 
it.  Shaw sees municipal law as law that governs the domestic aspects 
of government and deals with issues between individuals and the 
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administrative apparatus.2
IV. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is an indisputable fact that international law is a victim of definitional 
pluralism. This is because many scholarly definitions have been given 
to it by various scholars of repute from different perspectives.  Some of 
these definitions will be explored for the purpose of this study.
Khan defines it as a ‘body of rules, laws, and norms, which serves to 
limit the sovereignty of state in the international society’.  Oppenheim 
sees it as the ‘body of customary and treaty rules which are considered 
legally binding by States, in their intercourse with each other’.  Jessup 
presents it as the body of laws, which is applicable to States in their 
relations and to individuals in their relations to other States. In the same 
vein,  Kolawole defines international law or what he calls the ‘law of 
nations’ as the body of rules and principles of action which are binding 
upon civilized States in their relations with one another.  International 
law is the law at the international level made by the collective will of 
States and to lesser degree organisation and individuals.3  In essence, 
international law is a body of generally accepted principles and 
rules regulating or controlling the conduct of States, individuals and 
international organisations for the purpose of peaceful coexistence in 
the international plane.
Another scholar has identified the functions of international law, which 
include minimising frictions between and among States, stabilizing the 
behaviour of States, facilitating cooperation between and among States, 
protecting individuals, settling disputes and serving as a tool of public 
relations and propaganda.4
International law also serves as an instrument of national policy.  It 
contributes to a nation’s means of attaining its objectives in foreign 
policy.  It also serves as an integrative force in the world community, 
since no State can live in isolation. It atomised the entire States and 
people of the world into one whole as they are all subjects of the law 
without prejudice to race, colour or class.
2  MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (6th ed. 2010) 
3  MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (4th ed. 1997)
4   TUNDE ADENIRAN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1983)
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V. DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The scope of international law can be categorised into six broad topics, 
namely:
The law of peace, which seeks the peaceful settlement of 1. 
international disputes.
The law of war; since conflict is an inevitable outcome of human 2. 
and State relations. Conduct of hostilities must conform with 
laid-down regulations in terms of types of military wares and 
ammunition to be used, and stages of their utilisation, targets 
and non targets of attack, areas of combat, treatment of civilians, 
journalists and prisoners of war and refuges, and the duties of 
humanitarian agencies such as the Red-Cross.
The law of neutrality; international law forbids aggression on 3. 
neutral States in war.  It also spells out reciprocal responsibilities 
for neutral States.  Law forbids them to render any form of 
assistance whatever military or civil to any of the parties 
engaged in hostility.
Mercantile laws, which relate to regulations on international 4. 
trade, foreign investment and multilateral trade agreements 
between States.
The law of sea. The sea is very vital to the world economy as it 5. 
provides varied marine food and mineral resources. It serves as 
a means of international transportation, and it serves as strategic 
resource for national defence.  For these reasons, nations have 
fought wars over marine resources.  Consequently, activities of 
States in the sea need to be regulated in order to present inter-
State disputes.
Convention on the use of outer space.  The law regulates the 6. 
exploration and launching of objects into outer space.
VI. COMPARING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND  
MUNICIPAL LAW
The relationship between international law and municipal law is full of 
theoretical problems.  The international legal literature on the subject 
records two main principal theories involved in the debate.  But it is to 
be noted that this part does not necessarily distinguish or differentiate 
international law from municipal law or give one primacy over the 
other, but rather, it justifies the existence of both laws as laws in the 
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real sense of it.  Nevertheless, some of the arguments put forward by 
different schools of thought to explain the relationship between the 
two laws will be explored for theoretical explanation and academic 
consumption.
The dualist or pluralist school of thought assumes that international 
law and municipal law are two separate legal systems, which exist 
independently of each other (Malanczuk, 1997, 63-71).5  Dualism stresses 
that the rules of international and municipal laws exist separately and 
cannot purport to have effect on, or overrule the other.  This according 
to the school is because of the fundamentally different legal structure 
employed on one hand by the State, and on the other hand as between 
States.6
The dualist position is accepted by the positivists like Triepel and 
Anzilloti.  Triepel maintains that international law must be incorporated 
into the municipal law because the subject of a State is the individual 
whereas the subject of international law is an abstract entity known as 
the State.  Since subjects are not the same, there has to be a transformation 
from one to the other, i.e. international law has to be transformed into 
the State law before it can be applied to individuals.  This process is 
incorporated in the “transformation theory”. The claim of Triepel as 
regards State as the only subject of international law can no longer be 
sacrosanct due to dynamism in law.  In the contemporary international 
law, individuals are seen as subject albeit a limited capacity.
The 1945 Nuremberg Trials made individual as the subject of 
international law. Further, the Angola Trial also enunciated the same 
phenomena.  Anzilloti talked of the conditioning of the two laws.  In 
his opinionated view, State laws are imperatival and hence it has to 
be obeyed, whereas international law is in the nature of promises. It 
is therefore necessary to transform a promise into command before 
it becomes applicable in the municipal law.  The position also is not 
sacrosanct, in the sense that law is not necessarily command; people 
obey the law when they consent to it and often people obey because of 
the possible gains that can be acquired.
The second school of thought known as Monism, has a unitary 
perception of the law and understands both international law and 
municipal law as forming part of one and the same legal order.  The 
5  AKEHURST,S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, PE-
TER MALANCZUK 63 – 71 (Routledge 1997) (1970) 
6  Id.
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most radical version of the Monist approach was formulated by Kelsen. 
In his view, ‘the ultimate source of validity of all law’, is derived from 
a basic rule of international law.
Kelsen’s theory implies that all rules of international law were supreme 
over municipal law, that a municipal law inconsistent with international 
law was automatically null and void and that rules of international law 
were directly applicable in the domestic spheres of state.  Kelsen’s view 
was on formalistic logical grounds.  They opposed strict division of the 
two laws as demonstrated by the dualists and accept the unitary view 
of law as a whole.  Kelsen utilises the philosophy of Kant as its basis.
Law is regarded as constituting an order which lays down patterns of 
behaviour that ought to be followed, coupled with the provision for 
sanctions, which are employed once an illegal act or course of conduct 
has occurred or been embarked upon.  Since the same definition 
implies both within internal sphere and international sphere, a logical 
unity is forged. Since States own their legal relationship to the roles 
of international law, and since States cannot be equal before the law 
without a rule to that effect, it follows that international law is superior 
to or more basic than municipal law. 
Kelsen emphasises the unity of the entire legal order upon the basis of 
the predominance of international law by declaring that it is the basic 
norm of the international legal order, which is the ultimate reason of 
validity of the national legal orders too (Kelsen, 1997).7
Lauterpacht in his contribution upholds a strong ethical position with 
deep concern for human right.  He sees the primary function of law 
as concerned with the well-being of individuals and advocates the 
supremacy of international law as the best method of attaining this.
Interestingly, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 
States that: “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal laws 
as justification for its failure to carry out an international agreement.” 
However, expression on the supremacy on the international law 
over municipal law in international tribunals does not mean that the 
provisions of domestic legislation are either irrelevant or necessary.  On 
the contrary, the role of international legal rules is vital to the working 
of the international legal machine.
One of the ways that is possible to understand and discover a State’s 
7  JOCHEN VON BERNSTORFF AND THOMAS DUNLAP, THE PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW THEORY OF HANS KELSEN ( Cambridge 2010)
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legal position on a variety of topics important to international law is 
by examining its municipal laws.  A country will express its opinion 
on such vital international matter at the extent of its territorial sea or 
the justification of the claims or the conditions for the acquisition of 
nationality through the medium of its domestic law making.  Thus, it is 
quite often that in the course of deciding a case before it, an international 
court will feel the necessity to make a study of relevant pieces of 
municipal legislation.  The rules of municipal law can be utilised 
as evidences of compliance or non-compliance with international 
obligations.8
VII. INTERNATIONAL LAW VS. MUNICIPAL LAW?
International law governs the relation of sovereign independent States 
inter and constitutes a legal system the rules of which it is incumbent 
upon all States to observe. Municipal law also known as state law or 
national law is the law of state or a country.
International law regulates the behaviour of States whereas national 
law the behaviour of individuals. International law concerns with the 
external relations of the States and its foreign affairs. Municipal law 
concerns with the internal relations of States o and its domestic affairs.
 International law is a law between equal sovereign States in which 
no one is supreme to the other but municipal laws the w law of the 
sovereign over the individuals subject to the sovereign rule. 
Whether international law is a law or not is a debatable question and 
this debate is continued where as municipal law is a law in a real sense 
and there is o doubt about it.
However, international law and municipal law relates to each other 
and justice considers that both form a unity being a manifestation 
of a single conception of law while others say that international law 
constitutes an independent system of law essentially different from 
the municipal Law. Thus, there are two theories knows as monastic 
and dualistic. According to monism, the origin and sources of these 
two laws are the same, both spheres of law simultaneously regulate 
the conduct of individuals and the two systems are in their essence 
groups of commands which bind the subjects of the law independently 
of their will. According to dualism, international law and municipal 
law are separate and self contained to the extent to which rules of one 
8  Supra, n. 3
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are not expressly tacitly received into the other system. The two are 
separate bodies of legal norms emerging in part from different sources 
comprising different difference subjects and having application to 
different objects.
VIII. COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL  
LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW
International law does not entirely ignore municipal law.  For example, 
municipal law may be used as evidence of international custom or of 
general principles of law, which are both sources of international law. 
Moreover, international law leaves certain questions to be decided by 
the municipal law.
Harmonisation theory succinctly provides an answer to the true 
relationship of the two laws by asserting that:
“The starting point in the legal order is that man lives not in one 
jurisdiction, but in both.  International law and municipal law are 
concordant bodies of doctrine, autonomous but harmonious in their 
aim of basic human good.  When faced with an actual problem, a 
municipal court applies the rules operative within its jurisdiction and 
may in fact, apply international law to the exclusion of municipal law, 
or vice-versa.”
A treaty or other rule of international law imposes an obligation on 
States to enact a particular rule as part of their own municipal law. 
Similarly, there is a general duty for States to bring domestic law into 
conformity with obligation under international law either through 
transformation, incorporation, adoption or reception, e.g. treaties 
ratified in accordance with the constitution automatically become part 
of the municipal law of the USA.  In Britain, the traditional rule is that 
customary international law automatically forms part of English law.
In a case before a municipal court, a rule of international law may be 
brought forward as a defence to a charge.  For example, a vessel may 
be prosecuted for being in what the domestic terms is regarded as 
territorial waters, but in international law, it would be treated as part 
of the high seas.
Okeke (1986:6) puts it in the following manner:
“…as States grow in their international outlook, and as they participate in 
either the creation of new rules of international law or in the re-definition 
of the already existing ones, it must be borne in mind that the world is now 
advancing on the principle of interdependence and mutual cooperation.  The 
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age of holding tenaciously to the principle of absolute sovereignty is far gone. 
Indeed, a state by taking laws to be in conformity with international law is a 
legitimate exercise of the sovereignty of such a state.”9
Okeke’s position stresses the dynamism in law and the society. When 
the law operates and the need for global intercourse of nation for 
global benefits; and such interaction must be regulated with law both 
at national and international levels so as to have a peaceful and ordered 
world.
Okeke in his analysis cited a section each from the Constitutions 
of Germany and the United States of America to affirm the 
interconnectedness of international and municipal laws. The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany provides:
            “The general rules of public international law are an integral part of the 
federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create 
rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.”10
In the same manner, the American Constitution also provides:
            “The constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be the supreme law 
of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, and everything 
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding”.11
In addition, the rule of the municipal law can be utilised as evidences 
of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations, e.g. 
the issue of respect of fundamental human rights.  Though, in some 
countries the law will sometimes fail to reflect the correct rule of 
international law, but this does not necessarily mean that States will be 
breaking international law.
IX. CONCLUSION
From the submissions above, ranging from definitions of law, 
characteristics and purposes to relationship and complimentary nature 
of municipal law and international law, it is clear that both laws 
possess the qualities of law and all that takes to be called laws.  They 
serve the same purposes and perform functions of law because they are 
9  C. NWACHUKWU OKEKE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (Fourth Dimension 1986)
10  Id.
11  U.S. CONST. Art, VI
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meant to regulate conduct, maintain peace, provide protection, achieve 
justice, etc.  They are both enforceable; they have different mechanisms 
of enforcement and agencies.  They are both dynamic in nature, they 
are made by competent and recognised authority, etc.  As a matter of 
fact, both laws have been able to work towards achieving well ordered 
societies, which is the ultimate goal of any law.  Therefore, international 
law and municipal laws are real laws.
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tHe uniteD nations anD tHe rule of law: 
tHe action of tHe security council
Cecilia Zorzoli*
I.  DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW.
To define what the term “rule of law” means is a very 
challenging issue. As a matter of fact, even if it is quoted in many 
fundamental international documents as an essential element for 
a peaceful global context, there is no shared definition regarding 
its content and its limits. Its primary role is enshrined and sacred 
in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948, which states that “it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected 
by the rule of law”1. On the other hand, such a wide agreement 
on the importance of the rule of law may be due to the vagueness 
of its content. However it unanimously comprises at least these 
three elements: government of laws, the supremacy of the law, 
and equality before the law. 
Government of laws means that the State must not use its power 
in total discretion. That is to say, no rule of man is tolerable. In 
any case this principle isn’t extended till requiring a particular 
purpose in the State action: it comprises only the accessibility and 
clarity of laws. The supremacy of the law means that the laws have 
to be applied to everybody, even the sovereign, by an independent 
institution like the judiciary. This is very different from the so-
called rule by law, by which the sovereign can legally act with 
absolute powers. In the end, equality before the law means that laws 
have to be applied equally to everybody, without discriminations. 
Law must be applied generally and be able to play its role not 
only as “law in books”, but also as “law in action”.
I.I ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF LAW:  
DIFFERENT TRADITIONS.
The concept of rule of law derives from different traditions: 
it firstly rooted in the Anglo-American tradition in a theoretical 
perspective rather then in practical application. As a matter of 
* PhD. candidate in International Law at Pavia University, Italy.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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fact Magna Charta Libertatum already in 1215 put the first limits 
to the power of the king, but such limits were seriously respected 
only from the XVII century2. 
The fundamental Bill of Rights Act was adopted in 1689, after 
the civil war (1642-1660) and the beheading of King Charles I 
Stuart happened, a fact that put an end to the absolute sovereign 
of the king in England for good. Bill of Rights Act defined 
“illegal” the power of the king to suspend3 or dispense4 with 
laws, to establish his own courts5 and to impose taxes without the 
approval of the Parliament6. Such Act moreover established that 
the members of Parliament should be free and that parliamentary 
proceedings should be subject only to parliamentary scrutiny. In 
spite of these provisions, however, the king was still powerful 
while the institutions supporting the rule of law weak. 
As regards the development of rule of law in continental 
Europe, things are different. More importance is given to the 
nature of the State rather than to the judicial phase, as a matter 
of fact “rule of law” can be translated as “stato di diritto”, 
“Rechtsstaat”, “État de droit”, “estado de derecho”. 
In the German tradition, the origins of the Rechtsstaat are 
based in Kant’s philosophy, in Robert von Mohl7 book Die Polizei-
Wissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates8 (which 
mean, police science according to the constitutional principles) 
and in Hans Kelsen’s theories9. There is an ongoing debate 
whether the concept of “Rechtsstaat” involves both substantive 
2. In 1607 Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Sir Edward Coke, rejected 
the King’s (James I) argument that he had the power to decide himself cases, 
without basing on the judiciary. Sir. Coke declared that even if the King is 
not subject to man, he is subject to God and the law, as already stated in 
“Prohibitions del Roy” of 1343.
3. Bill of Rights Act, 1689, c.1.
4. Id. c.2.
5. Id, c.3.
6. Id, c.4.
7. Robert von Mohl (1799-1875), jurist, professor of political science, member 
of the parliament of Württemberg and of German Parliament, minister of 
justice for a few months. He coined the term “Rechtsstaat” as opposed to 
aristocratic police state.
8. ROBERT VON MOHL, DIE POLIZEI-WISSENSCHAFT NACH DEN 
GRUNDSÄTZEN DES RECHTSSTAATES 1834.
9. Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), a Jewish Austrian-American jurist. In his 
positivistic perspective, rule of law and State were synonymous. 
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and formal aspects. A substantive aspect is the use of reason in 
creating the laws, while a pure formal requirement is legality, 
with the paradoxical case of National Socialism. 
In the French tradition an essential role is played by 
Montesquieu’s “De l’esprit des lois”10 of 1748 and Rousseau’s 
“Du contrat social”11 of 1762. The main legal text was the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, but it 
was applied for the first time only in 1971 to invalid a French law12. 
In the Arabic tradition the first relevant document is the Code 
of Hammurabi (created around 1790 BC in ancient Babylon), 
that adopted a concept of supremacy of law far earlier than the 
Europeans. But this happened just in theory, since practice was 
different. Nowadays, in modern Arabic there is no equivalent 
word for the term “rule of law”13.
I.II. PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW.
After this brief overview, it is clear that the meaning of the 
term rule of law is linked both to time and geography. The main 
difference lies between formal and substantive understandings. 
Formal perspectives considering rule of law as a limitation on the 
power of the State, are the positivist or the so-called thin theories, 
while substantive theories involve a “thick” range of principles, 
like justice, human rights, specific forms of government, free 
market capitalism. Such perspectives are often interwoven. 
Maybe a formal definition, being more strictly related to law, is 
more appropriate to present situations and purposes: it can be 
commonly shared in different social and political contexts.
The main issue related to the rule of law is its promotion. 
It  has been promoted through treaties and international 
organizations. Human rights treaties promoted rule of law as 
essential basis for economic growth and recently the UN Security 
Council considered it also as an important step towards resolution 
10. It advocated constitutionalism, separation of powers and basic civil liberties. 
The book was published anonymously.
11. It stated the supremacy of law, but considering legislation as the expression 
of popular will, that is to say without any limitation.
12. Counseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 71-44 DC, 
July 16, 1971 (Fr.). 
13. A valid approximation may be “siyadat al-qanun”, that literally means 
sovereignty of law.
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of conflicts. Rule of law plays a role in promoting human rights, 
development, peace and security. 
As regards human rights, the three principles mirrored in the 
concept of rule of law are enshrined in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. As a matter of fact, arbitrary privation of liberty 
is prohibited. Fair trials by independent tribunals and equality 
before the law are required. Such document lays at the basis of 
every other document regarding human rights.
So far as the relationship between rule of law and development 
goes, the rule of law played the role of a vehicle for promoting 
economic development14. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in its report of 1992 “Human Development” 
listed some criteria to verify the level of the rooting of the rule 
of law, such as fair and public hearings, an independent and 
impartial judiciary, the possibility to obtain legal counselling, the 
possibility of review in criminal cases, the possibility to prosecute 
even government officials if violating the rights of other people.
The last step in the relationship between rule of law and 
development is the acceptance of developing countries of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome, which states that “good governance 
and the rule of law at the national and international levels are 
essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development 
and the eradication of poverty and hunger”15.
The rule of law, as said before, has been used also as a mean 
to maintain peace and security. The UN Charter confers to the 
Security Council the power to act under Chapter VII in order 
14. An example of the consideration it had can be the “law and development” 
movement, born in the US In the 1960s. With this programme the United 
States Agency for International Development, the Ford Foundation and 
other private donors wanted to reform the laws and judicial institutions of 
developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This movement 
produced many reports and articles but in the end failed in reaching its 
aim, since it was too focused on the exportation of US legal system, often 
incompatible with the legal systems of the target countries. By the way, 
such processes of reform require many years to succeed and should not 
be influenced by the US national issues (that in the years 1965-1975 were 
extremely relevant). Nowadays efforts are less devoted to the exportation of 
a model and more focused on target countries.
15. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 
16. 2005). 
16. Like those in Guatemala, in Liberia, in Côte d’Ivoire and in Haiti.
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to maintain global peace and since the mid-1990s its powers 
expanded supporting or replacing domestic legal systems. Many 
UN missions had important rule of law components16, with 
wide mandates that urge for reestablishment or restoration and 
maintenance of the rule of law, without furnishing any further 
indication. In concrete, such activities were essentially training of 
personnel, assistance in the institution-building process, taking 
part in the law reform issues, monitoring, focusing especially on 
criminal law issues. In two missions (Kosovo and Timor-Leste) the 
UN directly ruled the administration of Justice, controlled police 
and prisons. Even in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Office of 
the High Representative the UN did the same.
Moreover the UN action to support the rule of law lead to the 
creation of tribunals, like the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, and the creation of hybrid tribunals such as the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia. A fundamental role is played by the 
International Criminal Court, which exercises a complementary 
jurisdiction, so as to encourage national trials and protecting the 
sovereignty of the State17.
I.III. RULE OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS.
Dealing more in particular as to how the International 
Organizations operate to support and promote the rule of law, it 
seems difficult to draw a picture on how such concept influenced 
international affairs. This situation may be due to the fact that the 
concept of rule of law has developed within a vertical national 
context that is say, in citizen-sovereign scheme of relationship, 
while on the international level the sovereignty is horizontal 
among equal States.
In particular, the United Nations18 actively worked for 
17. Even if the Council has the power to defer prosecution, as stated in Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 16, July1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. This situation mirrors the difficulties in according two international 
interests: the promotion of justice and the maintenance of peace.
18. Whose legal personality was established by the International Court of Justice 
with the Advisory Opinion “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service 
of the United”, (1949) ICJ Rep 173, considering it as implicit in the decision 
of fifty States to create the Organization.
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promoting rule of law, acting in a framework of legal mechanisms. 
The UN can both apply its power with discretion within the limits 
of the Charter and arbitrary. As a matter of fact, the Security 
Council, which was created as a political organ, has the power 
to decide to establish a mission to face a particular crisis, but 
from 1999 it started to apply targeted sanctions. Such sanctions 
were meant to punish terrorists by cutting their funds, but were 
strongly criticized for the lack in transparency in identifying the 
subjects involved and for the lack of any formal review19. 
Moreover there are many other unresolved problems, like the 
19. As Silvio Favari underlines in Sovranità, diritti umani e uso della forza: 
l’intervento armato “umanitario”, Pubblicazioni Centro Studi per la Pace, 2002. 
Available at www.studiperlapace.it (last visit march 2010).
 He quotes the problematic Haiti case of 1994: the UN intervention was 
decided on the basis of Chapter VII of UN Charter. But such intervention 
was not justified on the basis of a violation of human rights, since it 
was directed to maintain the government democratically elected. Such 
intervention was a symbol of the growing interest of the UN within national 
affairs of a Country, but it was decided in order to fulfil the most important 
UN aim: maintenance of international peace and security.
20. A particular situation regards the relationship between the European Union 
and the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in its advisory opinion n.2/94 
of 28 march 1996 denied the legal basis for the EU for joining the ECHR, 
since the EU didn’t have jurisdiction in the field of human rights: there was 
no norm in the EU Treaty conferring European institution the power of 
creating norms or signing treaties of human rights. But with Lisbon Treaty 
the situation was reversed. The new article 6/2 of EU Treaty establishes the 
accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human 
Rights and ensures that such accession shall not affect the competences of the 
Union or the powers of its institutions. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
in the Convention and as resulting from common Constitutional traditions 
of Member States, are part of European Union law as general principles. The 
accession is regulated whit a series of procedures and will request a long 
time. The European Court of Justice applies and interprets the ECHR in the 
disputes of its competence. The present situation, in which the Convention 
is applicable only to the States and not to the EU itself, is paradoxical. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of the ECHR established that Member States are 
responsible for the respect of the Convention in the application of European 
Law. So that a theoretical conflict between UE and ECHR is possible. But 
coherence of the system is ensured by the Court of Justice of the EU, that 
refers constantly in its activity to the jurisprudence of the ECHR while 
applying and interpreting the Convention. Moreover, in the Bosphorus vs. 
Ireland case, (Appl. No. 45036/98, Judgment of 30 May 2005) the European 
Court of Human Rights reaffirmed that the UE offers a presumption of 
“equivalent guarantee” of human rights, so that a Member States respects the 
Convention while complying the obligations deriving from European Law.
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issue of applying the law to the UN itself, since the Organization 
is not part of human rights treaties, even if they were born under 
its auspices or monitored by its agencies. This situation depends 
on the traditional view that only States can enter such kind of 
treaties, since States alone can violate or promote human rights20. 
But things are different since the UN carries out the functions of 
a State, for instance by ruling administrations or territories. A 
series of cases arose regarding targeted financial sanctions and 
in the end the European Court of First Instance21 stated that the 
UN has to comply only with norms of jus cogens, due to the UN 
Charter’s primacy clause enshrined in Art.103 of the UN Charter. 
Other thorny questions are that the UN doesn’t have any formal 
procedure for monitoring its organs and that the organs can 
interpret the Charter by themselves, since the International Court 
of Justice has not the functions of a Constitutional Court22. The 
issue was at the centre of important decisions, crystallizing the 
contrast between the Council and the Court, such as in the “Case 
concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie” 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures)23 
and the “Case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application 
of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie” (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America) 
21. For instance the European Court of First Instance has considered actions 
aiming at the annulment of European measures adopted in relation United 
Nations Security Council counter-terrorism measures. Council Regulation 
2002/881, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9 (EC) applying sanctions of the S.C. Res. 1267, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct.15, 1999).directly linked to the list of the UN 
Sanctions Committee has only been subjected to limited review.
 The Yusuf, Kadi, Ayadi and Hassan cases regard such Community Regulation 
No. 881/2002. They were people resident respectively in Sweden, Ireland, 
Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, and were all listed in the Annex and sought 
its annulment on the grounds, that it infringed their fundamental rights. 
(CFI, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European 
Union and the Commission of the European Communities, Case T-306/01; Kadi v 
Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities, 
Case T-315/01; Ayadi v Council of the European Union, Case T-253/02; Hassan 
v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 
Case T-49/04, available at http://curia.europa.eu, last visit march 2010).
 In such cases the Court declared it could review a European regulation taken 
complying a Council’s decision only referring to the jus cogens parameters, 
since there is no other parameter for a valid international review. 
22. By the way, an organ can require an advisory opinion. 
23. ICJ Rep 3, 1992.
24. ICJ Rep 114, 1992.
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(Provisional Measures)24 . 
Another interesting issue related to the relationship between 
the rule of law and the UN is that such concept comprises the 
idea of equality before the law, while in the UN system some 
members are “more equal than others”: the Security Council 
has five permanent members with a strong privilege, the veto 
power25. 
I.IV. THE RULE OF LAW AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.
There are three meanings of rule of law at international level. 
In the first perspective, it can be meant as a simple application 
of the principles of rule law to the relations among States and the 
other actors of the international scenario. This meaning is the one 
which is widely prevalent at the moment.
 In a different perspective it can express the superiority of 
international law on domestic law, ensuring for instance the 
priority of human rights treaties on national legal production. In 
this sense, the activity of certain regional organizations, such as 
the European Union, can be an effective example. However such 
organizations are almost exceptions in the international context 
and by creating a State-like structure they recall a concept of rule 
of law more related to the meaning of rule of law at a national 
level.
In the end, rule of law at international level may be understood 
also as a normative regime able to regulate individuals without 
the mediation of national institutions. This is the situation of the 
quasi-administrative regimes that don’t correspond to any national 
or international legal category and are just beginning developing. 
By now justice seems more reachable through organizations of 
States rather than by a global law. In spite of this, the UN Charter 
25. This problem was faced in relation to the quasi-legislative resolutions of 
the Security Council dealing with counter-terrorism and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.
26. For instance Paragraph 3 of the Preamble simply expresses determination 
“to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained”. As regards peaceful resolution of disputes, the Charter simply 
states in its Art.1 that they must be resolved “in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law”, without mentioning the need for 
the elimination of breaches of peace and prevention or removal of threats.
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has been described also as a sort of a global Constitution. But its 
language is more hortatory than declaratory when dealing with 
international law issues26.
Moreover the UN, according to Art. 13 of the Charter, has the 
task to promote the development and codification of international 
law. All these points show that international law as a legal system 
is still primitive, very different from domestic law. Moreover 
all judicial organs at international level are basically possessing 
voluntary jurisdiction; so the summations can be made that 
the international rule of law doesn’t exist. The solution can be 
different by interpreting rule of law as the whole range of debates 
about international law, since it is evident that the principles 
of the national legislation can’t be directly transferred in the 
international law: there are structural differences between the 
two levels (horizontal and vertical structures), very different 
historical and political contexts. The concept of international 
rule of law may be built with the same elements that compose 
domestic rule of law. In that perspective, government of laws, 
that means non-arbitrariness in the exercise of power, is expressed 
in the formula “pacta sunt servanda” and in the attempts of 
creating international protections for human rights and standards 
for international trade. An effective way for strengthening this 
point may be expanding codification of international law27: as a 
matter of fact the main features of the rule of law, like clarity, 
are weakened by the fragmentation of law due to different 
legal traditions and categories. The second idea of rule of law is 
supremacy of law, that is to say the distinguishing between rule 
of law and rule by law. On international level such distinction 
is less applicable, since among States there is no hierarchical 
relationship. Improving rule of law in this direction would mean 
expanding the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice and of other independent courts and would mean 
also the necessity of the application of international law also to 
international organizations. The third element of rule of law, 
equality before the law, is strictly linked to the question of who 
is subject of law. In domestic law, States treat juridical persons 
differently from natural persons; improving international rule of 
law in this direction would mean applying international law to 
States and other entities, eliminating anomalies such as the veto 
power in the UN Security Council.
On these bases, rule of law is pictured as a political challenge, 
27. U.N. Charter Art. 13.
35
still far from being a normative reality. The UN is working to 
change such perspective, applying rule of law in its activities to 
promote human rights, peace and development.
I.V. RULE OF LAW & THE UNITED NATIONS: 
AGE OLD BED FELLOWS
The choice of analyzing in particular the practice of the United 
Nations reflects a view commonly shared by the scholars of 
international relations and of democratization processes: the rule 
of law and democracy are more influenced by external factors 
(like the activity of International Organizations28) rather than 
internal issues29. 
Rule of law is central in the UN action and mission. All the 
organs of the Organization deal with the concept, with different 
aims and perspectives. 
The Secretary-general acted from different perspectives, in 
general keeping a more theoretical approach:
- defined the rule of law as an universal value, essential for 
a world of justice, opportunity and stability in his Report 
“In larger freedom: towards development, security and 
human rights for all” A/59/2005,
- gave a definition of the rule of law and listed its requisites in 
his Report on “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies”, S/2004/616, 
- in his Report “Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United 
Nations support for the rule of law”, deepened the issue, 
A/61/636,
- in his Report “Strengthening and coordinating United 
Nations rule of law activities” dealt with the matter of 
coordinating the work on the rule of law, A/63/226,
The UN promoted also other activities related to the rule of 
law, also from a more operative and concrete point of view. 
28. Burchill, The Developing International Law, Review Article of Fox and Roth, 64 
MOD. L. REV. 133 (2001).
29. THE CHANGING NATURE OF DEMOCRACY 12 (Takashi Inoguchi et 
al. eds., 1998); LUIGI BONANATE, TRANSIZIONI DEMOCRATICHE 51 
(2000).
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Above all, the UN aims to develop a clear legal framework, 
based on a Constitution and enforced by independent institutions 
of justice and governance.
Moreover, the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group 
is becoming more and more important. Briefly, this institution is 
responsible for the coordination of the work on the rule of law, 
and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General and supported by 
the Rule of Law Unit. Its membership consists of:
- the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 
- the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR),
- the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA),
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
- The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
- UNHCR,
- The United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM),
- The United Nat ions  Off ice  on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC).
It has also agreed upon a Joint Strategic Plan for 2009-2011 and 
developed Guidance Notes of the Secretary General regarding UN 
Approach to Rule of Law Assistance, UN Approach to Justice for 
Children, The United Nations and Constitution-making.
II.  THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The activity of the Security Council in the field of rule of law 
is very significant. It held important thematic debates on the issue 
and adopted resolutions.
II.I. Thematic debates
As regards thematic debates, important statements were made.
II.I.I. Statements by the President of the Security Council in 
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connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled 
“Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations Role” and 
on the item entitled “Post-conflict national reconciliation: role 
of the United Nations”: S/PRST/2003/15, S/PRST/2004/2, S/
PRST/2004/34.
After ministers expressed their views, the Council focused on 
the vital importance of the issue, with a special emphasis on the 
context of protection of civilians in armed conflict, in relation to 
peacekeeping operations and international criminal justice.
The Council welcomed the offer of the Secretary-General 
to provide a report which could guide and inform further 
considerations, inviting all Member States and other parts of the 
UN system with relevant experience and expertise, to contribute 
to this process of analysis.
The Council urges the Secretariat to make proposals for 
implementation of the recommendations set out in Paragraph 
65 of his report, including coordination of existing expertise 
and resources, setting up data bases and web based resources, 
developing meetings of experts, workshops and training and 
invites Member State to participate.
Moreover the Council underlines the importance of restoration 
of justice and rule of law in post-conflict societies, not just 
to punish past abuses, but also in order to promote national 
reconciliation and to prevent the breakout of new conflicts. Such 
processes must be open to participation of women.
In particular, the Council recognizes particular justice and rule 
of law needs in each host country, underlining that the nature of 
the country’s legal system, traditions and institutions, should be 
taken into consideration. A “one size fits all” approach would be 
inappropriate. 
In the end, the Council recalls that rule of law is, together 
with justice, fundamental for promoting and maintaining peace, 
stability and development in the world and welcomes the 
Secretary General’s decision to address the UN activity to make 
the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies a priority.
II.I.IV. Statement by the President of the Security Council in 
connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled 
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“Strengthening international law: rule of law and maintenance 
of international peace and security”: S/PRST/2006/28.
In this Statement the President analyses the importance of the 
rule of law in maintaining peace.
After recalling the principles of the UN Charter and of 
international law, the Council underlines the importance of 
the role of international law in creating stronger international 
relations and in promoting cooperation.
The Council further emphasizes the important role of the 
International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes among 
States.
Moreover the relevance of rule of law is fundamental in the 
peace building strategies in post-conflict societies30.
The President supports the idea of establishing a rule of 
law assistance unit within the Secretariat and looks forward 
to receiving the Secretariat’s proposals for implementation of 
the recommendations set out in Paragraph 65 of the Secretary-
General’s report on the rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies31. In addition to that, the 
Council urges Member States to contribute national expertise and 
materials.
II.III.  THE CRUX OF IT ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
AND THE RULE OF LAW - A/63/69.
A/63/69 is a very important report regarding the issue of the 
rule of law. It confronts the issue from almost a theoretical point 
of view, giving a scientific approach to the topic, with definitions 
and deep analysis. 
The rule of  law is analysed on a national and on an 
international level from the Council’s activity perspective. The 
report contains 17 recommendations meant to guide the Council’s 
activity in every field in order to support the rule of law.
30. UN Peacebuilding Commission, S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 
20, 2005).
31. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and 
transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 
(Aug. 3, 2004).
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In the introduction the Council is described as the most 
important international organ playing the role of an essential 
actor in the maintenance of peace and global security. But it 
is a political organ and the effectiveness of its action doesn’t 
depend on something neutral, independent, totally devoted to 
international harmony, but obviously it depends on the will of 
the States. Especially the five permanent members (France, Great 
Britain, USA, China and Russia) and their agreements which 
influence the activity of the organ. The Council can act as a 
legislator, as a judge and as executive. 
The introduction also describes the core discussion of 
the report, which is to enlighten the Council’s activity with 
recommendations for enhancing an international system based on 
the rule of law. In addition to that, in the introduction there is a 
summary of the report: Chapter I and Chapter II will be the most 
systematic Sections, since they will deal with the concept of “rule 
of law” at international level and at national level: Chapter I gives 
definition for what is meant by the term “rule of law”, Chapter 
II analyses how international organizations use and apply this 
concept, while Chapters III, IV and V analyse how such principle 
may be applied to the Council itself, dealing with the Council 
as a “creature of law”, as a legislator and as a judge. Chapter VI 
is about the Council and the individuals, in particular about the 
targeted sanctions.
The last Section of the report regards the relationship between 
the Council and individual rights, in particular dealing with 
targeted sanctions. Such sanctions have been created in the 
1990s in order to damage just specific individuals, limiting the 
consequences of economic sanctions. They have in effect improved 
the consequences of sanctions, but they have also been criticized. 
Often the criteria of choice of the targeted individuals are not 
clear and there is no possibility of a formal review, even if in 
32. For instance in the Yusuf, Kadi cases the plaintiffs claimed that a European 
regulation taken in conformity with a Council’s decision (in particular of the 
Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee) regarding economic sanctions 
violated their rights. The Court could review it just referring to the jus cogens 
parameters, underling that there is no other parameter for an international 
review. 
 CFI, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European 
Union and the Commission of the European Communities, Case T-306/01; Kadi v 
Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities, 
Case T-315/01.
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many cases challenges arose in different forums, like the European 
Court of First Instance32. 
The report recalls then the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, in which the Council was urged to ensure fair and 
transparent criteria for labelling someone in the list of recipients 
of targeted sanction. Kofi Annan, in June 2006 replied affirming 
that such sanctions can be a concrete mean for fighting terrorism, 
but that they will be useful only if legitimate, that is to say, if 
there are transparent procedures and remedies. He underlines 
four elements that make these sanctions fair: the person has to 
be informed of the sanction and of the possibility of review, 
moreover has the right to be heard, to directly access the judge 
and to review in front of an impartial organ. In the end, the 
Council should periodically review its own sanctions. 
In effect the Council made steps forward in this direction, for 
instance Resolution 1730/2006 established specific procedures in 
delisting requests. Resolution 1735/2006 amended it in relation 
to listing and delisting of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
committee33 and new rules for informing persons were draft. But 
at the moment there are some States hesitant to add new names 
in the sanction list. Procedures pending in national and regional 
courts (like the European Court of Justice) will help in defining if 
such measures can be qualified as “fair and clear”.
Within and outside the United Nations there have been many 
debates on which kind of review would fit to these sanctions. 
Proposals regarded a form of appeal in front of a tribunal34, an 
administrative review35or a confidential review process36. By 
the way, for the political issues involved, it seems difficult to 
reach the creation of a judicial or administrative review. The 
best solution seems by now the creation of small review panel 
33. Supra note 15.
34. For instance, the ICTY which was formed in pursuance of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. U.N. Doc. S/
Res/827 (May 25, 1993).
35. The UN Compensation Commission, established subsequent to the S.C. Res. 
692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991). 
36. Detention Review Commission, S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 
10, 1999).
37. Final Report and Recommendations from the Austrian Initiative, The Role of 
the Security Council in Strengthening a Rules-based International System, 2004 - 
2008. 
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of experts that examine the delisting requests and then make a 
report to the Security Council committee. 
The report ends with Recommendation 17, suggesting the 
Secretary-General to present its initiatives to strengthen legitimacy 
and effectiveness of targeted sanctions, with a special attention to 
information and right of review.
In conclusion, “all Member States and the Security Council 
itself  have an interest in promoting the rule of law and 
strengthening a rules-based international system37”, since the 
effectiveness of the action of the Council as a political actor is 
strictly linked to its legitimacy as a legal actor. Its accountability 
will depend on how it will use its extraordinary powers. The 
Council’s authority derives from the rule of law, since respect 
for its decisions is interwoven with respect of the UN Charter 
and international law. Without a proper mean of review, the only 
remedies for contrasting a wrong resolution of the Council are 
extreme solutions: eliminating funding or not complying with 
the resolution. That is to say that the Council itself is subject to 
the rule of law. The function of law in the Council’s action is 
like a “hedgerow”38: it doesn’t block decisions but channels them 
effectively. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
The activity of both national and international actors shows 
that the rule of law permeates every field of political and juridical 
activity. For this reason it is easy to reach a sweeping consent on the 
importance of this issue. On the other hand such consent may be also 
due to the vagueness of the exact content of the term “rule of law”. 
In this article the author has tried to minimise the difficulties 
which exist to identify the elements that comprise of the rule of 
law, like circumstances of time and space or the relations between 
actors (that is to say, the attempts to elaborate a rule of law also 
on a international level), in order to present a shared notion. From 
a theoretical perspective, the rule of law unanimously comprises 
at least these three elements: government of laws, the supremacy 
of the law, and equality before the law, that can be found both on 
a national and on an international level.
As regards the operational field the activities for promoting 
38. Id. at para 51.
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the rule of law are multifarious in nature and practise, involving 
participation of States, international organizations, regional 
organizations, private donors, NGOs: some of them being; 
acceptance of the International Court of Justice’ jurisdiction, using 
other dispute resolution mechanisms, developing and codifying 
international law and really implementing it, fighting impunity, 
applying rule of law principles form peacemaking, peacekeeping, 
peace building towards development, giving funds for activities in 
this field, supporting the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource 
Group, supported by the Rule of Law Unit, furnishing technical 
assistance to Member States for an effective implementation of 
international law, strengthening rule of law on different levels, 
like governance, management, crime prevention, justice, gender 
violence, housing, land and property, Constitution-making and 
ensuring a periodic check and perusal of such activities.
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international regime for tHe conservation 
of marine ecosystems 
Mridushi Swarup*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Oceans cover approximately 71% of Earth’s surface and 
comprise the greatest preponderance of the hydrosphere. While all 
the seas of the world share certain obvious characteristics, many 
have unique attributes. For example, shipping lanes and straits are 
used more intensively than other parts of the ocean for navigation, 
making accidents and spills there more likely; some areas of the 
sea are more ecologically fragile than others; some seas such as 
the Mediterranean and the Baltic, are semi-closed, inhibiting the 
exchange of their waters with those of the rest of the ocean and 
thus slowing the process of self-purification; and some parts of 
the ocean are utilized more intensively by humans than others, 
resulting in more pollution, both chronic and accidental.
The world’s oceans are under stress from over-fishing, 
climate change, invasive species and marine pollution. United 
Nations Environmental Programme Ocean Atlas defines pollution 
sources that exist through the world as leading to a state of 
“silent collapse”. The stresses are particularly acute in coastal 
areas. In addition to ocean dumping and spills, intensive shore 
development funnels oil and toxic pollutants into coastal waters. 
Nutrient run - off from farm and yard fertilizers cause algae 
blooms which threaten coral reefs and sea grass beds.
In this project, the various aspects related to the protection 
of marine ecosystems have been analyzed in detail Also, the 
particular problems of the conservation of marine ecosystem 
and marine biodiversity and the threats with which they are 
confronted have been examined. Finally, the international regime 
for the protection of marine ecosystem has been elaborated upon 
with special reference to UNCLOS. Also, the international regime 
for the protection of marine ecosystem components has been 
discussed in a succinct manner. 
* 3rd year, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.
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II.  WHAT IS MARINE ECOSYSTEM?
The problems of addressing the conservation of marine 
ecosystems and the maintenance of biodiversity in the oceans are 
qualitatively different from those of terrestrial systems. Because 
ma1nkind is a terrestrial creature, there is, perhaps, inevitably a 
terrestrial bias in understanding of species and of ecosystem as 
well as the means which have been developed for their protection. 
This bias is reflected in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
itself.1 Article 2 of the Convention defines “biological diversity” 
to include “variability amongst living organisms from all 
sources including…marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are a part”, however it goes on 
to specify that “this includes diversity within the species, between 
species and of ecosystems.” Nowhere else in the Convention is 
specific reference made to the protection of marine biodiversity2 
although Article 22(2) does specifically provide that contracting 
States “shall implement the Convention with respect to the marine 
environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States 
under the law of the sea”.3 In fact the whole approach of the 
Convention – directed as it is to the biotechnology issues and, 
arguably a concept of national ownership of resources based on 
assumptions about endemic species – bypasses some of the key 
issues of marine biodiversity conservation.
Awareness of the importance of ecosystems or of ecosystem 
conservation and management is relatively new in international 
arena. Few international instruments rarely use this precise 
terminology.
III.  MARINE BIODIVERSITY: WHY IS IT IMPORTANT 
AND HOW IS IT THREATENED?
The oceans cover 70% of the planet yet far less is known 
1. United Nations Environment Programme Convention on Biological Diversity, 
5June 1992 (Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 9 
(No. 30619)); S.JOHNSON, THE EARTH SUMMIT 82-102(1993).
2. This was a reason why USA initially refused to become a party, THE 
26TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, 
THE LAW OF SEA : NEW WORLDS, NEW DISCOVERIES, GENOA, 22-25 
JUNE 1992, The Protection of Marine Environment and the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, TUCKER SCULLY. 
3. M.Chandler, The Biodiversity Conventions: Selected Issues of Interest to the 
International Lawyer 4 COLORADO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 141-175 (1993).
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about the marine environment than the terrestrial; 80% of all the 
known species are terrestrial;4 only sixteen of the 6,691 species 
officially classified as endangered are marine and fourteen of 
these are mammals and turtles – creatures which have some 
affinity with the terrestrial creatures.5 Because of the fluid nature 
of the marine environment scientists suggest that there has been 
less opportunity or need for speciation in marine organisms, as 
there has been in land organisms in which species and subspecies 
have developed as they have become separated from each other 
by physical forces. This does not mean however that, oceans are 
a single amorphous system. Apart from the obvious variations in 
the oceans at different latitudes or depths, the existence of closed 
or semi-closed seas and of major currents, confluences and gyres 
in the open system means that there is a wide variety of different 
ecosystems in the marine environment. However, these bear little 
relation to the various legal jurisdictional zones established by 
customary international law and now to be found codified in the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention.6
As seen from the definition of biodiversity given in CBD, the 
common practice of terrestrial biologists of assessing biological 
diversity or richness in terms of number of species and subspecies 
in a particular ecosystem, especially number of those who are 
unique or endemic. However, as far as marine biodiversity is 
concerned speciation is low and endemism uncommon. In oceans 
thereare far greater varieties of organisms amongst the higher 
taxonomic orders than species or subspecies.7 In the last few years 
entirely new life-forms which thrive in the boiling waters around 
deep ocean thermal vents have been discovered which offer 
exciting opportunities for development of medical and industrial 
processes.8
Marine and coastal systems provide important food sources, 
and marine creatures offer a multitude of different substances 
4. G.C. Ray, Ecological Diversity In Costal Zones And Oceans, 36-50, E.O.WILSON 
(ed.), BIODIVERSITY (1998).
5. B .  THORNE MILLER AND J .CATENA,  THE LIVING OCEAN : 
UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING BIODIVERSITY (1991).
6. R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA (2nd ed., 1989).
7. M.V. Angel, Biodiversity in the Pelagic Ocean 7/4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
760 (1993).
8. 28TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF SEA INSTITUTE, 
HONOLULU, HAWAII, 11-14 JULY 1994, State Practice, New Ocean Uses and 
Ocean Governance under UNCLOS, 
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which may be of significance to the medical and chemical 
industry.9 It is well established that oceans play a key role as sinks 
for greenhouse gases10, but also, and perhaps more significantly, 
there is increasing evidence that marine biota play an important 
role in global chemical processes which may affect the climate 
change.11 Thorne Miller and Catena suggest that the concentration 
on genetic, species and ecological diversity reflected in the work 
of terrestrial biologists (and strongly represented in the 1992 
Convention) overshadows what has been termed functional 
diversity – which reflect biological complexity of an ecosystem. In 
their words:
“In the face of environmental change, the loss of genetic 
diversity weakens a population’s ability to adapt; the loss of 
species diversity weakens a community’s ability to adapt; the loss 
of functional diversity weakens an ecosystem’s ability to adapt; 
and the loss of ecological diversity weakens the whole biosphere’s 
ability to adapt.”12
The evidence suggest that marine ecosystems are rich in 
functional diversity, and that there are therefore dangers in 
transferring to the marine environment concerns about lower 
order diversity and about protection of rarity which have been 
developed in a terrestrial context. 
 There are threats to the very maintenance and upkeep of 
ecosystems. The most significant threats are posed by marine 
pollution from a variety of sources and activities13, from over-
exploitation or indiscriminate exploitation of marine species14, as 
well as the destruction of the coastal habitats. A large proportion 
9. W.T. BURKE, Id. ; see also e.g. The Extraction Of Chemicals Which Are Being 
Used In The Development Of Anti-Cancer Drugs, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 
2005. 
10. J.T. HOUGHTON, G .J .JENKINS AND J. J. EPHRAMUS (ed.), CLIMATE 
CHANGE : THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (1990).
11. E.A. NOSE (ed.), GLOBAL MARINE BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 27-29 
(1993).
12. Supra note 5.
13. Reports of examination of four whales found dead on the Belgian coast 
conducted by Professor Claud Joiris of Brussels University in which high 
levels of toxic materials, including cadmium, mercury, DDT and PCBs were 
found in their blubber : THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 1995.
14. D. Freestone, The Effective Conservation and Management of High Seas Living 
Resources : Towards a new regime? CANTEBURY LAW REVIEW, 341-362 
(1995).
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of sea creatures depend on the inshore or coastal areas for an 
important part of their breeding or life-cycles. The destruction or 
degradation of coastal habitats or the degradation of coastal water 
quality therefore has a major impact on a widespread of marine 
‘life.15 This does suggest that protection of rare and endangered 
species and of key and representative ecosystems may also be 
appropriate to certain aspects of marine biodiversity conservation. 
These protected areas cannot in themselves provide protection 
from marine pollution. It must also be said that despite the fact 
that 1982 UNCLOS specifically recognizes that “the problems of 
ocean space are closely inter-related and need to be considered as 
a whole.”16 Also, the maritime jurisdictional zones recognized by 
UNCLOS, inevitably make arbitrary decisions in ocean ecosystems, 
do not assist a holistic approach to management of these issues.17
The recognition by international environmental law of the 
importance of ecosystem management is relatively of recent 
origin. The earlier environmental treaties related simply to species 
protection.18 It is possible to group the general classes of relevant 
international obligations. Firstly, those that address specific threats 
to marine environment and therefore to marine ecosystem.19 
Secondly, those obligations that address the conservation what 
might be called ecosystems components and finally those 
obligations that require conservation of marine ecosystems per se. 
Such a classification may serve to identify the strengths as well as 
defects and lacunae in the current legal regimes.
IV.  CONSERVATION OF MARINE ECOSYSTEMS
The recognition of importance of management of ecosystems, 
rather than simply those of their components which maybe 
of immediate significance to mankind, is a relatively recent 
15. M. Hayashi, The Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks under the LOSC 
Convention 8 IJMCL 245-262 (1993).
16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 (herein after referred to as UNCLOS), Preamble, para 3.
17. See generally D. Freestone, supra note 14; B. Kwiakowska, The High Seas 
Fisheries Regime : At a Point of No Return?8 ILMCL 327-358 (1993).
18. 1902 Convention for Protection of Birds useful to Agriculture, 102 BFSP 969, 
cited in A.KISS AND D.SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 33 (1991).
19. R.R. CHURCHILL supra note 6; W.T.BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF FISHERIES (1994).
20. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment U.N. Doc. A/
48
phenomenon. Crucial steps in development were the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration20 and the 1980 IUCN World Conservation 
Strategy which formed the basis of the 1982 UN General Assembly 
World Charter for Nature21, and which popularized the concept 
of, as well as the term, “life support systems” and which stressed 
the interrelationship of these with other ecological processes and 
genetic diversity.22
V.  INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF MARINE ECOSYSTEM
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS)
In order to seek an answer to a wider question of whether 
there is a general obligation on all States to conserve marine 
ecosystem, it is necessary to look beyond the specific treaty 
obligations at customary international law. The starting point 
of this assessment is UNCLOS which came into force only in 
November, 199423 but which is widely recognized as reflective of 
customary law. Customary law recognizes the division of ocean 
into a series of juridical regimes which reflect criteria related 
to Coastal States’ sovereignty and resource exploitation rather 
than considerations of ecosystem integrity. The nature of the 
obligations which the customary international law, and now the 
CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973) (herein referred to as the Stockholm Declaration), 
Principle 4 provides that: Man has special responsibility to safeguard 
and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and habitat which are now 
gravely imperiled by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation, 
including wildlife, must therefore, receive importance in economic 
planning.
21. GA Res. 37/7, (28 October 1982), reproduced in (1983) 23 ILM 455-460.
22. The IUCN 1980 World Conservation Strategy specifically required : (i) 
maintenance of essential ecological processes and life support systems, soil 
regeneration and protection, recycling of nutrients, and water purification; 
(ii) preservation of genetic diversity on which depends the functioning of 
most processes and life support systems , together with breeding programs 
necessary to the protection and improvement of cultivated plans, domestic 
animals and micro-organisms; and (iii) sustainable utilization of species and 
ecosystems (fish and other wildlife, forests and grazing lands) by humans in 
both industrial zones and countryside.
23. For an analysis of circumstances of the coming into force of the Convention 
and the UN General Assembly Resolution A/48/263 of 28 July 1994 adopting 
the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part IX of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea of 10 December 1982, see D. Freestone 
and G. J. Mangone, The Law of Sea Convention : Unifinished Agenda and Future 
Challenges A SPECIAL ISSUE OF IJMCL (1995).
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1982 UNCLOS, imposes on the States in relation to the marine 
environment does to a large extent depend upon the juridical 
nature of the particular waters under consideration, consequently 
these jurisdictional divisions can create a major obstacle to the 
rational management of ecosystems or species which cross or 
straddle more than one zone. Broadly, the oceans are divided into 
the following maritime zones: internal waters – behind the coastal 
state baseline; a belt of territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles 
in breadth, a 24 nm contiguous zone with restricted enforcement 
jurisdiction, a 200 nm exclusive economic zone or fishing zone, 
and the high seas beyond these limits. Within each of these zones, 
the Convention envisages a different balance of rights and duties 
between the coastal states and other states.
UNCLOS contains a number of  provisions of  general 
significance for the protection of marine ecosystems. Nevertheless, 
it would probably be a mistake to think this was a conscious 
drafting objective per se. It is certainly possible to read into the 
provisions of Part XII of the Convention endorsement for a marine 
ecosystem approach to marine conservation24, although these 
obligations are even less precise than those relating to pollution 
control. Article 192 of UNCLOS recognizes a general obligation 
to “protect and preserve marine environment”.25 In so far as this 
goes beyond simple protection, it can be interpreted as being an 
obligation to behave in a precautionary way.26
Article 194(5) specifically requires that “measures taken in 
accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to protect 
and preserve rare and fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat 
of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms 
of marine life.”27 As this provision is located within general 
provisions of Part XII this requires all States to protect these 
special ecosystems and habitats form the effects of pollution 
24. M.H. Belsky, Management of Large Marine Ecosystems : Developing a New Rule 
of Customary International Law 22 SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 733-763 (1985).
25. Article 192, UNCLOS.
26. The view that UNCLOS intends a proactive, rather than simply a passive role 
is supported by NORDQUIST (ed...), UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, Vol IV 35ff (edited by 
S.Rosenne and A.Yankov). On the development of precautionary principle in 
international environmental law see D. Freestone, The Precautionary Principle 
in R. CHURCHILL AND D. FREESTONE (eds.) INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 21-40 (1991); Developed further in D. 
Freestone, The Road from Rio : International Environmental Law after Earth 
Summit 6 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 193-218 (1994).
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originating from all  sources in addition to other general 
conservation measures.28
Article 196 requires the States to take all measures to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution from “the use of technologies” under 
either their jurisdiction or control. This could be mean to read 
biotechnology or any other polluting technology. The rest of the 
paragraph requires the states to prevent, reduce and control the 
“incidental or accidental introduction of species, alien or new, 
to a particular part of marine environment which may cause 
significant or harmful changes thereto”. 
However, the definition of pollution adopted by UNCLOS29 
does not make explicit reference to impacts on marine ecosystems. 
This defect has been remedied by in some regional conventions.30
In the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Part V) coastal 
States are obliged to ensure “through proper conservation 
and management measures that the maintenance of living 
resources is not endangered by over-exploitation”31, taking into 
consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent 
upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring 
populations of such associated or dependent species above levels 
at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.32 
Similar provisions apply to such species in high sea fisheries.33 
But these provisions “only aim to maintain the viability of such 
species, and …..[not] to protect their role within the food web or 
the functioning of the marine ecosystem as a whole.34
1980 Canberra Convention on the Conservation of Antartic 
Marine Living Resources
This is arguably the first convention to be centered on 
27. Article 194(5), UNCLOS.
28. K.Gjerde, The Law of the Sea in J.BROADUS AND R.VARTANOV (eds.) , 
THE OCEANS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY : SHARED US/USSR 
PERSPECTIVES 233 (1994).
29. Article 1(4), UNCLOS.
30. 1992 Paris Convention for Protection of Marine Environment of North East 
Atlantic, Article 1(d); 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Article 2(1).
31. Article 61(2), UNCLOS.
32. Article 61(4), UNCLOS.
33. See further D. Freestone, The Recruitment of Proof for Conservation in High Sea 
Fisheries, UN FAO LEGAL OFFICE (forthcoming).
34. Supra note 28 at 234.
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ecosystem approach to conservation and has been described as 
“a model of ecological approach.”35 Even the geographical scope 
of the treaty itself is unique, in that it is designed around the 
Antarctic ecosystem. Under Article 1, the Convention applies “to 
the Antarctic marine resources of the area south of 60 degrees 
South latitude and to the Antarctic marine living resources of 
the area between that latitude and the Antarctic Convergence 
which form a part of Antarctic marine ecosystem.” The Antarctic 
ecosystem is then defined by Article 1(3) as “the complex of 
relationships fop Antarctic marine living resources with each 
other and with their physical environment.” 
The sole objective of the Convention is declared to be “the 
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources;”36 conservation 
however is defined to include “rational use”.37 To achieve this 
very purpose any harvesting or associated activities has to be 
conducted in accordance with declared principles.38
These objectives, which clearly relate to the maintenance of the 
ecosystem are implemented by the Commission for Conservation 
of  Antarctic  Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) which 
coordinates research on Antarctic marine living resources and 
adopts appropriate conservation and management measures.39
A further formal step in the protection of Antarctic Ecosystem 
was taken with the conclusion of the 1991 Madrid Protocol to the 
Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection.40
1985 Asean Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources
Another treaty of major potential significance but, unfortunately, 
35. Supra note 18 at 254.
36. Article II.1, 1985 Canberra Convention on The Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources.
37. Article II.2, 1985 Canberra Convention on The Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources.
38. Article II.3, 1985 Canberra Convention on The Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources.
39. R.R. CHURCHILL, EEC FISHERIES LAW 188 (1987); M.Howard, The 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Resources : A Five Year 
Review 38 ICLQ 104 (1989).
40. (1991) 30 ILM 1461.
41. Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, reproduced in KISS AND SHELTON supra note 
18 at 493.
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still not in force after a decade is the 1985 ASEAN Convention on 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.41 This Convention 
reflects in its wording the concepts contained in the 1980 IUCN 
World Conservation Strategy, embracing a clear ecosystem 
approach to conservation. Kiss and Shelton describe this Treaty 
at “the most comprehensive approach to viewing conservation 
problems that exist today.42
The Convention recognizes “the interdependence of living 
resources, between them and other natural resources, within the 
ecosystems of which they are a part.” and is divided into eight 
chapters.
It is tempting to observe that the major treaties calling for 
marine ecosystem conservation considered thus far are either 
limited in geographical scope, or not yet in force, or both.43
VI.  GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is a general obligation first promulgated by Principle 21 
of Stockholm Declaration and now to be found in Principle 2 of 
Rio Declaration to ensure that “activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.44 This 
obligation not to cause damage extends not simply to activities 
physically located within the State territory but also to activities 
within the State jurisdiction. 
Customary international law would impose responsibility on 
States under this principle for a range of activities which impact 
42. Kiss and Shelton p. 279.
43. To the ASEAN Convention could perhaps be added the African Convention 
on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Algeria, 15 September 
1968, 1001 UNTS 3. The treaty makes no explicit reference to the marine or 
costal environments of contracting states, and none of the species listed for 
protection appear to be marine species. Nevertheless, there appears nothing 
in the treaty to exclude marine/ coastal ecosystems from its ambit. It too is 
not in force yet.
44. Principle 21, Stockholm Declaration; Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (June 1992) 31 I.L.M. 1261 (herein 
after referred to as Rio Declaration), Principle 2.
45. Report of Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development, published as Environmental Protection 
and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and Recommendations (1987), 
J.G.LAMMERS (ed.) 80.
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on marine ecosystems whether such activities take place within 
the areas of national jurisdiction or outside or straddling such 
areas.45Activities which could be argued to cause damage to 
marine ecosystems and to fall foul of this principle would include 
marine pollution – particularly that emanating from land based 
sources and activities46; it could also be extended to fishing and 
related activities which impact upon rare and endangered marine 
species or their habitat.
VII.  REGIMES FOR THE CONSERVATION OF 
MARINE ECOSYSTEM COMPONENTS
Historically, the two main techniques which have been utilized 
by international conventions for the conservation of marine species 
are derived from those taken for terrestrial species, namely, the 
regulation or prohibition of the poaching of designated species 
and the protection of habitat by designation of protection areas.
VIII.  PROTECTION OF SPECIES
The protection of designated species has habitually been 
addressed by the imposition of restrictions and prohibitions on the 
harvesting, taking or killing of target species. The approach was 
taken by the 1946 Whaling Convention47, by the various seal hunting 
regulatory agreements48 and by the 1973 Polar Bears Agreement.49 
Such a strategy is still maintained as a part of approach adopted 
by more modern generic or regional protected species treaties such 
as the 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals50 and the regional treaties concluded 
under UNEP Regional Seas Programme.51
46. This principle is also utilized for high seas fishing in the recent UN FAO 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 1994.
47. 1946 International Convention for Regulation of Whaling (Washington) 161 
UNTS 143.
48. 1911Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals.104 BFSP 175; 1975 
Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 314 UNTS 
105; 1972 Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 11 ILM 251.
49. 1973Agreement on the Convention of Polar Bears, 13 ILM 13.
50. 1973Bonn Convention (1980) 19 ILM 15.
51. 1985Framework Convention for the Protection, Management and Development 
of Marine and Coastal Environment of the East African Region.
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IX.  PROTECTED AREAS
The second key technique, often used in combination with 
protection of species and in modern treaties increasingly merge 
with it52, is the establishment of protected areas either to protect 
the habitats of specific species or as representative examples of 
ecosystems or habitats. These may be important isolated areas 
or take their place within a systematic network permitting for 
example transnational migration.53
In the terrestrial environment between 5-8% of the total world 
land mass now lies in protected areas. Despite the fact the sea 
covers more than two and a half times the land area, marine 
protected areas may cover an area less than half that of terrestrial 
protected areas.54
X.  REGULATION OF TRADE IN WILD SPECIES
One of the major threats to marine species such as sea turtles 
is the commercial trade in products such as turtle shell. Other 
well known threats to marine ecosystems are posed by over 
exploitation of shells and corals for the tourist souvenir trade 
and of reef fish for the aquarium trade. CITES provides the main 
regulation of such trade, although a number of treaties provide 
independent proscriptions or regulation of such trade.55
XI.  CONCLUSION
It is paradoxical that although the particular problems of 
conservation of many marine creatures, make them particularly 
suitable to regulation at an international level under a treaty on 
biological diversity, the most important discussions concerning 
conservation of marine biological diversity are currently taking 
place in the context of other forums – those relating to land based 
52. 1990 Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea. See D. 
FREESTONE AND T. IJSTRA, THE NORTH SEA : PERSPECTIVES ON 
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT COOPERATION 280 – 287 (1991).
53. Objective of 1979 Berne Convention and the 1992 EC Habitats Directive.
54. R. Kenchington, C. Bleakly and S. Wells, A Global Representative System 
of Marine Protected Areas, Draft Report, Great Barrier Reef Marien Park 
Authority IUCN, 1995.
55. 1990 Kingston Protocol on Specifically Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW), 
Article 11 and Article 25 specifically relates to the relationship with CITES.
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resources, straddling fish stocks or at a regional level.
The recognition by the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
of the issue of the “conservation of biological diversity as a matter 
of common concern of humankind” implies that all states have 
a legal interest in the issue as well as positive responsibility to 
safeguard it. However, this “common concern” still requires a 
more obvious focus than national actions or diverse regional 
or sectoral actions, for much of the attention has to be taken in 
international waters as well in coastal waters or in ways that will 
reflect natural ecosystem boundaries rather than national maritime 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
It can thus, be concluded that there is an existence of a 
substantial body of treaty law which seeks to address one or 
more aspects of marine ecosystem conservation. Although, a 
few treaties actually commit themselves to this, it is clear that 
a large number of treaty regimes are developing an ecosystem 
approach through their parties’ interpretation of their existing 
treaty obligations. UNCLOS can be seen as a most positive force 
in the crystallization of the general obligations of States to protect 
the marine environment. Nevertheless, important though the 
obligations of Part XII are in this respect, they too require further 
substantial elaboration and implementation.
A protocol on the conservation of marine biodiversity in 
context of protection of marine ecosystems would be an obvious 
way of seeking to remedy the lacunae of existing regimes and 
refocusing attention on this crucial, but somewhat neglected, 
aspect of biodiversity debate.
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economic sanctions in tHe Human rigHts era 
evolving in tHe wake of mDgs anD tHe kaDi 
JuDgement: millennium Development goals anD  
tHeir bearing on Human rigHts
Harjass Singh*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether we like it or not, we live in a time when ruthless torture of 
untried individuals is abetted by the only remaining pole in a unipolar 
world, when economic interests of nations that are spoilt for riches prove 
a hindrance in the arrest of perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, when nations are free to impose unchecked embargos on 
vast inhabited areas, implicitly accepting a forfeiture of human life and 
dignity1. At such a time, it becomes necessary for legal academia to bring 
to light the legal obligations of the international community, thereby 
discharging the burden placed on them by a society that is becoming 
increasingly conscious of human rights and ancillary concepts.
At the turn of the millennium, the idealistic members at the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), in an effort to cleanse the 
world of some of its fundamental evils, formulated eight ‘Millennium 
Development Goals’ (MDGs). These goals include the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; 
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women; reducing 
child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and 
developing a global partnership for sustainability.2
Prima facie, these MDGs target some of the fundamental ills that plague 
society’s quest for development. It is also clear that proliferation of 
such hazards in society result in infringement of the most basic human 
rights that have been recognised and incorporated not only under 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but also under 
Specific International Human Rights Instruments and Domestic legal 
enactments of most UN member states.
* 3rd year, B.A.LLB., National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), Kolkata.
 1.  Richard Goldstone, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, 258 – 283, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009).
2.  united nationS develoPment PRoGRamme, millennium develoPment GoalS (2000).
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Through the course of this paper, the researcher shall look to highlight 
the negative impact that General Economic Sanctions have on the 
domestic populations of sanctioned nations and their neighbouring 
States. It is contended that General Economic sanctions display scant 
regard for the goals that the UNDP has sought to propagate, thereby 
resulting in gross violations of the elementary human rights that are so 
inextricably entangled with the MDGs.
The researcher shall also analyse Targeted Economic sanctions as an 
alternative approach, and point out structural flaws with implementation 
of such measures that have emerged in light of the Kadi Judgement3. On 
weighing the pros and cons of both these approaches, the researcher 
humbly submits his findings regarding the human rights challenge 
that the traditional understanding of Economic Sanctions poses.
II. UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
In understanding the harms of economic sanctions, it is important to 
begin by dwelling on their basis and developing a lucid understanding 
about them. Economic Sanctions have long been considered a fairer 
and more peaceful method of dispute resolution and intervention 
than the military alternative. Kofi Annan has even gone to the extent 
of stating that they are “a necessary middle ground between war 
and words.”4 However, it is submitted that the harms accruing from 
economic sanctions are just as bad, if not worse than those posed by 
military sanctions. 
International politics and international law enmesh in a way to provide 
us with four generic instruments of policy, which individuals and 
groups implement in trying to influence others.5 These include the 
Military Instrument, characteristic of which is extreme levels of coercion 
by engaging in violence against the sanctioned party. The second 
happens to be the Diplomatic Instrument, which involves persuasive 
communication or downright coercion, aimed at the political elite of 
the target nation. The third instrument may be identified as Propaganda, 
involving the propagation of signs and symbols directed at the 
relevant strata of a community, not limited to its elite. However, the 
most important instrument in our present discussion is the Economic 
   
   
3.  Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l 
Found. v. Council of Eur. Union & Comm’n of Eur. Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. II-3533
4. Bryan P. Schwartz & Christopher C. Donaldson, Protecting the Playground: Options 
for Confronting the Iranian Regime, 35 bRook. J. int’l. l. 395 (2010). 
5. W. Michael Reisman, Sanctions and International Law,    
inteRcultuRal hum. RtS. l. Rev. 9 (2009).
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Instrument, which is characterised by the grant of or curb in indulgences 
or deprivations from the target.6
Since States and non-state actors use all four instruments in varying 
degrees, international law has endeavoured long and hard to prescribe 
the contingencies for and modalities of their use. However, success has 
been hard to come by.7
It is important to establish at the outset that only when these instruments 
are carried out under authorisation by the international community are 
they appropriately accorded with the status of ‘Sanctions’, thereby making 
them military sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, ideological sanctions or 
economic sanctions.8 When individual states act in such a manner without 
express authorization of an international organization, they constitute 
various forms of concentrated unilateral violence even though such States 
would try to accord the status of ‘sanctions’ to their actions.
In recent years, the preferred foreign policy instrument has been that of 
‘Economic Sanctions.’ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has 
felt the need to impose economic sanctions a total of 18 times. However, 
like with all efforts of the Security Council, the Cold War curtailed 
and limited economic sanctions to just one instance against Southern 
Rhodesia and one against South Africa.9  The end of the Cold War in 
1991 has seen a spike in the regularity with which these sanctions are 
imposed. Currently, UNSC sanctions are outstanding against Iran, as 
well as certain terrorist organizations. In recent years, sanctions were 
nearly imposed against Zimbabwe and against North Korea.10
III. TYPES OF ECONOMIC ACTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT
The economic instrument also encompasses different types of actions. 
Major classes of this instrument that the researcher believes are 
pertinent given the nature of the present discussion are ‘Positive and 
Negative’ Economic Instruments, and ‘General and Targeted’ Economic 
Sanctions.11
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9.  Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial 
Sanctions, 30 u. Pa. J. int’l. l. 789 (2009).
10.  Padriac Foran, Why Human Rights Confuse the Sanctions Debate: Towards a Goal-
Sensitive Framework for Evaluating United Nations Security Council Sanctions, 4 
inteRcultuRal hum. RtS. l. Rev. 123 (2009).
11.  Eckart Klein, Some Observations on the Kadi Judgement of the European Court of Justice, 
4 inteRcultuRal hum. RtS. l. Rev. 111 (2009).
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The Positive Economic Instrument would generally be aid. This can 
take many forms, like direct funding from national governments or the 
International Monetary Fund.12 Economic Aid can also be engaged in 
enabling the target nation to engage in self-help in the future. A viable 
example pointed out by Schwartz and Donaldson would be ‘aiding 
Iran’s push to become a member of the World Trade Organization’. 
This use of the carrot method to influence the regime, may serve the 
world in influencing Iran’s behaviour without imposing the negative 
consequences of sanctions.13 Personally, the researcher believes that 
the “carrot method” is of greater consequence at the international 
level than the “stick method”, given the “rule of reciprocity” that 
governs almost all significant actions of sovereign nations.
‘Negative Economic Instruments’ is an obvious reference to economic 
sanctions, which may be undertaken against the target state in a variety 
of methods. The most prevalent among these methods is General 
Economic Sanctions.
General Economic Sanctions refer to restrictions imposed on the general 
trade and economic relations with the sanctioned nation. Woodrow 
Wilson, a staunch supporter of (General) Economic Sanctions, spoke 
of them thus:14
“A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this 
economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. 
It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside of the nation boycotted, 
but it brings oppression upon the nation, which in my judgment no modern 
nation could resist.” 
It is this stance of a veritable supporter of general economic sanctions 
that also helps highlight the pressing need to review them in an era that 
sees the international community make tall claims about its human 
rights ambitions. In saying that such measures do not cost a life outside 
the boycotted nation, the proponents of such sanctions concede to the 
fact that they are extremely oppressive to inhabitants (innocent ones 
included) of the nation that is sanctioned.
General economic sanctions such as those imposed by the UNSC 
on Iraq during and after the liberation of Kuwait have since been 
recorded to have had a telling impact on the population resulting in 
12.  See aliReza JafaRzadeh, the iRan thReat: PReSident ahmadineJad and the cominG 
nucleaR cRiSiS, 158 (2007), as cited in SchwaRtz and donaldSon, supra note 6.
13. Id. 
14. ReiSman, supra note 7.
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a serious decrease of supply for food and medicine. These sanctions 
aim to inflict injury to the target nation, thereby coercing an agreeable 
response. However this injury almost always ends up being inflicted 
on most vulnerable members of society as the political and economic 
elite continue to thrive. There is wide consensus amongst researchers 
and philosophers that such economic sanctions have a debilitating 
impact on the poorest and most disenfranchised members of the target 
State. In 1999, Foreign Affairs magazine estimated that, according to UN 
estimates, UNSC “economic sanctions may well have been a necessary 
cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all 
the so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history.”15 In 
1999, this figure amounted to more than a half a million people and 
unfortunately, in the past decade, this staggering number has only 
grown steeper.
This brings me back to my initial point about how when basic human 
rights such as access to fundamental amenities for sustainable life are 
taken away, the UNDP’s Millennium Development Goals seem like 
an unattainable dream charted out by buoyant believers of Utopia. 
If food and medicine are denied to a majority of the population, it 
automatically hinders the ability of a nation to achieve the MDGs. 
Also, they happen to contravene, to varying extents, Article 216, 
Article 317, Article 2218, Article 25(1) and (2)19 as well as Article 2820 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.21
15.  John Mueller & Karl Mueller, Sanctions of Mass Destruction, foReiGn affaiRS, May-
June 1999, at 43, 51.
16.  Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Fur-
thermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether 
it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sov-
ereignty.
17. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
18.  Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled 
to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in ac-
cordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.
19.  Article 25 (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack 
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood 
are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of 
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
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Targeted Sanctions were developed as a new generation of sanctions 
that were heralded as a welcome change as they would limit the burdens 
imposed on innocent populations by general economic sanctions.22 
Instead of targeting an entire population that, in most cases, is not at all 
or only in part responsible for the acts of their leaders, these Targeted/
Smart sanctions of the UNSC aim to target only responsible politicians 
or military chiefs through imposing restrictions on their opportunities 
to leave their country, freezing their assets abroad, etc.
In the war against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, this 
strategy was expanded to non-State actors. When the fight against 
international terrorism heightened, individuals like Osama Bin Laden 
and others suspected of supporting Al-Qaida were also taken under 
this instrument’s fold.23
IV. THE KADI JUDGEMENT AND TARGETED SANCTIONS
In the Kadi Judgement24, there emerged a glitch in the well-intentioned 
introduction of Targeted Economic Sanctions. In this case, Mr. Kadi, 
residing in Saudi Arabia, was identified and listed by the Security 
Council’s Sanction Committee in 2001 as an individual (among others) 
associated with Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organization.25 
This resulted in the Security Council passing the relevant Resolution, 
which held that his funds and other financial assets would be frozen 
and will not be made available to him as well as to the other listed 
individuals.26 
According to European Union Law, the European Community is 
authorised to enforce binding Security Council resolutions on behalf 
of European member States. The European Community in the present 
case did so by enacting a regulation which, according to the European 
20.  Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.
21.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
22.  klein, supra note 13.
23.  Id.
24.  Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l 
Found. v. Council of Eur. Union & Comm’n of Eur. Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. II-3533, as 
cited in klein, supra note 13.
25. Id. at 31.
26.  Giacinto Della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law between 
the United Nations and the European Union: Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council, 15 colum. J. euR. l. 511 (2009).
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Community’s law, is directly applicable in member States.27 This 
regulation propagated the UN Security Council’s wishes of freezing of 
funds and assets, as well as prohibition on making economic resources 
available to individuals who had been recognised on their list. Since 
Mr. Kadi figured on the list, such action was directed against him as 
well. Though his proceedings against the Council and Commission of 
the European Union before the Court of First Instance in Luxembourg 
were dismissed; on appeal, he succeeded before the European Court of 
Justice which annulled the contested regulation.28
This path-breaking judgement by the European Court of Justice is 
characterized by the fact that the Court assumed jurisdiction over the 
case by evading the tricky question of whether it could review binding 
UNSC Regulations. The court held that the EC regulation in question 
would not be considered an act attributable to the United Nations as the 
regulation is in essence a legal act issued by an organ of the European 
Community. Since the Court has jurisdiction over acts of the European 
Community, the court was entitled to assume jurisdiction.29
From its findings, the Court inferred that it would have to complete 
a full review of the lawfulness of the regulation taking account of the 
fundamental rights that form an integral part of the general principles 
of the European Community’s law. The Court proceeded to do this 
disregarding the fact that the controversial regulation was simply 
enacted to effectuate a UN Security Council resolution adopted as a 
Chapter VII measure.30
After establishing its jurisdiction over the case at hand, the Court 
went on to find that fundamental rights claimed by Mr. Kadi had 
“patently” not been respected by the Community’s organs.31 Although 
the Court conceded that Mr. Kadi’s right to be heard before the UN 
Security Council entered his name in the list for the first time had not 
been violated, there was still an infringement of his right because there 
was no disclosure of information as to why he had been included on 
the list. The appellant’s right to defend himself was also curbed as 
evidence against him was withheld before the European Community 
judicature. The Court also held that his right to an effective remedy 
27.  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3, 4 Eur. Y.B. 412, arts. 60, 301 and 308 taken together constitute the legal 
basis for the Court’s action
28. klein, supra note 13.
29. Id.
30.  malcolm n. Shaw, inteRnational law 1124-1133 (5th ed. 2007).
31 cananea, supra note 28.
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had been therefore deemed infringed. Finally, the Court held there 
had been a violation of the appellant’s right to respect for property. 
This violation did not accrue from freezing of assets per se. Instead, the 
Court reasoned that procedural requirement of presenting a reasonable 
opportunity for Mr. Kadi to put his case for review to the competent 
authorities was not granted, thereby vitiating this right.32
Critics of this judgement have accused it as bordering on the 
line of activism. It has also been contended by some critics that the 
judgement moves to ‘undermine the legal and political relevance of 
Security Council resolutions, particularly in combating international 
terrorism.’33 
However, on carefully analysing the judgement, it is observed that 
the European Court of Justice has categorically stated that it is not 
competent to review the Security Council resolutions as such. Further, 
critics’ claims that the judgement is a major blow to the implementation 
of Security Council resolutions are unfounded. While critics are quick 
to claim that ‘this could upset the whole U.N. mechanism for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security’34, the 
researcher believes that, if anything, the judgement has served to point 
out a few glaring holes in the procedural functioning of various UN 
organs. The fact that the UN Security Council authorises itself to freeze 
individuals’ accounts and assets without providing an opportunity to 
defend their stand, along with the fact that there appears to be no right 
to a fair hearing or even information as to the evidence relied on before 
handing out targeted Economic Sanctions to the affected party/ parties 
is clearly in contravention to the founding principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and all the specific Human Rights treaties 
that base themselves on these principles.35
 
V. IMPACT ASSESSMENT
It is submitted that the much heralded Economic Sanctions need 
to be reviewed for procedural flaws that leave them so inherently 
exposed. While the deficiencies of General Economic Sanctions are well 
documented and it is internationally recognised that the rights of the 
32. Id.
33. Contended by klein, supra note 13.
34 Id.
35  Mainly the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) and the International Con-
vention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
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most vulnerable groups are trampled upon by them, the alternative 
method of Targeted Economic Sanctions has also met with some 
conspicuous hurdles.
While the conclusion that the Court of First Instance reached in the 
Kadi Judgement toes the line that presently established international 
law sets, the decision of the European Court of Justice shows great 
maturity and clear reasoning in pointing out the evident deficiencies 
in the Security Council’s procedure imposing sanctions on individuals. 
Instead of merely looking at the Kadi Judgement as a case regarding 
an individual’s right to enjoyment of his own property and construing 
this as a proper defence against Sanctioning authorities, this judgement 
should be raised to the pedestal of one that raises pertinent questions 
regarding the procedure used to enforce international law while driving 
home its call for review of this structure. The Kadi Judgement may well 
be the push the Security Council needed to review its own practice in 
enforcing the otherwise preferable ‘Targeted Sanctions’.
Therefore, the researcher concludes that positive Economic 
Instruments are better positioned to respect Human Rights while being 
implemented, and therefore need to be given adequate consideration 
before resorting to the use of Sanctions. 
However, where Sanctions are being resorted to, in the interests 
of serving the greater good, Targeted Sanctions are better positioned for 
success. This is highlighted from the fact that unchecked embargos and 
trade barriers such as the ones seen in Operation Cast Lead36 have been 
found wanting on Humanitarian Grounds time and again. Yet, there is a 
glaring need to respect procedural safeguards for Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms while imposing Targeted Sanctions. If the Kadi judgement and 
its brave yet thought-provoking stance does end up hastening a review 
of such UN procedure behind targeted sanctions, regardless of whether it 
has strayed down the road of Activism, it would have served its purpose.
36. GoldStone, supra note 3.
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murky waters: tax expenDitures in 
tHe sHipping sector
Archit Dhir*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Tax expenditures are essentially measures in a budget which 
depart from a normative structure of tax with the intention of 
providing benefits to a particular group of persons or an industry 
by using tax incentives, instead of a direct spending mechanism.1 
The concept of tax expenditure is often credited to Stanley Surrey, 
a Harvard Law School professor and the Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury for Tax Policy (1961-69) in the US government. This 
article seeks to study the concept of tax expenditure in context of 
special tonnage tax benefits given to the shipping industry under 
Chapter XII-G, Section 115 V of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
II.  HYPOTHESIS
It is argued that the tax expenditure benefits intended by the 
government are achieved by the tonnage tax regime and concerns 
propounded by Prof Surrey do not hold much ground in this 
context. 
III.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How is the tonnage tax regime a form of tax expenditure?
2. Whether the tax expenditures incurred by the government 
under the tonnage tax regime fulfill their intended 
objective?
3. Whether the concerns put forth by Prof Surrey arguing in 
favour of direct expenditure are addressed?
I will first briefly explain the concept of tax expenditure and 
outline three main arguments put forth by Prof. Surrey against 
the use of these indirect benefits as opposed to direct expenditure. 
I would then explain the concept of tonnage tax and how it is 
* 4th Year Student, B.A. LLB (H.), National Law School of India University, 
Bangalore, India. 
1. Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 
1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. 679, 683 (1975-76).
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a mode of indirect government expenditure aimed to support 
the shipping industry. I would then proceed to analyse two 
particular conditions of the tonnage regime i.e. of transfer of fund 
to a reserve account, and the officer training requirement, and 
demonstrate how these two conditions aim to fulfill the social and 
economic goals. In the last part I would address some concerns 
expressed with the tonnage tax regime. I conclude the paper by 
demonstrating how the thesis statement taken in the introduction 
is correct. 
The author is limited by non-availability of recent statistical 
data relating to the shipping sector. 
IV.  TAX EXPENDITURE
In order to understand the concept of tax expenditure, let 
us divide the process of charging into two components. The 
first component consists of defining the normative tax base, the 
identification of the taxable unit, the time period, the applicable 
tax rates and the administration of tax.2 The second component 
consists of the deviation from this normative structure for the 
purpose of non tax goals aimed to achieve desired investments, 
savings or relief to an industry.3 Thus the taxing jurisdiction 
waives off its tax claim by providing a special reduction in tax 
payment and providing government assistance which would have 
been otherwise a part of the overall government spending. 
Prof. Surrey published hundreds of articles, delivered tons 
of lectures and wrote numerous books on the concept of tax 
expenditure. In an article published in the Harvard Law Review 
in 1970, Prof. Surrey argued that “the tax incentive is generally 
inferior to the direct subsidy as a means of achieving social goals”.4 
Later that year, in another article in the same journal he argued in 
favour of “replacing tax expenditures with direct expenditure programs 
if governmental assistance is found necessary.”5 In a third article,6 
2. Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and 
Emerging Issues, 20(2) Boston College Law Review 226, 228 (1979). 
3. Id. 
4. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
comparison with Direct Government Expenditure, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
5. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace 
Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 
(1971).
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dealing with Least Developed Countries (LDC), he warned against 
the “governments committing itself to excessive control over taxing 
system” while implementing tax expenditure schemes. Let us 
study the introduction of tonnage tax by the Indian government 
in 2004 in background of these three statements, and analyse 
whether the intended benefits have been achieved or whether 
direct spending would have served as a better alternative.
V.  TONNAGE TAX
Shipping plays an important role in the transport sector of the 
Indian economy. Fiscal policy, in particular taxation, is considered 
as an important factor which has an impact on investment decisions 
and national registrations done by shipping companies.7 
A tonnage tax is a special tax regime for the shipping industry 
wherein a notional profit is computed based on the number and 
size of the ships operated. A standard income tax rate is then 
applied to this profit. For the purpose of calculating tonnage tax, 
the shipping tonnage will be converted into a notional profit on 
which the prevailing corporate tax rate is applied to arrive at the 
tonnage tax.8 The tonnage rate is so set so that the profit, and 
subsequently the tax paid, is at a minimum. 
An illustrative example of computation of tonnage tax is:
Let us assume that there is a tonnage tax company operating 
one qualifying ship9 throughout the year. The net tonnage of this 
ship is 50,000 tons, and the applicable corporate tax is 33%. 
Applying the table given under Section 115 VG (3), the daily 
profit would be calculated as:
 For the first 1000 tons: (1000/100)* Rs.46 = Rs. 460
 For the 1000- 10000 tons: (9000/100)* Rs.35 = Rs. 3,150
 For 10000-25000 tons: (15000/100)* Rs.28 = Rs. 4,200
6. Surrey & Maktouf, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Tax and Budgetary Reform in 
Less Developed Countries, 15 LAW AND POL’Y INT’L BUS, 739 (1983).
7. Discussion Document on South African Tonnage Tax Proposal, www.
treasury.gov.za/.../Tonnage%20tax%20discussion.pdf 
8. Tonnage Tax at last for a Smooth Sailing, The Hindu, http://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/2004/07/09/stories/2004070901460300.htm 
9. Income Tax Act of 1962, Section 115 VD (1962).
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 For > 25000 tons: (25000/100)* Rs.19 = Rs. 4,750
Thus the total daily notional profit would be: Rs (460+3150+4200+4750) 
i.e. Rs. 12,560
The annual notional income would be: Rs 12,560*365 = Rs 
45,84,400
(This is assuming that the ship operated throughout the year. 
Had it been, say 180 days, we would multiple the annual notional 
income by 180, instead of 365)
The tonnage tax payable would be: Rs (45,84,400*33/100) = Rs. 
15,12,852
This tax payable normally works out to be much less than 
what would have been taxable on the income of a shipping 
company. The difference in the actual tax collected by the 
government under the tonnage regime and what would have 
been collected on the actual income is the tax expenditure or the 
indirect spending by the government. The tonnage tax regime 
is not mandatory because certain shipping companies may find 
that they would pay more tax under a tonnage tax regime. For 
example, a shipping company may have continuous losses, and 
since under a tonnage tax regime there are no shipping losses, the 
company would have to pay taxes. However, once elected, this 
regime comes in with a lock in period of 10 years.
After continous demands from the sector,  the Indian 
government was forced to introduce a tonnage tax regime in 
April 2004.10 Prior to 2004, initially shipping companies were 
subjected to a corporate tax of around 35%, with effective rate of 
taxation working out to around 22%, and from 2002-03 onwards, 
10. PLANNING COMM., The Working Group Report on Shipping and Inland 
Water Transport for the 11th Five Year Plan, www.planningcommission. 
gov.in/aboutus/committee/.../wg11_ship.pdf 
11. Income Tax Act 1962, Section 33AC (relating to reserves for shipping 
business which provides for hundred per cent deduction of the profits 
derived from the business of operation of ships has also been amended to 
provide that no deduction shall be allowed under the said section from 
assessment year 2005-06 onwards).
12. Amit Mitra, Tonnage Tax Regime: A shot in the Arm for Shipping 
S e c t o r ,  h t t p : / / w w w .  t h e h i n d u b u s i n e s s l i n e . c o m / 2 0 0 4 / 0 2 / 0 4 /
stories/2004020402320600.htm 
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with the benefits under Section 33 AC of the ITA,11 the effective 
rate of taxation had been about 7.5 per cent, which was still 
considered amongst the highest in the world.12 The main aim 
behind introduction of tonnage tax was to increase the tonnage 
capacity of Indian ships and avail the ancillary benefits.
The choice of benefits under the tonnage tax has certain 
conditions attached to it. It is through these conditions that the 
government seeks to fulfill its economic and social goals aimed at 
the shipping sector. Let us analyse two of such conditions.
VI.  TONNAGE TAX RESERVE ACCOUNT
Section 115VT deals with the transfer of profits to a “tonnage 
tax reserve” account. Sub-section (1) of the said section provides 
that “a tonnage tax company shall be required to credit to a reserve 
account an amount not less than twenty per cent of the book profits 
derived from the activities” referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of 
sub-section (1) of section 115V-I in each previous year. Sub 
section 3 of the Section 115VT conditions that the amount in 
this reserve account would be used for “acquiring a new ship for 
the purpose of the business of the company.” Thus the government 
ensures continuous expansion of fleet of the country by giving tax 
exemptions. It helps build infrastructure, and also ensures that 
equity comes in from internal resources. With the greater number 
of ships coming under the tonnage tax regime, there would be 
increased collection of taxes, which sets off the reduced incidence 
of taxation initially. The government is thus indirectly spending 
on building infrastructure and also increasing its tax base, which 
on a long term basis would set off the losses incurred by taxing a 
shipping company on its notional income. As an alternative, the 
government could have tried to seek this objective of expansion 
of fleet through direct spending. This would have been possible 
through soft loans. However, this is not economically viable 
because of possibilities of default and increased pressure of 
liabilities on the shipowners. The government recently rejected the 
demand of local shipowners to set up a corpus of Rs10,000 crore 
in soft loans for purchasing ships amid a liquidity crunch in the 
global financial markets on these grounds.13 Thus the transfer of 
funds to a corpus, and its utilization for expanding the shipping 
13. Indian Shipowners Clamour for Protection, The Wall Street Journal, (Sep. 04, 
2009), http://www.livemint.com/2009/09/04002250/Indian-shipowners-
clamourfor.html?h=B&usg=AFQjCNGe bZkl0lflWgGv8AJSJFoR1stWfQ 
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fleet using internal resources, is an efficient way of government 
expenditure.
The success of this indirect government expenditure is not 
only theoretical. An unprecedented growth of 23.6% in combined 
shipping tonnage happened in only after 2004-05 and the country’s 
tonnage grew thereafter from 7.05 million GT on 01.07.2004 to 8.42 
million GT as on 01.01.2007.14 The freight revenue retention in 
2007 was Rs. 5962 crores, which was an increase of Rs. 1646 crore 
from 2004.15 As on 31st March 2009, Shipping Corporation of India 
(SCI) had Rs 200 crore in its reserve account.16
VII.  TRAINING REQUIREMENT 
Section 115VU relates to minimum training requirement for 
tonnage tax companies. The said section provides that “a tonnage 
tax company, after its option has been approved under sub-section 
(3) of section 115VP, shall be required to comply with the minimum 
training requirement in respect of trainee officers in accordance with 
the guidelines framed by the Director General of Shipping and notified 
in the Official Gazette by the Central Government.” The government 
thus seeks to build a pool of maritime officers without directly 
spending on their training. It instead puts the onus on the 
shipping company, and indirectly pays for this through taxing less 
under the tonnage scheme. What is the government’s intention 
behind this tax expenditure? 
Indian shipowners face a shortage of about 1,000 officers, 
according to the Baltic and International Maritime Council 
(BIMCO), world’s largest shipping body.17 Of the 26,900 Indian 
officers currently employed on board ships globally, 8,900 are 
on Indian ships, while almost double the number i.e. 18,000 are 
on foreign ships.18 Thus once a company opts for benefits under 
the tonnage regime, it has to contribute towards man power 
development of marine officers. This serves the dual purpose of 
14. Supra note 10, at p.5.
15. Supra note 10, at p.5.
16. Government plans to sell atleast 10% SCI stake, The Wall Street Journal, 
(May 13,2010) http://www.livemint.com/2010/05/13205015/Govt-plans-to-
sell-at-least-10.html 
17. Buying Ships? Great. But who will Operate Them?, The Wall Street Journal, 
(Jun. 26, 2008), http://www.livemint.com/2008/06/26231953/Buying-ships-
Great-But-who-w.html 
18. Id.
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employment opportunities for local sea farers as well as expansion 
opportunities for shipping companies with increased number 
of trained manpower. Increased number of trained personnel 
attracts new investors and greater investments. If the government 
had tried to solve this problem through direct spending, there 
would have been no guarantee of employment to these trainees, 
and furthermore, there is no mode of ensuring that the trained 
personnel would not join foreign ships. However, with the 
tonnage tax regime being applicable only to Indian companies, the 
training requirements would benefit Indian shipping companies 
only. 
The government is also supplementing its indirect spending 
with direct spending. This is where criticism put forth by 
Prof. Surrey becomes relevant. The objective behind training 
requirement would be rendered otiose if there are no good 
institutes. Realising this, the government has opened the Indian 
Maritime University in Chennai with an outlay plan of Rs. 300 
crores for the same.19 This demonstrates the need for a fine balance 
between direct and indirect expenditure, which is essential for the 
successful implementation of any beneficial scheme. 
VIII.  SOME CONCERNS
The social and economic goals aimed by the benefits given 
under the tonnage tax regime are being offset by certain factors. 
Some of these factors are the lower visibility of tax expenditures 
(which results in lesser tax scrutiny), ancillary tax burdens, lack 
of expertise in sector specific areas etc. These factors defeat the 
purpose of the social and indirect expenditure by the government.. 
Furthermore, Surrey argued that “many tax incentives would be seen 
as inequitable, unfair or ineffective.”20 Let us analyse these concerns 
with a few illustrative examples and case laws. 
First and foremost, it is argued that Prof. Surrey permits a 
very narrow purview on tax policy. All through his arguments, 
he failed to recognise the fact that not all social or economic 
goals can be achieved through direct expenditure. He further 
failed to recognise that inequity can only be argued if the 
19. Supra note 10 at p.15.
20. Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, 
Deconstruction, and Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 3 University of Pittsburg 
School of Law Working Papers (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=567422 
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players are on an equal playing field in the first place. Let us 
return to tonnage tax to illustrate this. The shipping industry 
is a very cyclic industry involving huge initial investment costs 
and differences in operating costs for local and foreign players. 
In order to incentivize investments, some sort of government 
assistance is required. The desired goals of increase in tonnage, 
fleet capacity, training to officers etc can be achieved much more 
effectively through indirect expenditure by providing tax benefits. 
Furthermore, many of the new ships are getting registered outside 
India where the taxation system is both favourable and less 
burdensome.21 The tax system for seamen on foreign voyages 
in foreign vessels and for those aboard Indian ships is also 
different.22 In order to balance out these inequalities, indirect 
government expenditure and tax benefits for Indian companies 
are needed. 
It is true that the benefits of the tonnage tax regime are 
being offset by introduction of certain taxes like service tax and 
dividend distribution tax. For example, the profits from sale 
of ships subjected to the minimum alternate tax (MAT) levied 
at 15%.23 These concerns have been addressed by many other 
jurisdictions like South Africa.24
Since the government provides tax expenditure to support 
specific industries and companies, it is important to make sure 
that the intended benefits accrue only to the intended beneficiaries. 
The Courts have ruled that “the question of applicability of tonnage 
tax regime, has necessarily to be decided by taking into consideration 
various aspects, including the ground realities as to the nature of 
activities and different other aspects.”25 
21. Shipping Industry Demands Tonnage Tax System, Project Manager, (Mar. 
25,2011), http://www.projectsmonitor.com/detailnews.asp?newsid=6935 
22. Id.
23 Praveen Kumar Singh, More Income in Tonnage Tax net to help Shipping 
Companies sail through, (Mar. 25,2011), http://www.financialexpress.
com/news/more-incomes-in-tonnage-tax-net-to-help-shipping-cos-sail-
through/578229/0 
24 Discussion Document on South African Tonnage Tax Proposal, www.
treasury.gov.za/.../Tonnage%20tax%20discussion.pdf 
25 South India Corp. ltd. v. Addl CIT [2009]180TAXMAN319(Ker)(Ind.).; Also on 
similar lines is the reasoning in Addl. CIT v. EPSOM Shipping (I) (P.) Ltd. 
(2009) 121 TTJ (Mum) 186(Ind.)
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IX.  CONCLUSION
It is argued in this paper that the tonnage tax regime fulfills 
the intended objective of providing impetus to the shipping 
industry. The indirect government tax expenditure seeks to build 
an internal mechanism, which would support the industry, rather 
than a one off direct expenditure which would not be sustainable. 
Over a long term period, the loss/expenditure incurred by the 
government by charging a lesser tax would be compensated by 
the increase in tax base, and also be justified by the social and 
economic development of this particular sector.
It is true that there are certain concerns regarding ancillary 
taxes and the increased burden upon the ship owners. However, 
these concerns can be addressed by a systematic review of 
the tax liability of the shipping sector, and bring in necessary 
amendments. The same has been done before, and there is no 
reason why this issue cannot be sorted out and the concerns 
addressed satisfactorily. 
The concerns addressed by Prof. Surrey, with regards the 
viability of tax expenditures, atleast in regards with tonnage tax 
in India, can rest in peace.
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tHe assisteD reproDuctive tecHnologies 
(regulation) bill, 2010 – a barrier to 
Homosexual parentHooD
Arunima and Karishma Muravne* 
I.  INTRODUCTION
The r ight  of  an individual  to  conduct  int imate 
relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home 
seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution’s 
protection of privacy... Disapproval of homosexuality 
cannot justify invading the houses, hearts and minds of 
citizens who choose to live their lives differently.1
-Justice Blackmun
Decriminalisation of consensual sexual acts between adults in 
India was a significant and progressive leap taken by the High 
Court of Delhi in the Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of 
Delhi2(hereinafter Naz Foundation case).  The court also established 
the right of homosexuals to full personhood.3 “Personhood” 
is the sense of being an individual.  It  encompasses self-
development, dignity, and humanity. Personhood is developed 
through introspection, relationships with others, and through 
one’s interactions with the State.4  Thus, for complete attainment 
of homosexual personhood, it is imperative that the focus now 
be shifted to rights that need to be afforded to homosexuals 
in order to enable them to lead a normal life. One of such 
rights is the right to reproduce. Since same-sex couples cannot 
reproduce by heterosexual means, they are left with no options 
but to employ assisted reproductive technologies to have children 
genetically related to them. However, the Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 20105 imposes legal hurdles 
disabling homosexual couples in India from resorting to assisted 
reproductive technologies. 
* 3rd year, B.Sc. LLB. (Hons.), Gujrat National Law University, Gandhinagar.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2853 (1986).
2. 94 CriLJ (2010) (Ind.).
3. Id. at para 48.
4. Maya Grosz , To Have and to Hold: Property and State Regulation of Sexuality 
and Marriage, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 263 (1998).
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Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) are non-coital 
methods of having children including in-vitro fertilisation, 
artificial insemination and surrogacy. In-vitro fertilisation of 
embryos refers to embryos whose fertilisation, or any other 
process by which the embryo was created, began outside 
the human body. Artificial insemination is the process by 
which sperm is placed into the reproductive tract of a female for 
the purpose of impregnating the female by using means other 
than sexual intercourse. The most common instance of non-coital 
procreation among female same-sex couples involves lesbian 
women who request artificial insemination with sperm obtained 
from donor friends or purchased from sperm banks. Surrogacy 
is an arrangement by which the child is borne by a woman 
outside the couple. A commercial surrogate mother is one who is 
commissioned and paid to undertake the labour of pregnancy in 
order to produce a child that will be delivered to the commission 
parties who will raise the child as their own and will hold all 
the parental rights. A partial surrogate contributes the egg that 
becomes the child and so is genetically as well as gestationally 
the parent of the child. A full surrogate is not the genetic mother 
of the child she bears.  For male same-sex couples, surrogacy is 
the only means of assisted reproduction to have a child. In some 
cases, the surrogate mother provides the egg which is fertilised 
with sperm obtained from either of the males. In other cases, egg 
is obtained from a donor and fertilised with sperm obtained from 
either of the partners and the zygote is implanted in the surrogate 
mother who will gestate the child. 
This article analyzes the procreative liberty of gays and 
lesbians and their right to use assisted reproductive technologies 
to form families. It argues that all persons, regardless of sexual 
orientation or marital status, have the right to procreate and 
to use ARTs when necessary to achieve that goal. The article 
explains as to why and how barriers preventing access to assisted 
reproductive technologies by homosexuals should be removed 
and concludes by making suggestions regarding the same. 
Part II elucidates how Indian same-sex couples have not been 
given any rights to access ART as a “couple” under the Bill. 
Part III establishes the existence of a right to reproduce which 
5. M I N .  O F  H E A L T H  &  F A M I L Y  W E L F A R E ,  T H E  A S S O C I A T E D 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (REGULATION) BILL OF 2010.
6. Id. clause 32(1).
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encompasses reproduction by means of assisted reproductive 
technologies thereby bringing assisted reproductive technologies 
within the scope of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Part 
IV explains the discriminatory consequence of the Bill and 
argues that all persons, irrespective of their sexual orientation, 
should be permitted the use of ART. Lastly, Part V examines 
the constitutional validity of such provisions through the “strict 
scrutiny” analysis. It proves that concerns such as absence of legal 
recognition of same-sex couples in India or the quality of gay 
parenting are irrational and do not form a “compelling interest” 
on the part of the state to prevent same-sex couples from accessing 
assisted reproductive technology. PART VI examines laws of other 
countries which have given recognition to procreative liberty of 
homosexual couples through ARTs.
II. THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
(REGULATION) 
BILL, 2010 AND SAME-SEX COUPLES
The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill 2010 
allows married couples, individuals as well as unmarried couples 
to have access to various methods of assisted reproductive 
technologies in India6. However, despite its liberal approach, 
homosexual couples in India have been barred from using ARTs. 
 “Unmarried Couple”, according to the Bill, means two 
persons of marriageable age, living together with mutual consent 
but without getting married, in a relationship that is legal in the 
country or countries of which they are citizens.7 By ruling that 
section 377 of the Indian Penal Code was violative of Articles 
14, 15 and 21 of the Indian Constitution, the High Court of Delhi 
in Naz Foundation case, decriminalised consensual sexual acts in 
India8. The decision relied on foreign references, not only from 
the United States of America and the United Kingdom, but also 
from Hong Kong, Fiji and Nepal destroying the notion that “gay 
rights” are a Western concept. However, homosexual relationships 
are yet to be legalised in India and thus, Indian same-sex couples 
are excluded from the ambit of an “unmarried couple” as defined 
7. Id. clause 2(v).
8. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 94 CriLJ (2010) (Ind.), para 
132.
9. The Associated Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill, clause 34(2) 
(2010).
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by the ART Bill. 
The Bill  also allows an individual to opt for assisted 
reproductive technology methods giving him or her complete 
parentage rights over the commissioned child. It might be 
contended that by permitting individuals to have access to ART, 
the bill gives same-sex couples in India an opportunity to be 
parents. If a same-sex couple in India- X and Y- decides to have 
a child by means of ART and X, as an “individual” under the 
ART Bill, commissions a child, only X shall be recognised as 
the legal parent9 and Y would have no legal rights over the 
child. Y may be unable to consent to medical care, meet with 
school officials, or represent the child’s interests to various 
government agencies.  Most importantly, Y’s position is most 
perilous if the relationship between them ends. Y is legally 
unrelated to the child and has no right to any continuing contact 
with the child. The relationship between the two may end because 
they decide to separate. If they do so, they may be unable to 
agree on dividing childcare responsibilities. When they litigate for 
custody, X begins with an overwhelming advantage over Y10.  This 
is because of the general rule that a court prefers a parent or a 
natural guardian11 to a non-parent in a custody matter.  
In certain States of America12, “second parent adoption” is 
enabled whereby a legally recognized parent’s committed partner 
may adopt and become a co-parent of the child.13 It is the legal 
recognition of the parental relationship between a homosexual 
and her partner’s biological or adopted child, without termination 
of the partner’s already legally recognized parental rights. Second 
parent adoption does not require the legal parent to be married 
to the party seeking to adopt the child14. Thus, by second-parent 
adoption, both partners of a same sex couple, who cannot marry 
in most jurisdictions, can be legal parents of the child.
10. Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique Of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J 17, 23 (1999).
11. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, § 6 (1956).
12. California, Connecticut, D.C., Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Vermont.
13. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children From The Marriage Movement: The Case 
Against Marital Status Discrimination In Adoption And Assisted Reproduction, 39 
U C DAVIS L REV 305, 339 (2006).
14. Id. at 340.
15. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,  § 12 (1956).
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However, for Indian same-sex couples, adoption by the other 
partner is not a plausible option.  For example, if both the partners 
are Hindus, according to the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance 
Act, 1956 the child severs all his ties in the family of his birth 
which are replaced by those created in the adoptive family.15 
Since, same sex couples in India are not married or otherwise 
in any form of legal relationship, the effect of adoption by one 
partner would not create ties between the child and the other 
partner. There are no statutory provisions for a second parent 
adoption in India.
Thus the Bill does not allow same-sex couples in India to have 
a child of whom both partners are legal parents. It has been said 
that the Bill is liberal in the sense that it allows homosexuals to 
have children by means of ART as individuals and leaves further 
scope for same-sex couples to have children by ART once their 
relationship is legalised in India16.  Yet, at issue is a denial of a 
right rather than a mere delay in when the right can be exercised, 
and thus “critical examination” is required. 17
III.  IS THERE A RIGHT TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
 TECHNOLOGIES?
To establish a right to assisted reproductive technologies, it 
needs to be determined if there exists a “right to reproduce”- at 
all-and whether such a right encompasses the assistance of new 
technologies.  
The right to reproduce can be regarded as a moral right as 
well as a legal right. 18 John Robertson, deriving the moral right 
from dignity, states that the decision about reproduction best 
captures “the importance of procreative liberty” since “control 
over whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, 
to dignity, and to the meaning of one’s life”.  One’s self-definition, 
he explains, can be affected in the most basic sense when deprived 
of the ability to avoid reproduction, impacting upon one’s 
16. Satya Prakash, Surrogacy not for married couples only: Draft law, (Last 
visited Dec.25, 2010) http://www.hindustantimes.com/Surrogacy-not-for-
married-couples-only-Draft-law/Article1-560762.aspx 
17. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
18. Marleen Eijkholt, The Right To Found A Family As A Stillborn Right To 
Procreate?,18 MED L. REV. 127, 129 (2010).
19. Nicolette Priaulx, Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive Autonomy 
Matters, 16 MED L. REV 169, 174  (2008).
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“psychological and social identity and one’s social and moral 
responsibilities”. Further, a disability to reproduce, Robertson 
remarks, “prevents one from an experience that is central to 
individual identity and meaning in life”, and its denial, whether 
through infertility or external restriction, “is experienced as a 
great loss”19. As, Roger Chin puts it, it seems extreme to question 
the choice of any two people to have a child.20
Legally, on the other hand, the right to reproduce traditionally 
finds its origin in the right to found a family. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1976 by Article 16 
and Article 23(2) respectively, gives “men and women of full age” 
the right to found a family. 
Scholars may contend that the draftsmen of the UDHR or 
ICCPR never intended to include families of same-sex couples 
within the meaning of “family” as provided under these articles. 
However, such an argument is refutable and non conclusive since 
the scope of various provisions have been enlarged according to 
changing times and development of new technologies. Further, 
political,  social and economic changes might bring about 
recognition of new rights and the law to meet social demands.21  
The House of Lords, in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association 
Ltd.22, stating that the concept of family had undergone a change, 
both in the United Kingdom and overseas, held as follows: 
Social groupings have come to take a number of different 
forms. The form of the single parent family has been long 
recognised. A more open acceptance of differences in 
sexuality allows a greater recognition of the possibility 
of domestic groupings of partners of the same sex. The 
formal bond of marriage is now far from being a significant 
criterion for the existence of a family unit. While it 
remains as a particular formalisation of the relationship 
between heterosexual couples, family units may now be 
20. Roger J. Chin, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Legal Issues In Procreation, 8 
LOY CONSUMER L. REP 190, 229 (1996).
21. Unni Krishnan & Ors. v State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2178 
(Ind.), para 21.
22. 1 A.C. 27 (2001).
23. Id. at 52.
24. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 94 CriLJ  (2010) (Ind.)  para 
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recognised to exist both where the principal members are 
in a heterosexual relationship and where they are in a 
homosexual or lesbian relationship.23
The right to found a family has also been laid down by the 
Yogyakarta Principles24 on the Application of Human Rights Law 
in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Principle 
24 clearly states that every person has a right to found a family 
irrespective of his or her sexual orientation or gender identity and 
that no family should be subjected to discrimination based on the 
sexual orientation of its members.25
Thus, keeping in view the changes in societal patterns, 
families of same-sex couples should be read within the scope of 
“family” as provided in the UDHR and ICCPR. Impliedly, same-
sex couples, as per the two conventions, have a right to found a 
family which includes the right to procreate.   
In the contemporary scenario, however, right to reproduce 
is encompassed within the right of privacy-a facet of Article 21 
of the Indian Constitution.26 Privacy recognises that we all have 
a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy which 
allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without 
interference from the outside community.27 In R. Rajagopal v State 
of T.N.28, the Supreme Court held the right to privacy is “the right 
to be left alone”. The two-judge bench stated that a citizen has a 
right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, 
procreation, motherhood, child bearing and education among 
many other matters.29 Construing this right to be left alone in 
matters of procreation, state’s interference or restrictions on 
procreation would be a direct encroachment on one’s privacy. 
Further establishing this principle, the High Court of Andhra 
Pradesh in B.K. Parthasarthi v State of AP30 held that there is a right 
43 (discussed Yogyakarta Principles).
25. THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ 
(Dec. 22, 2010).
26. Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295(Ind.).
27. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 CriLJ 94 (Ind.) para. 
40 (Referred Article 12 of UDHR; Article 17of ICCPR).
28. AIR 1995 SC 264 (Ind.).
29. Id. at para. 28.
30. AIR 2000 AP 156 (Ind.).
31. Id. at para. 15.
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to make a decision about reproduction and such a right is very 
personal on the part of every man or woman. The court further 
proceeded to state that such a right “includes the right not to 
produce”31. The use of “includes” by the court brings forth an 
obvious implication that the decision as to reproduction could 
be negative as well as an affirmative. Thus the High Court of 
Andhra Pradesh expressly established the right of “reproductive 
autonomy” and held that it was a part of right to privacy.32
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in the judgement, 
concurred with the right to reproductive autonomy as established 
in America through a line of cases, though mainly in dicta.  In T. 
Skinner v State of Oklahoma33, the US Supreme Court characterised 
the right to reproduce as “one of the basic civil rights of man”34. 
Further, by striking down a law that regulated the distribution 
of contraceptives because it discriminated between married and 
single persons, the Supreme Court of United States in Eisenstadt 
v Baird35 established a fundamental right to “bear or beget a 
child”36.
The next question that follows is whether this right to 
reproductive autonomy implies a right to reproduce with the help 
of various reproductive technologies or does the use of a doctor, 
Petri dish or other technologies in the process of reproduction 
render it any less of a right? An act of procreation refers to a 
voluntary act taken by an individual, that is either one of the 
two most proximate causes of the conception of a future person 
or persons, with such person or persons eventually being born. 
A couple that enters into a surrogacy contract and bears no 
biological relationship to the resulting child, but whose acts might 
be considered the proximate cause of its conception and birth, has 
arguably procreated. The relevant consideration is whether a person 
or persons have voluntarily acted to cause the creation of another 
32. Id. at para 14.
33. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
34. Id. at 541.
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
36. Id. at 453.
37. Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking The Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM RTS & DEV 
L. J. 1, 9 (2001).
38. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection Of Offspring characteristics, 76 B U L REV 
421, 426 (1996).
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
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being, and those actions have resulted in the birth of a child.37
Thus, if the Constitution protects coital reproduction from 
state interference, there are strong grounds for concluding that it 
would protect non-coital techniques involving the couple’s own 
gametes to the same extent as their efforts to reproduce coitally.38
Moreover,  the courts have protected the right to use 
contraceptives39 and the right to abortion40 as a part of the right to 
reproductive autonomy. If the courts have sheltered the right not to 
produce a child by employment of technologies that are not natural, 
it would be irrational to state that the right to bear a child extends 
to only fertile couples and by employment of coital means and 
does not include the right to assisted reproductive technologies. 
Applying a similar logic, the district court of Illinois, in Lifchez 
v. Hartigan41, held that “it takes no great leap of logic to see that 
within the cluster of constitutionally protected choices that includes 
the right to have access to contraceptives, there must be included 
within that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that 
may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.”42
Thus, it would not be unwarranted to construe that the right to 
reproduce includes the right to assisted reproductive technology. 
Since the right to reproductive autonomy is a part of the right to 
privacy- an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution- it can 
be inferred, by the doctrine of implied Fundamental Rights43, that 
this right to assisted reproductive technologies is a fundamental 
right in itself. 
IV.  NON-DISCRIMINATORY ANALYSIS
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees to Indian 
citizens “equal protection of laws” and Article 15 prohibits the 
41. 735 F Supp 1361 (N.D. Illinois 1990).
42. Id. at 1377.
43. PROF. M P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  833 (LexisNexis 
Butterworths Wadhwa 2008).
44. The Equal Rights Trust,  Declaration on Principles of Equity, 2008 
(Jan.31,2011), http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Pages%20
from%20Declaration%20perfect% 20croped%2016%20Oct%20dimitrina%20
comment.pdf 
45. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010  CriLJ 94 (Ind.).
46. Id. at para 104.
83
State from discriminating between individuals “on grounds of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.” 
Indirect discrimination occurs when a provision puts persons 
having a status or a characteristic associated with one or more 
prohibited grounds at a particular disadvantage compared 
with other persons.44 The path breaking Naz Foundation 45 
judgement established that discrimination against individuals 
on the ground of their sexual behaviour is analogous to “sex” 
under Article 15 and was thus prohibited.46 Thus, when the Bill 
disadvantages same-sex couples as compared to heterosexual 
couples by allowing married heterosexuals to access ART and 
not granting access to the same to unmarried same-sex couples, it 
indirectly discriminates against homosexuals. The consequences of 
discrimination have been stated by John Gardener as followed: 
Discrimination on the basis of our immutable status tends 
to deny us life. Its result is that our further choices are 
constrained not mainly by our own choices, but by the 
choices of others. Because these choices of others are based 
on our immutable status, our own choices can make no 
difference to them. …. And discrimination on the ground 
of fundamental choices can be wrongful by the same token. 
To lead an autonomous life we need an adequate range 
of valuable options throughout that life…. there are some 
particular valuable options that each of us should have 
irrespective of our other choices. Where a particular choice 
is a choice between valuable options which ought to be 
available to people whatever else they may choose, it is a 
fundamental choice. Where there is discrimination against 
people based on their fundamental choices it tends to 
skew those choices by making one or more of the valuable 
options from which they must choose more painful or 
burdensome than others.47
As explained above, since there exists a right to ARTs 
47. J. Gardner, On the Ground of Her Sex(Uality), 18 OXFOR JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 167, 170-171 (1998).
48. Robertson, Gay And Lesbian Access To Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 
CASE W. RES. L REV. 323, 329 (2004).
49. Id. at 330.
50. Sara Cotton, et al, Model Assisted Reproductive Technology Act,9 J GENDER 
RACE & JUST 55 (2005).
51. Id .at § 202.
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when infertile, it is unlikely to limit such a right to persons 
who are married since a person’s interest in reproduction exists 
independently of marriage48 It cannot be denied that  homosexuals 
too may have strong desires to have or care for offspring.  They 
too have been brought up in families and in a society that 
identifies having and rearing children as an important source 
of meaning and fulfilment.49 The Model Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act50 prohibits restrictions on grounds of sexual 
orientation as well.51
The State might argue that such discrimination is permitted 
since the possibility of same-sex couples having children is 
impossible and unnatural. If that might be the case, then the State 
cannot, in the case of married infertile heterosexuals, aid them 
in having children by ART. Since nature has not equipped such 
heterosexuals to reproduce, then the state should not interfere 
with nature by assisting them to do so.52 However, if it does, there 
seems to be no comprehendible reason as to why it should not aid 
same-sex couples as well.  
Moreover,  certain countries  l ike Belgium 53,  Canada 54, 
Netherlands55, Iceland56, South Africa57, Spain58, Sweden59 and 
certain states of America like Iowa, Columbia recognise same-
sex marriages. Thus, same-sex couples who are citizens of such 
countries can legally opt for assisted reproductive technologies 
52. Robertson, Supra note 48 at 331.
53. Law of 30 January 2003 (Jan.7, 2011).
 http://www.senaat.be/www/?MIval=dossier&LEG=2&NR=1173&LANG=nl
54. HOUSE OF COMMON, CIVIL MARRIGE AACT, C-38, 2005.
55. Act on the Opening Up of Marriage, 2001 available at: 
 http://athena.leidenuniv.nl/rechten/meijers/index.php3?m=10&c=86 (last 
accessed on February 1, 2011)
56. Registered Partnership Law, 1996.
57. Civil Unions Bill, B 26B-2006.
58. Boletin Oficial del Estado, July 3, 2005.
59. Civilutskottets betänkande 2008/09:CU19.
60. The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill, Clause 2 (v) 
(2010).
61. Id. Clause 2 (dd).
62. Id. Clause 32 (1).
63. Danish Registered Partnership Act No. 372 of 7 June 1989, substituted by Act 
No. 360 of 2 June 1999.
64. GOVT. OF U.K.., CIVIL PARTNERSHIP ACT OF 2004.
65. Karner v. Austria, App No. 40016/98, Eur. Ct. H. R., July 24, 2003.
66. Life Partnerships Act, 2000.
67. Loi no. 99-944 du 15 Novembre 1999, Relative au Pacte Civil de Solidarité.
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in India since the Bill allows a married couple60 whose marriage 
is legal in the country or countries of which they are citizens to 
opt for ARTs. Another conspicuous feature of the Bill is that it 
allows “unmarried couples” constituting two persons, both of 
marriageable age, living together with mutual consent but without 
getting married, in a relationship that is legal in the country or 
countries of which they are citizens61 to have children by means 
of assisted reproductive technologies62. Such legal relationships 
include “civil union”, registered partnership” and their likes 
in countries such as Denmark63,United Kingdom64, Austria65, 
Germany66, France67, Iceland68 and the states of California, 
New Jersey in the United States. The consequence is clearly 
discriminatory and unwarranted against same-sex couples in 
India. 
Consequently, the Bill  not only discriminates between 
marr ied  heterosexuals  and same-sex  couples ,  but  a l so 
discriminates between Indian same-sex couples and their 
counterparts in countries that have granted legal recognition to 
homosexual relationships.  The reason for the same, however, is 
unconvincing. 
V.  STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
As concluded above, the right to assisted reproductive 
technologies is a fundamental right within the meaning of Article 
21 of the Indian Constitution. Also, the Constitution of India, by 
virtue of Article 14, guarantees to its citizens the fundamental 
right of “equality before the law” and “equal protection of the 
laws”. However, the Bill discriminates between Indian same-sex 
couples and married heterosexuals thereby classifying couples on 
the basis of their sexual orientation. 
Where a classification burdens a fundamental interest, to 
determine its constitutional validity, it should be subject to 
strict scrutiny on equal protection grounds. 69 A measure that 
68. Registered Partnership Law, 1996.
69. Brooke Dianah Rodgers-Miller, Adam And Steve And Eve: Why Sexuality 
Segregation In Assisted Reproduction In Virginia Is No Longer Acceptable, 11 WM 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 293, 302 (2005).
70. Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 663 
(Ind.) para. 45.
71. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
72. Id. At page 541.
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disadvantages a vulnerable group, defined on the basis of a 
characteristic that relates to personal autonomy must not be only 
tested on grounds of “reasonableness” but must be subject to 
strict scrutiny.70 
The Strict Scrutiny Analysis was established in T. Skinner v. 
State of Oklahoma71 which involved the validity of statute providing 
for the mandatory sterilization of some, but not other, three-time 
felons. Justice Douglas stated that the statute could survive the 
highly deferential rational basis review normally applied under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the American Constitution. Thus, 
the court held that rational basis review was inappropriate, 
because the challenged statute infringed upon the right 
to procreate—”one of the basic civil rights of man” that was 
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” In 
place of rational basis review, “strict scrutiny of the classification 
which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential,” the Court 
said, “lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are 
made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the 
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.”72
The Strict Scrutiny Analysis entails a two-pronged scrutiny:
(a) The legislative interference should be justified in principle,
(b) The same should be proportionate in measure.73
The scrutiny implies that “any classification which serves 
to penalize the exercise of [a fundamental constitutional] 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”74
In the given case, the ART Bill 2010 must be subject to strict 
scrutiny analysis since it “disadvantages” same-sex couples by 
disallowing them to exercise their right to reproduce on grounds 
of their sexual orientation. Consequently there should be a 
“compelling interest”, justified in principle for same-couples in 
73. Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 663 
(Ind.) para 48.
74. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
75. Surrogacy Still Not An Option For Indian Gay, Lesbian Couples, THE 
TIMES OF INDIA, (May.27, 2010), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/Surrogacy-still-not-an-option-for-Indian-gay-lesbian-couples/
articleshow/5978164.cms#ixzz0w2LTb9VL (last accessed on January 5, 
2011).
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India to be disallowed access to ART.
A. Absence of a Legal Relationship 
Dr. Sharma, member secretary of  the twelve member 
committee that drafted the ART Bill stated that though consensual 
sexual acts have been decriminalised in India, homosexual 
relationships has not been made legal. Thus, till gay and lesbian 
couples get legal status in India, they cannot avail surrogacy. 75
According to the drafters, the fact that same-sex couples have 
not been given any legal recognition in India is the reason as 
to why they have not been given the right to ARTs. However, 
the statement is contradicting. There does not seem to be much 
litigation in India regarding same-sex marriage. In America, 
however, courts have often held that the reason why same-sex 
couples have been denied the right to marry is their disability to 
have children. The Court, in Singer v Hara76, rejected homosexual 
marriage on the ground that the state’s recognition of marriage 
was based on its interest in procreation and it was apparent that 
no same-sex couples offered the possibility of the birth of children 
by their union.77  One of the important features of marriage, courts 
have held, is that it provides a setting in which child-rearing can 
take place.78
Assisted Reproductive technologies allow same-sex couples 
to have children, furthering state’s interest in marriage. ARTs, 
thus, bridges the gap between same-sex couples and homosexual 
couples partly. Hence, it seems ironical that legislators would 
deny same-sex couples the right to reproduce on grounds of 
absence of legal recognition of their relationship in the form of 
marriage or otherwise. Thus, a law limiting ARTs to married 
persons or to heterosexual persons should fail because it would 
treat the very same act-the use of a particular technology-
differently based upon the marital status or sexual preference of 
the persons involved, with no real basis for the distinction other 
than societal disapproval or prejudice.79
76. 11 Wash App 247 (1974).
77. Id. at 260.
78. Mark Strasser, Loving Revisionism: On Restricting Marriage And Subverting The 
Constitution, 51 HOW L. J. 75, 109 (2007).
79. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology And Reproductive 
Equality,76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1476 (2008).
80. 821 N.E.2d 15 (2005).
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The court, in Morrison v Sadler80, offered a better and more 
convincing answer to the requirement of legal recognition of 
same-sex couples. The court noted that:
There is a key difference between how most opposite-sex 
couples become parents, through sexual intercourse, and 
how all same-sex couples must become parents, through 
[adoption] or assisted reproduction. Becoming a parent 
by using ‘artificial’ reproduction methods is frequently 
costly and time-consuming..... Those persons wanting to 
have children by assisted reproduction or adoption are, by 
necessity, heavily invested, financially and emotionally, 
in those processes. Those processes also require a great 
deal of foresight and planning. ‘Natural’ procreation, on 
the other hand, may occur only between opposite-sex 
couples and with no foresight or planning. All that is 
required is one instance of sexual intercourse with a man 
for a woman to become pregnant.81
 The court noted the state’s “clear interest in seeing that 
children are raised in stable environments” and then suggested 
that individuals opting for assisted reproduction or adoption may 
be seen as very likely to be able to provide such an environment, 
with or without the ‘protections’ of marriage, because of the 
high level of financial and emotional commitment exerted in 
conceiving or adopting a child or children in the first place.82 
Thus, it seems unnecessary that there should be a requirement of 
legal recognition of same-sex couples for them to have an access 
to Assisted Reproductive Technologies and it is difficult to see 
any “compelling” interest of the State in this regard. 
B. The Interests Of The Child
The other possible State interest could be with regard to 
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id. At 24.
83. John A. Roberston, Gay And Lesbian Access To Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 331 (2004).
84. David Orentlicher, Beyond Cloning: Expanding Reproductive Options For Same-
Sex Couples,66 BROOK. L REV 651, 666 (2001).
85. Lesbian & Gay Parenting, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 
(Jan.15, 2011), http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/parenting.aspx 
86. Flaks, Fischer, Masterpasqua, and Joseph (1995) reported that lesbian 
couples’ parenting awareness skills were stronger than those of heterosexual 
couples. Brewaeys and her colleagues (1997) likewise reported more 
89
the quality of gay parenting as well as the sexual orientation of 
children of homosexuals. Usually opponents rest their opposition 
to gay and lesbian reproduction on concerns about the welfare 
of offsprings raised by gay or lesbian parents. In taking that 
position they assume, without actual evidence, that a gay or 
lesbian sexual orientation in parents is not good for children.83 
However, statistics regarding the same do not give rise to any 
concern.84 The American Psychological Association has concluded 
that children raised by gay parents are not “disadvantaged in any 
significant respect relative to children of heterosexual parents.”85 
On the contrary, the results of some studies suggest that lesbian 
mothers’ and gay fathers’ parenting skills may be superior to 
those of matched heterosexual couples.86 Also, a number of studies 
report that the great majority of offspring of both lesbian mothers 
and gay fathers described themselves as heterosexual.87 Further, 
“the non-identity problem” characterised by Derek Parfit states 
that even if we allow for the sake of argument, that it would 
be preferable for all children to be reared in a heterosexual 
married setting; children born with the high likelihood of being 
raised outside that setting are not harmed by that fact alone 
because the children in question would not exist unless they 
were brought into the world by the gay or lesbian individuals 
or couples who rear them, they are not harmed simply because 
they have been born into what some have claimed to be less than 
optimal circumstances.88 If a State seeks to restrict ARTs solely 
to those who prove themselves to be suitable parents and satisfy 
additional requirements, as in the adoption context, then these 
requirements must apply equally to all.89 
Whi le  cons ider ing  ex tending  ass i s ted  reproduct ive 
technologies to a lesbian couple, former Prime Minister of 
Australia, John Howard, explained that “this issue primarily 
involves the fundamental right of a child within our society to 
favourable patterns of parent–child interaction among lesbian as compared 
to heterosexual parents. 
87. Bailey, Bobrow,Wolfe, & Mickach, 1995; Bozett, 1980, 1987, 1989; Gottman, 
1990; Golombok & Tasker, 1996; Green, 1978; Huggins, 1989; Miller, 1979; 
Paul, 1986; Rees, 1979; Tasker & Golombok, 1997.
88. Robertson, supra note 83 at  341.
89. Radhika Rao, supra note 79 at 177.
90. Ruth McNair, Does the Convention on the Rights of the Child impose an obligation 
on states to allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt?, 23(10) INT. J.L.P.F. 110,113 
(2009).
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have a reasonable expectation, other things being equal of the care 
and affection of both a mother and a father.” Such a notion seeks 
support from international conventions governing rights of child. 
However, as explained by Ruth McNair, this position is untenable 
under international law90. Article 18(1) of the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of Child, 1989 provides that parents 
have primary responsibility for the upbringing and development 
of a child while article 27(2) states that parent(s) have the primary 
responsibility to secure the conditions of living necessary for a 
child’s development. However, there is nothing in the drafting 
history of the Convention to suggest that the term ‘parents’ 
was ever to be defined or confined to a man and woman. The 
Committee on Rights of Child has stated that it would seem hard 
to argue for a single notion of a family.91  
 As observed by Nevins J in the Canadian case of Re K 92 , it is 
the capacity of its members to ensure the “healthy development 
of a child through the provision of a stable, consistent, warm and 
responsive relationship between a child and his or her care giver” 
that is of central concern. Thus, extending the right of assisted 
reproductive technologies to same-sex couples would not, prima 
facie, be against the best interests of the child.
C. Societal Norms
Social restrictions attached to same-sex parenting could also 
be seen as a potential reason. However, popular morality or 
public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid justification for 
restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution.93 
Therefore, it seems difficult to establish a “compelling state 
interest” in light of which same-sex couples could be regarded 
less deserving to have parental rights. The only limitation 
on homosexuals’ “ability to perform or contribute to the 
society” comes from the society itself: laws, moral traditions and 
general ignorance which prevent homosexuals from living openly, 
91. Committee on Rights of Child, Role of the Family in the Promotion of the 
Rights of the Child, (Jan.5, 2011).  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CRC/Documents/Recommandationsfamily.pdf 
92. 15 RFL (4th) 129  para 143 (1995) (Canada).
93. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 CRiLJ 94 (Ind.) para 75.
94. Brooke Dianah Rodgers-Miller, supra note 56 at 301.
95. 117 P.3d 660. 
96. Id. at p. 666.
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raising families, and otherwise contributing to society.94
Hence, the ART Bill fails the strict scrutiny analysis so far as 
it denies same-sex couples in India the right to reproduce under 
Article 21 by means of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and is 
thus, unconstitutional.
VI.  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Several countries have extended parental rights to same- sex 
couples. The Supreme Court of California in Elisa B. v Superior 
Court95, acknowledged parental rights and obligations of both 
mothers in a same sex- relationship who had commissioned the 
child. The court could not perceive any reason as to why both 
parents of a child cannot be women.96
The United Kingdom specifically lays down provisions 
granting lesbian couples the right to assisted reproductive 
technologies.  Section 42 of  the Human Ferti l isation and 
Embryology Act,  2008 gives a woman, who is in a “civil 
partnership” with another woman at the time the woman is being 
artificially inseminated, rights of a parent unless she did not 
consent to the artificial insemination. Further, under section 43, 
provision is made for lesbians who are not civil partners in United 
Kingdom to be legal parents of a child, if no man is treated as 
the father of the child and no woman is treated by virtue of the 
section 42 as a parent of the child.
Similar provisions have been codified under the Assisted 
Reproductive Treatment Act, 2008 of Victoria, Australia. The 
Act under section 3 of Part I defines partner to include a person 
who lives with another “as a couple on a genuine domestic 
basis, irrespective of gender”. Under section 13 of Part III, the 
woman’s female partner is presumed, for all purposes, to be a 
legal parent of any child born as a result of the pregnancy if she 
was the woman’s female partner when the woman underwent 
the procedure as a result of which she became pregnant and 
consented to the procedure as a result of which the woman 
became pregnant. Thus the Victorian Assisted Reproductive 
Treatment Act also extends benefits of ARTs to female same-sex 
couples living together. 
Further, the Parliament of Canada, through the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, 2004, declared that persons who 
seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not be 
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discriminated against, including discrimination on the basis of 
their sexual orientation or marital status.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The cause of homosexual behaviour is unknown and the 
question whether it is a choice is yet unanswered. It has been 
said to be a result of various factors including biological and 
psychological causes.  Given to the fact that homosexuality is not 
a question of choice, it is difficult to comprehend any reasonable 
basis for the denial of assisted reproductive technologies to 
homosexual couples. Assuming that homosexuality was a question 
of choice, there still will be a lack of justification as to why 
homosexuals must be so discriminated, since human dignity 
recognises a person’s autonomy of the private will and freedom of 
choice and action. Limits upon individual liberty and autonomy 
should be meted out with a measure of equality.
Consequently, same-sex couples should not be deprived of 
the human need of bonding that the Constitution has afforded to 
their heterosexual counterparts. Thus, the Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 2010, because it classifies couples 
on the basis of sexual orientation, violates the constitutional 
guarantee of equality provided under Article 14 of the Indian 
Constitution. The Article has elucidated on the absence of a 
compelling state interest on part of the State to draw lines 
between homosexual and heterosexual couples in India with 
regard to assisted reproductive technology. 
It is recommended that section 2(v) of the Bill be altered so as 
to include explicitly same-sex couples in India thereby permitting 
them to employ assisted reproductive technologies. Alternatively 
the Bill could provide for recognition of court decrees that allow 
a committed homosexual partner of the individual employing 
ARTs to be recognised as the legal parent of the child as well. 
Provisions enabling second parent adoption, as explained 
above, would also remove the barriers of homosexual couples to 
procreate. Such provisions will enable children to have, in the case 
of same-sex couples, two legal parents, thus furthering the interest 
of the State in child welfare. However, this should not be the be 
all and end all of it- consequent legislations should be passed 
recognising the relationship between same-sex couples, identifying 
family units where principal members are homosexuals and 
giving them rights similar to heterosexual couples.
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tHe future of Human rigHts: rigHt to 
internet
Varun Chablani* and Alok Nayak**
I.  INTRODUCTION
That the concept of human rights is an ever evolving subject 
has nowadays become a cliché. Every book ever published in the 
field of Human Rights has been emphasizing on the evolution 
and the floating nature of human rights. It is on this basis that the 
author has made certain predictions on what would amount to the 
human rights in the future. More important than predicting what 
would amount to human rights in the future, the need of the hour 
is to understand what has been the failure in implementation of 
the current human rights, even though there has been no lack in 
capital, manpower or knowhow. What would have probably failed 
in the implementation of the current human rights would be the 
lack of interest in receiving the rights, the difference in priorities 
in providing those rights or the lack of effective implementation. 
Throughout history, human rights have evolved in two 
manners - using the nomenclature of Karl Marx, the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat. In the opinion of the author, the rights 
received in violent forms have come through the proletariat. On 
the other hand, the rights received in more of a phased manner 
have come through the bourgeoisie. The predicted human right 
in this paper, ie. Right to Internet, would probably be arrived at 
from the latter. 
II.  SARVA SHIKSHA ABHIYAN - FROM CONFIDENCE 
TO CONSTERNATION
On 28th November, 2001, the Indian Parliament passed the 
ninety third constitutional amendments; where the ministry of 
Human Resource Development had sanctioned a Rs. 10,000 crore 
project to provide free education for all children from ages six to 
fourteen.
When it had started off, there was unprecedented hope for 
* 4th year, Gujarat National Law University, B.Com LLB. (Hons.).
** 4th year, Gujarat National Law University, B.A. LLB. (Hons.).
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change in the education of the country. Long before this move, 
the Supreme Court had declared that right to education was a 
fundamental right.1 International declarations and covenants had 
seconded this claim.2 
Somehow, the scheme has not reached its mark. This has 
been because of either lack of will, or administrative problems, 
gap between inputs and outputs and accountability to a 
higher authority. On the other hand, probably one of the most 
overlooked reasons for the failure of the right is that there is a 
lack of incentive at the ground level. The central government 
acts as the principal and the agent is the ground level teacher. 
The remuneration/incentive is low and it does not have a 
correlation on the performance of the teacher or the student which 
is quintessential to a principal agent relationship. The concept 
of piece based or time based performance appraisal system is 
absent. 
At the end of this paper, the author will propose a modus operandi 
to prevent these problems when right to internet becomes a human 
right.
III.  RIGHT TO INTERNET: A FUNDAMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHT
The concept of internet has increased manifold in the last ten 
years. The cyber world has grown from what is jargon-like known 
as Web1.0 to Web 2.0; the former being where the internet user 
is a passive user and the latter being that the internet user is as 
active as the website host. Not only have the users of internet 
increased exponentially, but also the uses of internet have grown 
beyond imagination. So much so that there is a section of society 
that cannot live without the internet. Having considered this, 
some governments have already taken initiative in enforcing 
mandatory internet. France and Finland are examples of the same. 
Costa Rica is the latest member of this club.3 The debate has also 
been considered in the US Senate and the European Parliament. 
1. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666.
2. A Fundamental Right, THE HINDU, Apr. 1, 2010, www.thehindu.com/
education/article347392.ece.
3. Fundamental Right to Internet Access Declared, CENTRAL AMERICAN DATA, 
Sep. 8, 2010, http://en.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Funda-
mental_Right_to_Internet_Access_Declared.
95
Current Position of Right to Internet as A Fundamental Human 
Right
The  f i r s t  country  to  enforce  r ight  to  in ternet  as  a 
fundamental human right was Finland. From July 2009, the 
Telecommunication companies of Finland have been directed 
by the Central Government to provide internet access at least 1 
MBPS to all the citizens, especially the rural citizens. If that is not 
progressive enough, the country has setup a time table wherein 
the country seeks to increase the speed to at least 100 MBPS by 
2015.4 France, on the other hand, had legalised right to internet 
through a judicial decision in its constitutional court, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel. The decision came through challenging the 
validity of a controversial law called Loi Hadopi. Under the rule, 
pirates would be given three emailed warnings before having 
their access to the net cancelled.5 Although the Constitutional 
Council agreed that theft of copyright material was a crime, it 
rendered the law unenforceable by saying that only a court had 
the authority to switch off a person’s web connection.6
Both these countries, though very creative, have received a 
lot of criticisms. The obvious criticism is that with the exorbitant 
number of illegal downloads, whether the courts can afford to bar 
the internet connection of each illegal downloader? Further, in the 
words of Matt Asay, “if the government assumes Internet access as a 
fundamental right, it ultimately is granting itself the fundamental right 
to tax its citizens to pay for it.”7
Another major criticism of this law is the unclear status of 
right to internet vis-a-vis online privacy, suspicious malware, 
data collection and third party information sharing. On similar 
lines, comes the concept of whether right to internet itself is 
a fundamental human right or just a means to achieve other 
fundamental human rights like right to speech, expression etc. 
4. Ahmed Saeed, Digital Biz Fast Internet access becomes a legal right in Finland, 
CNN INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 15, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/
TECH/10/15/finland.internet.rights/index.html.
5. Sparks Ian, Internet access is a fundamental human right, rules French 
Court, DAILY MAIL, June 12, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
worldnews/article-1192359/Internet-access-fundamental-human-right-rules-
French-court.html?ITO=1490#ixzz0h31hKJBm 
6. Id.
7. Matt Asay, Is Internet access a ‘fundamental right’?, THE OPEN ROAD, http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10234555-16.html?tag=col1;post-4748
96
Probably the most relevant criticism of this law is the need 
and the priority of right to internet as a fundamental human right 
with respect to other human right violations, even in civilised 
countries like Finland and France. 
The debate had reached the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, it had 
struck down right to internet as a fundamental human right. On 
the other hand, Vivane Reding of the Barosso Commission of the 
European Parliament believes that Right to Internet Access is a 
Fundamental Right. She quotes, “The fourth element I would like to 
underline is the recognition of the right to Internet access. The new rules 
recognise explicitly that Internet access is a fundamental right such as the 
freedom of expression and the freedom to access information. The rules 
therefore provide that any measures taken regarding access to, or use of, 
services and applications must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons, including the right to privacy, freedom of expression 
and access to information and education as well as due process.”8
On the other hand, international conventions, by and large, 
upon their strict interpretation, accept right to internet as a 
fundamental human right. For example,
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media, and 
regardless of frontiers.” 9
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”10
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
8. Reding, Vivane, Vice President, Barosso Commission, European Commission, 
Justice, Fundamental Right and Citizenship, (Mar. 4, 2010), http://ec.europa.
eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/index_en.htm 
9. Art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN 
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71.
10. Art. 19, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
11. Article 10, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.
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borders.”11
IV.  RIGHT TO INTERNET AS A FUTURE 
HUMAN RIGHT IN INDIA
As discussed earlier, right to internet as a human right has 
basically two dimensions. The first one being that the government 
should stay away from a human right for it to be truly enjoyed. 
On the other hand, the second dimension propounds that the 
government should take keen steps in providing the human right 
to its citizens even if it is at the cost of taxes and regulations. The 
author believes that, while France, Finland etc. are exponents of 
the former, India is set in course to be the exponent of the latter. 
It is considerably easier for the government to provide the former, 
negative right as against providing the latter, positive right. 
Further, the regulations of the negative right can be globally 
envisaged through a international network for internet regulation. 
As far as India is concerned, it need not bother about internet 
based regulations with relation to international law and the 
negative right to access internet. This is because, by the time India 
would have enough internet penetration comparable to Finland or 
France today, there would be an existing international mechanism 
with respect to the limits of freedom of speech on the internet vis-
a-vis online piracy and other hazards. If not, India would have 
the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the more developed 
countries in legitimising right to internet. On the other hand, 
India needs to concentrate on how to provide the right in the first 
place, even though there are more apparent and grave human 
right violations in the country. 
To start with, we will have to clarify one major assumption. It 
is a common misconception that technology will enlarge the gap 
between the rich and the poor, the root cause of most human right 
violations. This is quite wrong. Technology can in fact give power 
to the people in helping themselves solve their own problems.12 As 
quoted by Iqbal Qadir13, “if citizens can learn to network, their voices 
will be heard and will be productive.”14 Through the micro-lending 
system pioneered by Mohammad Younus, he had increased 
mobile phone penetration in Bangladesh manifold, thus reducing 
poverty. The best way that communication has helped increase 
12. Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Digireads.com. 2009.
13. Founder of GrameenPhone, Bangladesh.
14. TED Video, Oxford England, September, 2007.
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the standard of living in Bangladesh is to empower people to 
foresee and avoid natural disasters like floods. This has also been 
supported by some economists.15 Even if internet accessibility 
is not a fundamental right in India, the government should still 
pursue increasing internet penetration. Internet will also empower 
people in making their decisions. 
The second misconception is that the government are the 
donors in addressing the second generation of human rights 
and the citizens are just passive recipients.16 This is also wrong. 
The new methodology which the author proposes in achieving 
the human rights is to empower and incentivise the people to 
incorporate the human right. As compared to the Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan, usually the agencies/instrumentalities of the government 
do not have enough of an incentive to provide the human right to 
the people. For example, if a national legislation exists has a law 
where a prostitute is to be arrested, the policeman on ground 
level has more of an incentive to have sexual relations with the 
prostitute as against arresting her. On the other hand, if the 
policeman would have more incentives in arresting the prostitute, 
he would even probably go out of his way in order to arrest the 
prostitute.17 
Lets Compare this example to online social networking. If 
a person is on a particular online social networking portal like 
Orkut or Facebook, there is no incentive for him if he is the only 
one in it. hence, he would invite others to join. Every additional 
member of the social networking portal would not only himself 
get benefited but would also be beneficial for the existing member 
who sends the invite. This concept is called, in the words of Adam 
L. Penenberg, a Viral Loop.18 This concept does not need to apply 
15. The Economist, The Real Digital Divide, February 2006.
16. V. K. Parigi, CGG Collected Working Papers: 2003 – Volume 1, Citizen 
Governance: Concept and Practice, http://www.cgg.gov.in/pdfs/WP-72-84.
pdf 
17. Dubner, Stephen J., and Steven D. Levitt, Super Freakonomics: Tales of 
Altruism, Terrorism, and Poorly Paid Prostitutes, William Morrow 2009 at 
chapter 3.
18. Inspired from Penenberg, Adam L. The Viral Loop, The Power of Pass-it-on, 
First South Asian Edition, 2009, Sceptre. 
19. Vincent, Susan, Preserving Domesticity: Reading Tupperware in Women’s 
Social, Domestic, and Economic Roles, Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology, 40(2) (2003): 180-184, Available at 10.1111/j.1755-618X.2003.
tb00242.x visited on 4th March, 2010.
20. Sangheet Verghese, Reliance Infocomm’s Marketing Strategy and its Impact in 
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only for online products. As history has shown, the viral loop 
may apply for Tupperware Products19, Reliance Mobiles20, and, in 
this proposal, internet service provision. 
Some city municipalities, especially in the United States, are 
proposing very expensive methods to create a Hot Cities wherein 
the whole city would be connected by wi-fi or a similar mode of 
internet service.21 This is not only expensive, there would also be 
major administrative problems. A better alternative would be to 
let the people pass the ball in incentivising their fellow citizen to 
avail internet services. This does not undermine the role of the 
government. While it is acknowledged by the author that human 
rights can be claimed only from the State, it does not mean that 
the State would be the only provider of the rights. The State may 
just play the role of the initiator of the viral loop. To compare this 
with the growth of Facebook, the State may just play the role of 
the pioneer Harvard students who sent invites to everyone after 
Facebook became an open network.22 This does not mean that 
the State would get into a loss. Quite the contrary, they may just 
sneak a profit through this venture in the following ways, even 
though that would probably not be their intention.
• The State can achieve the right for a fraction of the cost of 
the traditional right implementation mechanisms. 
• The cost of installing, usage, upload-download, and 
bandwidth would substantially reduce over time. 
• The State would also benefit from economy of scale.
• A Public–Private Partnership may be implemented for 
distribution of internet service.
the Indian Mobile Phone Telecommunication Scenario, Media@LSE, http://www.
lse. ac.uk/collections/media@lse/pdf/Varghese%20paper%2031.01.06.PDF 
21. First Wi-Fi City In America:Grand Haven goes Wireless, PHYSORG.COM, Aug. 
1, 2004, http://www.physorg.com/news605.html 
22. FACEBOOK COMPANY TIMELINE, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.
php?timeline (last visited march 4, 2010).
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V.  CONCLUSION
After a thorough research on this new topic, the hypothesis 
put forth by the author partly falls. The author had predicted that 
it would be easier to enforce the right to internet as a human right 
as a negative right. The law has not matured enough to know 
what is the optimal amount of intervention that the state needs to 
follow for this right to prosper. This is because only two countries 
have acknowledges this right, and that too, only recently. The 
countries of France and Finland face a very interesting challenge 
wherein they will have to set the precedent to exercise optimal 
amount of State intervention with respect to right to internet. 
India here is at an advantage because by the time right to internet 
is recognized as a fundamental human right, either there would 
be an international framework for the countries to follow, or 
they would learn from the mistakes of countries like Finland and 
France. Hence, this hypothesis falls. On the other hand, it would 
probably be easier for a country like India to enforce the right as 
a positive, second generation right, even if it appears to fulfill 
the objective of first generation rights. Success stories of mobile 
penetration in India and Bangladesh and its positive effects 
thereof should prompt internet penetration also, whether it is 
sooner or later. Further, even if the State is only concentrating on 
fulfilling existing human right problems, it should still invest in 
internet penetration. This is because, as seen with mobile phone 
penetration, it would result in unintended consequences which 
would eventually help in implementing and upholding the current 
human right problems in the country. The author would like to 
sum up reiterating the point that traditional right implementation 
mechanisms do not work as well in a vast and developing country 
where there are a lot of administrative problems and red-tapism. 
Hence, providing the people themselves incentives in spreading 
a concept would not only become more economical, but also cost 
effective. The State would only need to play the role of a regulator 
of the citizens who would pass the ball and thus help right to 
internet access be achieves as a positive right.
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tHe national iDentification autHority of 
inDia bill, 2010 – wHats your number?
Harikrishna Pramod*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The wheels of the future started turning on September 30, 2010 
when Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh distributed the first 
Adhaar numbers to ten villagers in Tembhli in Maharashtra. This 
“unique identification number” (Unique-ID) endeavour was first 
initiated during the NDA Government in 2003. However, due to 
privacy concerns among the residents, there was no progress. The 
UPA Government initiated the UID project after the events of 26th 
November, 2008 which expedited the setting up the Authority in 
2009. Subsequently, in 2010, the National Identification Authority 
of India Bill was drafted to establish the National Identification 
Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as the “Authority”) 
and to regulate matters with regard to the functioning of the 
Authority. The primary purposes of the identity number include 
the obviation of requirement of multiple documentary proof, 
easy verification, facilitation of e-governance and helping welfare 
programmes reach intended beneficiaries.1
Chapter I of the Bill talks about the definitions and other 
preliminaries. Chapter II defines an Adhaar number, who can 
avail of it and the Authority’s role in issuing the number. Chapter 
III talks about the constitution of the Authority. Chapter IV talks 
about Grants, Funds, Accounts and Audit and Annual reports of 
the Authority. An Identity Review Committee is established under 
Chapter V of the Bill to review the identity information provided. 
Chapter VI prescribes the steps to be taken by the Authority for 
the protection of the Information. The penalties and offences are 
prescribed under Chapter VII. The various other miscellaneous 
provisions are provided for under Chapter VIII.
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERN – PRIVACY V. BENEFITS
“The said right [to privacy] is an essential ingredient of personal 
liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected 
* 3rd year, B Sc. LLB., Gandhinagar National Law University.
1. Government approves issue of unique identity (UID) number to all residents, PReSS 
infoRmation buReau, GoveRnment of india (Nov. 10, 2008, 04:56 P.M.) http://
pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=44711. 
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to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security.”2 
And thus, the Supreme Court of India upheld the “Right to 
Privacy”. The Right to Privacy; it is an essential part of a free 
life of an individual. It entitles him the right to keep his personal 
information from being publicised and known to the general 
public without his consent. An Adhaar number holder is faced 
with the same circumstance. The information he provides for 
availing of the number needs to be suitably and sufficiently 
protected from all illegal and mala fide entities so as to protect 
the information that is stored in the Data Repositories. The 
Government, if it may be said, has a fiduciary relationship with 
the Adhaar number holder to keep the information provided 
and to not disclose such information without the permission of 
the holder of such number.3 The Bill mentions that “the Authority 
shall take measures (including security safeguards) to ensure that the 
information in the possession or control of the Authority (including 
information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository) is 
secured and protected against any loss or unauthorised access or use or 
unauthorised disclosure thereof.”4 
The Bill specifies that the Adhaar number will be, subject to 
authentication, used as a proof of identity of the individual. This 
will involve many and almost all Government and State bodies 
using the Adhaar number as a parameter for proof of identity. 
The Legislature seemed to have deliberated and given adequate 
thought about including the consent for disclosure of information 
but giving due consideration that India has an illiteracy rate 
of 23.1%among men and 45.5%among women above the age 
of 15 years5, it is unreasonable to expect a written consent for 
disseminating the information from them and quite far-fetched to 
expect them to understand the reasons of sharing their personal 
information with any agency, Governmental or commercial.6 
Clause 23(2)(k) of the Bill states “...sharing, in such manner 
as may be specified by regulations, the information of aadhaar 
2. Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
3. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 (2006).
4. National Identification Authority of India Bill, § 30(2) (2010).
5. Monitoring ICPD Goals: Selected Indicators: State of the World Population 
Report 2009: Facing a Changing World: Women, Population and Climate 
(Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2009/en/pdf/EN_SOWP09_ 
ICPD.pdf.
6. The Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) (1974).
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number holders, with their written consent, with such agencies 
engaged in delivery of public benefits and public services as the 
Authority may by order direct;” The whole purpose of this Bill 
being delivery of ‘public benefits’ and ‘public services’, these two 
terms are not defined or specified comprehensively anywhere 
in the Bill. This gives the Authority complete discretion as to 
what can be taken as benefits and services under the Act. Such 
collection of personal information without specifying purpose has 
been held unconstitutional in a few countries.7 
The United States of America also faced a similar situation 
in which benefits were to be distributed to the citizens by means 
of a Social Security Number (hereinafter referred to as “SSN”) 
which was given to all citizens. This number over the years was 
a subject to thousands of identity thefts and billions of dollars of 
money spent in rectifying the mistakes and damage caused by 
such thefts. The Congress then came up with The Federal Privacy 
Act of 1974 (hereinafter called the “Privacy Act”). This Act gave 
specific directions as to the usage and practices involved in 
collecting of information and furnishing of the SSN for various 
purposes. Exemption 6 of the Privacy Act “allows agencies to 
exempt from disclosure of information contained in ‘personal 
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”’ 
Many courts in the US, on the basis of this exemption have 
interpreted it to include information involving the SSN as well 
as the number itself.8 The Privacy Act, 1974 requires that if an 
entity is a local, state, or federal government agency, it cannot 
require an individual to submit his SSN unless it has received 
specific permission from Congress for the same.9 The Bill does 
not mention any limitations or regulations for the exchange of 
information between the Authority and any public agency which 
might want access to such information. 
The US courts, for the purpose of deciding whether a 
particular case involves invasion of privacy by disclosing 
private information such as SSN has formulated two tests, one 
7. Legfelsõbb Bíróságának (LB) [Constitutional Court] 1991.04.13 15-AB http://
www.uoou.cz/files/judik_hungarian_constitutional_court.pdf. (Hung.).
8. Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354 (1999) quoting I.B.E.W. Local No. 5 
v. HUD, 852 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1988).
9. Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number: An Overview Of Legislation And 
Decisions To Control The Use Of Social Security Numbers As Personal Identifiers, 
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implemented by a majority of courts and the other a minority 
which is gaining popularity over the former steadily. The first test 
is called the Restatement’s publicity test. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express, Inc.10 while applying 
the publicity test stated that the test should consider not only 
the breadth of the disclosure but also the nature of the recipient 
and the nature of the information disclosed. According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, publicity means that a private 
matter is made public when it is communicated “to the public at 
large or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” 
This definition provided in the Restatement has been liberally 
and strictly interpreted by the US Courts.11 After a few judgements 
deciding that the dissemination of the information like the SSN is 
not a violation of the privacy of the individual since the number 
of people disclosed to, was not large enough12, there was a need 
for a new test which would provide more appropriate relief to the 
person affected by such violation. 
It was in Beaumont v. Brown13 that the court reasoned that 
“communication of embarrassing facts about an individual to a 
public not concerned with that individual and with whom the 
individual is not concerned” does not interfere with the plaintiff’s 
right to privacy. Thus, the court stated that an actionable situation 
arose if the private facts reached a “particular public” whose 
knowledge of the private facts would be embarrassing to the 
plaintiff. Then, in Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron14, 
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the “high potential for fraud 
and victimization caused by the unchecked release of city 
employee SSNs outweigh[ed] the minimal information about the 
government processes gained from disclosure of that information.” 
In Greidinger v. Davis,15 the plaintiff was prevented from voting 
for nondisclosure of his SSN. This move was challenged in the 
Virginia Court. The court, on hearing the matter, concluded 
16 J. maRShall J. comPuteR & info. l. 529, 549 (1998).
10. 663 N.W.2D 550 (Minn. 2003).
11. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999).
12. Id. at 960.
13. Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977).
14. 640 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio 1994).
15. 988 F.2d 1344, 1354 (1999).
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that egregious harm “can be inflicted from the disclosure of a 
SSN” and that Greidinger’s right to vote was substantially and 
unconstitutionally burdened because Virginia’s statutes permitted 
public disclosure of SSNs.16 
The information collected in the process of issuing Adhaar 
numbers is at the disposal of the Authority. Though the Bill 
specifies that the person’s consent is required for disseminating 
information collected, the consequences of such disclosure might 
not be completely comprehended by many residents, mainly the 
illiterate. In such cases, the remedy available for such residents 
needs to be clear and the courts need a principle on the basis 
of which they can rule in favour of such affected residents. The 
Restatement publicity test and the “special relationship” and 
“particular public” test are apt for such a situation, at least for the 
time being in the Indian context. 
The “particular public” or “special relationship” test is more 
applicable in the current scenario. This test provides for the 
rightful cause of action in the case of a violation of privacy of an 
individual. 
The Indian Government should make amendments to the 
Bill to incorporate the provisions of the Privacy Act in it for the 
protection of the privacy of the citizens. This is necessary since 
sensitive information being collected should be protected and 
adequate measures and remedies for the protection and violation 
of the same respectively, ought to be drafted and passed. 
III.  MISSION CREEP: A LURKING FEAR
Mission Creep refers to the expansion of a project beyond its 
original goals after initial successes. The SSN in the US is a perfect 
example of this. The number was introduced in 1936 by the Social 
Security Act whose purpose was stated as follows:
“[t]o provide for the general welfare by establishing a 
system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the 
several States to make more adequate provision for aged 
persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, 
maternal and child welfare,  public health, and the 
administration of their unemployment compensation laws; 
16. Id. at 1346.
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to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and 
for other purposes.”
The politicians at the time of the introduction of the Act 
emphasised on the point that the SSN would not be used as an 
identifier in the State or Federal structure. But this eventually 
happened in 1943 when President Roosevelt signed an Executive 
Order making the SSN a personal identifier to meet the national 
identification system.17 The major step in the “creep” was when 
the Department of Defence stopped issuing serial numbers and 
shifted to SSN.18 As the need for a national identifier for American 
citizens evolved with information and technology, the SSN was 
the logical choice because it was already in place. It is unlikely 
that such a system would have been adopted had anyone foreseen 
the creation of the Internet, the relative ease of obtaining private 
information over the Internet, and the potential damage it could 
have to an individual.19 Thus, the “mission” of the SSN has “crept” 
from its original purpose as a Social Security benefit account 
number to a public and private sector tool for identification.20 
So what if the function of one entity has crept into another 
dimension? The answer to this is the current scenario in the US 
where, with a SSN and a name, anyone can access accurate details 
about a subject profile including financial information, driving 
history, medical records, public records that identify number of 
children, marriage, birth and death certificates, political affiliation, 
business and social networks and buying behaviour.21 Such 
information will scandalize and threaten to crack the foundations 
17. History, FAQs – Frequently Asked Questions, Social SecuRity, the official 
webSite of the u.S. Social SecuRity adminiStRation, http://www.ssa.gov/
history/hfaq.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
18. Id.
19. Rick S. Lear & Jefferson D. Reynolds, Your Social Security Number Or Your 
Life: Disclosure of Personal Identification Information by Military Personnel and 
The Compromise of Privacy and National Security, B.U. int’l. l. J. 140, 144-145 
(2003).
20. Geoffrey D. Kravitz, Real Id: The Devil You Don’t Know, 3 haRv. l. & Pol’y 
Rev. 431, 443-444 (2009).
21. William H. Minor, Identity Cards and Databases in Health Care: The Need for 
Federal Privacy Protections, 28 colum. J. l. & Soc. PRobS. 254, 279-81 (1995); 
also see Susan E. Gindin, Lost And Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy 
in The Age of the Internet, 34 San dieGo l. Rev. 1153, 1173 (1997); Jeff Sovern, 
Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight For Control Of Personal 
Information, 74 waSh l. Rev. 1033, 1033-1034 & n.2 (1999).
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of trust developed between the consumers and the commercial 
agencies which bona fide collect such information. The “creep” 
in the US has been severe with identity thefts, data phishing and 
stalking, both physically and virtually being reported increasingly. 
The Federal Trade Commission in 2000 conducted a survey in 
which they reported 28,000 cases of identity theft.22 After just 
seven years, the number had increased tenfold with more than 
258,000 cases being reported.23 Since most identity theft cases are 
never reported and some not even discovered, the actual number 
might be anywhere around ten million annually.24 
The UIDAI Bill is ambiguous in relation to its purpose and 
object since it does not mention the benefits to be distributed to 
the card holders. The non-specific approach of the Bill leaves a 
lot to the discretion of the Authority to identify “benefits and 
services”25and could end up in unrestricted use of the “Adhaar 
number” leading to no check and balance with respect to the 
power and extent of power of the Authority. The Bill specifies 
that the number can be used for identification purposes subject 
to authentication.26 But such purpose for the identification is 
nowhere mentioned in the Preamble of the Bill. This creates a 
situation where the extent of the Bill is already “creeping” into 
the actual purpose of the Bill. It is a valid and dormant fear that 
the Adhaar number will follow the footsteps of the SSN. 
IV.  PENAL PROVISIONS
The Bill’s Chapter of Offences prescribes certain penalties for 
the unauthorised disclosure of information, unauthorised access 
to the Central Identities Data Repositories. The Bill however, 
specifies penalties only for gaining unauthorised access to the 
22. Identity Theft Complaint Data, fedeRal tRade commiSSion: PRotectinG ameRica’S 
conSumeRS (Jan. to Dec. 2000) http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/idtheft/
archives_ 2000.pdf
23. Consumer Fraud and Identity Theft Complaint Data ,  tRade commiSSion: 
PRotectinG ameRica’S conSumeRS (Jan. to Dec. 2007) http://www.consumer.
gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2007.pdf
24. How To Protect Your Good Name From Identity Theft, fedeRal buReau of 
i n v e S t i G a t i o n  (Oct .  20 ,  2004)  ht tp ://www.fbi .gov/page2/oct04/
preventidt102104.htm; see also Neal Walters & George Gaberlavage, 
Protecting Social Security Numbers From Identity Theft, AARP, (Sept. 2005), 
http://www.aarp.org/research/fraudsscams/fraud/fs122_id_theft.html
25. National Identification Authority of India Bill, § 23(2) (h), (2010).
26. National Identification Authority of India Bill, § 4(3), (2010).
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Repositories. Since the Bill gives the power to the Authority to 
appoint Registrars and other enrolling agencies for the purposes 
of enrolment, a question arises as to why there are no penalties 
for unauthorised access to the database of these enrolling agencies 
and Registrars. There are no guidelines as to the manner in which 
the data collected must be disposed off after entering into the 
Data Repository. So, people who gain access to the Registrars’ 
databases rather than the Central Repository go scot-free. 
The IT Act of 2000 provides for declaring of certain computer 
server systems, networks as “protected data systems”.27 The 
penalty imposed for unauthorised access to these systems is 
a prison term of up to ten years. However, the Bill provides a 
reduced term of only three years for the offence. Though the Bill 
is an independent legislation dealing with identification numbers, 
there seems to be no reason for the deviation from the existing 
law in the IT Act. 
The Bill  specifically mentions that no Court can take 
cognizance of any matter unless a complaint made by the 
Authority or any person authorised by it is presented before it. 
It bars the locus standi of individuals to approach the Court in 
case they have suffered losses. The Bill lacks a suitable redressal 
mechanism since it makes the Authority the sole judge as to 
whether a matter must be proceeded with or not, making it an 
encroachment into the powers of the Judiciary thereby violating 
basic Administrative Law principles.
The Bill provides for necessary change in the information 
provided by the Adhaar number holder. The Authority in such 
cases will look into the information and upon satisfaction of 
the accuracy of information, will make the necessary changes in 
its Repository. But the Bill nowhere presents a remedy for any 
consequential damage caused due to the Authority not accepting 
the information provided or due to delay in such acceptance. 
The Privacy Act of the USA allows individuals to file suits 
against agencies in such situations where they refuse to alter the 
information provided on request.28 The Privacy Act also imposes 
consequences on agencies if they fail to maintain records with 
27. The Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 
(India) § 70.
28. The Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1)(A) (1974).
29. The Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (1) (C) (1974).
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accuracy which leads to denial of benefits to individual.29 The Bill 
however does not cast any responsibility or accountability on the 
Authority with regard to accuracy of the information. 
V.   CONCLUSION
It is undoubted that the purpose of the Bill is bona fide, in the 
interests of national security and integration. At no cost should 
the whole project be abandoned. Realities of the situations in the 
country suffice in proving how far “social benefits” benefit the 
society.
However the Bill creates more problems than it solves. 
Population and i l l i teracy create massive barriers  in the 
implementation of the Adhaar number project. Rather than 
attempting to handle the above barriers, the Bill only creates 
further ones concerning privacy and mission creep.
Besides these apprehensions, other concerns such as the 
penal provisions provided in the Bill which make the Authority 
unaccountable for any disclosure due to technical problems, 
the remission of the imprisonment for unauthorised access to 
protected data systems from ten years as mentioned in the IT Act, 
2000 to three years without any explanation, the bar on process of 
suit without a complaint from the Authority or anyone authorised 
by it hamper effective implementation.
Therefore, it is imperative that the Bill be re-drafted adequately 
answering the above concerns for the actual distribution of 
benefits and services to the Adhaar number holders.
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you’ve got (more tHan Just) mail: gmail’s 
email-content monitoreD aDvertising – 
tecHnological aDvantages anD 
legal concerns
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I. INTODUCTION
According to Louis Gerstner, nowadays the technology issues 
are not technical- they are the compelling societal implications 
that counterbalance the undeniable advantages.1 Technological 
innovation extends to every conceivable and sometimes 
unexpected realm of our lives. On a specific note, the technological 
innovation over the internet impacts our personal and professional 
lives remarkably. The pace with which advancements are 
happening in the field of technology is one which has never 
before been confronted by the legal system. In its quest to regulate 
and protect the myriad dimensions associated with and impacted 
by the internet, an attempt has been to avoid over-specificity and 
over-regulation to allow for dynamism in the legal response to 
problems thrown up by technological innovation.
Though the debate has largely taken place in the West, it has 
real implications and lessons for the Indian society and the legal 
system in place.
II.  TARGETED ADVERTIZING BY GMAIL
Gmail’s launch in 2004 combining a mammoth 1 GB of free 
memory with Google’s stellar search capabilities to manage 
inboxes raised a furor among the media and activist groups over 
the ‘cost’ incurred by users – in terms of violation of privacy by 
its targeted advertisements.2
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Bangalore.
1. louiS GeRStneR, who SayS elePhantS can’t dance 272 (2004).
2. G. Yang, Stop the Abuse of Gmail, 14 duke l. & tech. Rev. 1, 3 (2005). 
 See also, M. A. Goldberg, The Googling of Online Privacy: Gmail, search Engine 
Histories and the New Frontier of See also, Protecting Private Information on the 
Web, 9(1) lewiS & claRk l. Rev. 249, 251 (2005). 
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Like most cloud computing services, Gmail is funded by 
revenue generated through advertizing.3 The only difference with 
Gmail is that instead of paying to reach every user or network, 
the advertisers pay to target a specific category of users based on 
their interest in a particular subject.4
Targeted advertisement involves the display of advertisements 
that are contextually relevant to the current interests of the user.5 
Using the technology that powers Google’s ‘Adsense’ program to 
scan emails received by the user, Gmail displays ads in the inbox 
that contextually correspond to certain keywords picked up from 
the scanned email in a completely automated process.6
III.  TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES
This targeted advertising technology revolutionized email 
services, facilitating unprecedented inbox sizes and unobtrusive 
yet effective advertizing in users’ inboxes. 
Apart from the value of free services, pertinent advertisements 
are a value addition to the user as well. Less obtrusive than the 
pop up and random ads found in other email services, targeted 
advertizing helps interested consumers find what they are looking 
for even when they are not actively looking for it. Gmail even 
attempts to be sensitive to the user’s feelings, desisting from 
displaying ads with emails that contain catastrophic words or 
phrases, though there have been technical glitches with this 
endeavor.7
IV.  LEGAL CONCERNS
Legal concerns about targeted advertizing are born out of the 
nebulous relationship between utility, privacy and legality in 
3. W. J. Robison, Cloud Computing: Free at what Cost? Cloud Computing Privacy 
under the Store Communications, Geo. l. J. 1195, 1205 (2010).
4. Id. at 1206.
5. M. A. Goldberg, The Googling of Online Privacy: Gmail, search Engine Histories 
and the New Frontier of See also, Protecting Private Information on the Web, 9(1) 
lewiS & claRk l. Rev. 249, 251 (2005). 
6. Ads in Gmail and your personal account, Gmail Help, Gmail: GooGle’S aPPRoach 
to e-mail, http://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer= 
6603 (last visited on July 15, 2010). 
7. N. Carlson, Google’s Worst Ads Ever buSineSS inSideR (Aug. 20, 2009, 10:11 
A.M.), http://www.businessinsider.com/googles-worst-ads-ever-2009-8.
8. More on Gmail Privacy, about Gmail, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/
112
cyberspace. 
A. Utility and Consent
1. The Hapless User Argument
The legal relationship between Google and its users is defined 
by a click-wrap contract. In this contract, users agree to Gmail’s 
Terms of use, Privacy Policy and Program Policy. Adequate notice 
regarding the advertizing system is prompted at many places.8 
Users therefore weigh the utility they get from Gmail against the 
perceived loss of privacy, if any, before they voluntarily choose to 
enter the contract.9 The contract should be considered in context 
of the fact that Gmail is not a monopoly. 
The legal position has changed from being prejudiced against 
standard form click-wrap contracts. Courts no longer treat users 
like unwilling or uninformed parties to the contract and do not 
hesitate to enforce these contracts against the users.10
B. Privacy
The relevant conceptions of privacy in this respect are control 
over personal information and freedom from surveillance.11 The 
real question is whether after deconstructing targeted advertizing 
from the surrounding discourse, does the scanning of emails 
violate privacy?  
1. Scanning is not ‘reading’
Why are we against information disclosure? Logically, because 
about_privacy.html (last visited on July 14, 2010).
 See also, supra text accompanying note 6. 
 See also, Privacy Center, Gmail: GooGle’S aPPRoach to e-mail, http://mail.
google.com/mail/help/intl/en/privacy.html (last visited on July 12, 2010).
9. RobiSon, supra note 3, at 1206.
10. ProCD v. Zeidenberg  86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir., 1996).
 See also, Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, No. 98-20064, 1998 WL 388389 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998), Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 229 (E. D. 
Pa. 2007), In re Real Networks Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. No. 00-1366, 2000 
WL 631341, I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 
328, 336 (D. Mass. 2002), Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593 
(E. D. Pa. 2007), Caspi  v.  Microsoft LLC, 323 N.J. Super. 118,  732 A.2d 528 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
11. See Whalen v. Roe 97 S. Ct. 869, 875-876 (1977).
 See also, D. J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 (4) calif. l. Rev. 1087, 1088 (2002).
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of the undesirable social, financial, legal consequences that follow. 
In case of secure and automated scanning of words, none of these 
consequences follow. Therefore, the targeted advertisement by 
Gmail does not involve the ‘reading’ of email by any third party 
to the communication. Gmail guarantees that no email content 
or personally identifiable information is ever made available to 
advertisers.12
Concerns voiced have more to do with the potential effects of 
disclosure of information than with any apparent invasion just by 
the process of scanning. Even supposing that automated scanning 
of emails amounted to an invasion, it has already a part standard 
procedure for spam and virus protection.13
2. Is the issue with the means or the ends?
The technology used by Gmail for targeted advertisements is 
the same as that used industry-wide to scan emails for spam and 
viruses.14 Therefore, there is nothing inherently wrong with the 
means. The actual issue in the middle of all the rights and privacy 
talk is in the objective - marketing, which brings in huge revenues 
for Gmail.15 Gmail has patented for this idea, blocking competitors 
from following suit.16 However, the mere reason that Gmail 
profits from the process does not make it ethically reprehensible 
and legally wrong. 
3. Privacy of Senders who are not Gmail users
Another argument raised against Gmail is that since non-
Gmail senders have not consented to their emails being scanned, 
Gmail violates their privacy.17 This is a narrow argument. Once 
12. See Gmail Terms of Use, http://gmail.google.com/gmailhelp/terms-of-use.
html, (last visited July 12, 2010).
13. yanG, supra note 2, at 5. 
14. J. I. Miller, “Don’t be Evil”: Gmail’s Relevant Text Advertisements violate 
Google’s own Motto and your E-mail Privacy Rights, 33 hofStRa l. Rev. 1607, 
1610 (2004-2005).
 See also, supra text accompanying note 6. 
 See also, Yang, supra note 2, at 14. 
15. milleR, supra note 14, at 1608.
16. US Patents Application number 20040059712.
17. yanG, supra note 2, at 4.  
 See also, K. T. Muth, Googlestroika: Privatizing Privacy, duQ. l. Rev. 337, 
353 (2009). 
 See also, milleR, supra note 14, at 1607. 
114
the email enters the inbox of the Gmail user, the communication 
belongs to them in the eyes of law. The sender has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the email message once it reaches the 
recipient’s address.18 The advertisement is a part of services that 
the receiver of the mail (the Gmail user) chooses to avail of and 
does not violate the privacy or rights of the sender in any way. 
4. Law Enforcement Arm-twisting
Considering its potential to collect individual specific 
information and build profiles of users, Google could be forced 
by law enforcement agencies to use such capability or part with 
information. However, this is an industry-wide concern.19 Every 
service provider has the capability to scan individuals’ messages 
and store them.20 Gmail possesses a monopoly only in using this 
scan technology for marketing. Any other kind of use is open to 
all its competitors as well.  
5. User Profiles
Service providers like Google have branched out successfully 
into so many manifestations of cloud computing applications that 
a single user will often have information relating to almost every 
aspect of his life – social, economic, professional – on the service 
provider’s servers.
Using cookies and IP co-relation, Gmail has the power to create 
profiles of individual users based on their search history and email 
content or subject-matter.21 While there is no evidence regarding 
this proposition, Google does not rule out the possibility of doing 
so in its Terms of Service or other policy statements. However, 
the likelihood of Google’s abusing this power is extremely low 
considering the enormous losses that would accompany any leakage 
or misuse of information – not only in the form of legislative clamp 
downs and due process of law, but in terms of loss of trust of users, 
which would be catastrophic.22  Gmail is not alone in having the 
18. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F.Supp.1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
19. yanG, supra note 2, at 3.
20. United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002).
21. Complaint: Google Inc – Gmail email service, PRivacy inteRnational (April 
19, 2004), http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/internet/gmail-
complaint.pdf.  
22. See also K. A. Oyama, E-mail Privacy after United States v. Councilman: 
Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21 beRkeley tech. l. J. 499, 510 (2006). 
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power to build user profiles. Google’s competitors like Yahoo and 
Microsoft also have terms in their privacy policy allowing them 
to collect user information and use it for marketing purposes.23 In 
fact, Gmail’s terms are much more precise. Also, after the change 
in policy to randomize and anonymize the cookie-IP information, 
Gmail now retains individually identifiable user data for shorter 
periods than its competitors.24 So this is an industry wide concern, 
not a Gmail specific concern.
V.  BUT EXISTING LAWS DO NOT DISALLOW 
TARGETED ADVERTISEMENT
While there is no specific provision under the Indian law to 
address the issue, the United States and the European Union do 
have relevant data protection and privacy laws. In the United 
States, to facilitate the scanning of emails for spam and virus 
protection, judicial interpretation of the Stored Communications 
Act and the Electronic Communications Act exempted email 
service providers from falling within the norms of privacy 
violation.25 Despite the enactment of a very specific law in 
California to regulate this technology, the benefit of anti-spam and 
anti-virus technology overrode the concerns about user-privacy 
invasion during its framing, creating enough leeway for Gmail 
to continue with targeted ads.26 The cost-benefit analysis clearly 
induced the law to allow this technology, without precluding 
the need for pre-emptive regulation for any future misuse of the 
power. Similarly, a practical and contextualized interpretation of 
EU Data Protection Laws does not implicate Gmail for privacy 
violation based on its current practices.27
23. Yahoo Privacy Centre, yahoo comPany info, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/
us/yahoo/details.html (last visited on July 13, 2010).
 See also, Microsoft Online Privacy Statement, micRoSoft coRPoRation, be 
what’S next, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/fullnotice.mspx (last 
visited on July 14, 2010).
24. Privacy FAQ, GooGle PRivacy centeR, http://www.google.com/privacy_faq.
html#toc-protect (last visited on July 15, 2010).
25. milleR, supra note 14, at 1636.
26. milleR, supra note 14, at 1610. 
27. See supra text accompanying note 21.
 See also, supra text accompanying note 6. 
 See also, supra text accompanying note 8.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over Gmail has more to do with potential problems 
of privacy and individual rights posed by technology in future 
than in present. The possibility that our lives might be ‘run’ by an 
omnipresent Google is what is really keeping privacy advocates 
up at night. Information, after all, is power. However, we ought to 
recognize that social and hence legal standards of acceptability are 
constantly evolving. Legal concerns surrounding technology are 
healthy catalysts for debate and may even pre-empt undesirable 
developments in technology, but must not attempt to crush change 
by imposing rigid notions or without situating the development 
in terms of utility and pragmatism. The prevailing combination of 
legal regulation and self-regulation seems sustainable - provided 
the gap between innovative technology and law is narrowed to 
suit the needs of ever evolving and ever widening society.

